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ABSTRACT 
It is generally assumed that by virtue of s. 5 of the 
Civil Law Act 1956 (Malaysia), which deals with the 
application of English law, the law of insurance in 
Malaysia follows strictly the law of England either as it 
stood on 7 April 1956 (for the states of Johore, Kedah, 
Kelantan, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, Perlis, 
Trengganu and Selangor) or as it stands currently (for 
the states of Penang, Malacca, Sabah and Sarawak). Whilst 
this is essentially correct, there are several factors 
which result in the development and application of some 
divergent principles. 
This thesis seeks to trace the general body of insurance 
law which has developed in Malaysia. It starts with a 
historical account of the insurance industry in the 
country. This is followed by ten chapters dealing with 
the main aspects of the substantive law. In these 
chapters, an attempt is made to highlight any noticeable 
departure from the statute law or common law of England. 
Such a departure may be due to the fact that the relevant 
law in Malaysia differs from that in England, for example 
the provisions of the Contracts Act 1950 (Malaysia) in 
relation to contractual formalities. Again, the 
provisions of the Insurance Act 1963 (Malaysia) in 
ii 
relation to insurable interest differ from the English 
common law. Moreover, Malaysian judges have interpreted 
and applied the common law in ways which do not always 
mirror English developments. Even where there are almost 
identical statutory provisions, such as those in relation 
to trusts of life policies, there may be problems which 
are unique to Malaysia because of the different 
personal laws of its peoples. 
The next chapter deals with Compulsory Third Party Motor 
Insurance which is the most important branch of general 
insurance in the country. The thesis then describes the 
introduction of a parallel system of insurance, ie. the 
Islamic system of insurance in the country, a development 
in Malaysia and a few other Muslim countries. The final 
chapter looks at how Malaysia, as a developing country, 
regulates its insurance industry. 
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1.0 Malaysia -A Historical Background 
Malaysia is a federation of thirteen states; eleven in 
Peninsula or West Malaysia, two in North Borneo or East 
Malaysia and includes the Federal Territories of Kuala 
Lumpur, the capital, and Labuan, an island off the coast 
of East Malaysia. It covers an area of 332,952 square 
kilometres and has a population of about 15 million. 
The written history of Malaysia dates from the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, during the period of the Malacca 
Sultanate. Commercial links between the Malay Peninsula, 
particularly Malacca, and the trading centres in India 
and Arabia flourished during this period, resulting in 
the advent of Islam, which is now the state religion. 
The Portuguese capture of Malacca in 1511 marked not only 
the demise of the Malacca Sultanate but also the 
beginning of European incurs ion into the country. 
Portuguese rule in Malacca was replaced by the Dutch in 
1641. This was followed in 1675 by a period of alternate 
British and Dutch rule until 18 24 when the Dutch finally 
ceded Malac ca to-the British under the terms of the 
Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824. 
1 
It was the search for a suitable shipping base along the 
Straits of Malacca for the lucrative Sino-British trade 
that brought the British officially into the country in 
the 18th century although British and other European 
individuals were already trading in Malacca since the 
15th century'. Francis Light occupied the island of 
Penang on behalf of the East India Company in 1786, 
hoping that it would serve as such a base. The 
unsuitability of Penang coupled with the problems posed 
by the Dutch in Malacca led Stamford Raffles to search 
for an alternative base. In 1819 he landed on the island 
of Singapore and promptly brought it under British rule. 
In 1826, Penang, Malacca and Singapore were brought 
together to form the colony of the Straits Settlements2. 
Administration of this colony was first carried out from 
India but in 1867 it was put directly under the Colonial 
Office in London. 3 
The other Malay states were then ruled by independent 
Malay rulers. The development of the tin mining industry 
1. Braddel, R, The Law of the Straits Settlements, A 
Commentary, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur 
1982, pp. 1-2. 
2.6 Geo. IV c. 85, s. 21. See also Turnbull, CM, The 
Straits Settlements 1826-67, University of London 
Athlone Press, London 1972. 
3. Government of Straits Settlements Act, 29 & 30 Vict. 
c. 115 and Letters Patent dated 28th December 1866. 
2 
particularly in the states of Perak and Selangor, coupled 
with the constant bitter feuding between the immigrant 
Chinese miners and the Malay rulers and their chiefs over 
the collection of revenue from tin, caused concern among 
the British as the economy of the Straits Settlements 
was threatened. This ultimately motivated them to extend 
their power and influence into the four more economically 
developed states of Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri 
Sembilan, by the introduction of a British Resident in 
each state4. In 1896 these states formed the Federated 
Malay States, a single British Protectorate headed by the 
British High Commissioners. 
The other states of Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis and 
Trengganu were subsequently brought under British 
tutelage as independent British Protectorates with a 
British Adviser in each state. Together they were loosely 
called the Unfederated Malay States. 
The Straits Settlements, the Federated and the 
Unfederated Malay States existed as three separate 
entities each with varying degrees of British control 
4. Perak was the first state to have 
after the Pangkor Engagement of 
followed in the same year by Selango 
(now part of Negri Sembilan), Pahang 
Sembilan in 1889. 
5. Treaty of the Federation of 1st July 
such a Resident 
1874. This was 
r and Sungei Ujong 
in 1888 and Negri 
1896. 
3 
and influence, until the outbreak of the Second World War 
and the subsequent Japanese occupation of the entire 
Malay Peninsula in 1941. After the surrender of the 
Japanese in 1945, the three entities were placed under 
the British Military Administration. In 1946, faced with 
new economic and political challenges, the British 
brought the Straits Setlements to an end. Penang and 
Malacca were joined to the Federated and the Unfederated 
Malay States to form the Malayan Union6 while Singapore 
was made a separate colony. 
Opposition to the Malayan Union from the Malays led to 
its abandonment in 1948 and the formation of the 
Federation of Malaya, a Federation of all the Malay 
States together with Penang and Malacca7. The Federation 
obtained its independence in 1957 while Singapore was 
granted full internal self-government in 19598. 
Sarawak, in East Malaysia, was part of the dominions of 
the Sultan of Brunei until 1841 when it was ceded to 
James Brooke who became its first white ruler. The Brooke 
6. Malayan Union Order-in-Council, [1946] 1 Stat. Rules 
and orders 543 (No. 463). 
7. Federation of Malaya Order-in-Council [1948] 1 Stat. 
Instr. 1231 (No. 108) and Federation of Malaya 
Agreement 1948. 
8. Federation of Malaya Independence Act 1957,5 &6 
Eliz. II c. 60, Federation of Malaya Order-in-Council 
[1957] 1 Stat. Instr. 832 and Singapore (Constitution) 
Order-in-Council [1958] 2 Stat. Instr. 2156. 
4 
family governed the state as independent sovereigns until 
Sarawak was occupied by the Japanese in 1941. In 1946, 
after a brief period of British Military Administration, 
the Brooke family handed the state to the British Crown. 9 
Sabah, the other East Malaysian state, was also part of 
the dominions of the Sultan of Brunei. Formerly known as 
British North Borneo, it was carved out and ceded for the 
purpose of development to the British North Borneo 
Company in 1888 and remained as such until it too was 
occupied by the Japanese in 1941. Like Sarawak, it became 
a Crown Colony in 1946. 
In 196-3, the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and 
Sarawak were joined together to form a single political 
entity - Malaysia's. In 1965 Singapore left Malaysia to 
" be an independent city state. 
Singapore was thus at times part of the Federation and at 
times out of it. It had been part of the Straits 
Settlements for ninety years. It then stood by itself 
until 1963 when it joined Malaysia and finally left in 
9. For an account of Sarawak under the Brooke family, see 
Rawlins, J, Sarawak 1839 - 1963, Macmillan, London 
1965. 
10. Malaysia Act 1963 (Laws of Malaysia, Act 26). 
11. Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Act 1965, Constitution 
(Amendment) Act 1965 (Singapore) and Singapore 
Independence Act 1965. 
5 
1965. Inspite of these political changes, Singapore 
remained throughout the commercial, financial and 
maritime capital not only of the entities of which it was 
a part, but also of the region as a whole. The history of 
the development of the insurance industry in Malaysia, 
like the history of all other commercial and financial 
sectors in the country, is inextricably linked with the 
developments in Singapore. Throughout this thesis, 
Singapore is considered to be a part of Malaysia until 
its final departure in 1965. Cases that were decided and 
other events which took place there prior to 1965 are 
considered to to be part of the cases that were decided, 
and the events as events which took place, in Malaysia. 
2.0 The Introduction and Application of English 
Commercial Law 
English law was first introduced by statute in Penang in 
1807 by the First Charter of Justice12. It established a 
Court of Judicature in Penang which was to exercise all 
the jurisdiction of the English courts of law and 
Chancery 'as far as circumstances will admit'13. A second 
12. Letters Patent dated 25th March 1807. As to the legal 
significance of this Charter, see Kamoo v Bassett 
(1808) 1 Ky. 1. 
13. For the meaning of this phrase, see Sheridan, LA, The 
British Commonwealth; The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution; Malaya and Singapore, The Borneo 
Territories, Vol. 9, Stevens, London 1961, p. 3. 
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Royal Charter of Justice was granted in 182614, extending 
the jurisdiction of the Court of Judicature to Singapore 
and Malacca. This statutorily introduced into Penang, 
Malacca and Singapore, English law as at 26th November 
1 18265. 
After the transfer of the administration of the Straits 
Settlements from India to the Colonial Office in London 
in 1867, legislative authority within the Colony was 
delegated to the Legislative Council of the Straits 
Settlements. This Council passed the Civil Law Ordinance 
of 187816 which marked the introduction of a considerable 
body of English commercial law into Malaya. S. 6 of this 
Ordinance provided that in all questions or issues which 
arose or which had to be decided with respect to certain 
specified areas of commercial law as well as with respect 
to mercantile law generally, the law to be administered 
would be the same as would be administered in England in 
the like case at the corresponding period. Among the 
areas specifically mentioned were marine insurance, 
average and fire and life insurance. This provision was 
retained when the 1878 Ordinance was replaced by the 
14. Letters Patent dated 27th November 1826. 
15. In the Goods'of Abdullah (1835) 2 Ky. 8 and Rodyk v 
Williamson Unreported, see (1835) 2 Ky. 9 (Footnote). 
16. Straits Settlements Ordinance No. IV of 1878. 
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Civil Law Ordinance 190917. The Civil Law Enactment 
193718 of the Federated Malay States which was 
subsequently extended to the Unfederated Malay States in 
195119 had no specific provision for the reception of 
English commercial law. S. 2 of the Enactment merely 
provided generally for the application of the common law 
of England and the rules of equity as administered in 
England at the commencement of the Enactment, subject to 
local statutory provisions or other modifications. 
In 1956, a single Civil Law Ordinance20 was introduced in 
the Federation of Malaya. This replaced both the Straits 
Settlements Ordinance and the Federated Malay States 
Enactment. 
Statutory reception of English Law in Sarawak began in 
1928 with the introduction of the Law of Sarawak 
Ordinance21. S. 2 of this ordinance provided that the law 
of England, in so far as it was not modified by state 
ordinances and to the extent permitted by native customs 
and local conditions, was to be applied. This Ordinance 
was repealed by the Application of Laws Ordinance 194922 
17. Straits Settlements Ordinance No. VIII of 1909. 
18. FMS Enactment No. 3 of 1937. 
19. Civil Law (Extension) Ordinance 1951 (FM Ordinance 
No. 49 of 1951). 
20. FM Ordinance No. 5 of 1956. 
21. Order No. L-4,1928. 
22. No. 27 of 1949, now Cap. 2, Revised Laws of Sarawak, 
1958. 
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which provided for the application of the common law, 
doctrines of equity and English statutes of general 
application, subject again to qualifications similar to 
2 3. those in the 1928 ordinance 
English law was statutorily introduced in Sabah by the 
Civil Law ordinance 1938. This was replaced by the 
24 
Application of Laws Ordinance 195125 which contained a 
provision similar to that in the Sarawak Ordinance of 
1949. 
The Application of Laws ordinances of both Sarawak and 
Sabah, like the Civil Law Enactment 1937 of the Federated 
Malay States, did not have specific provisions relating 
to the application of English commercial or mercantile 
law. It was only in 1972 when the Civil Law ordinance 
1956 of the Federation of Malaya was revised and extended 
to these two states26 that there was a single statute 
providing for the reception of English law for the whole 
of Malaysia. 
The application of English commercial law is provided for 
23. Application of Laws ordinance 1949, s. 2. 
24. No. 2 of 1938. 
25. No. 27 of 1951, now Cap. 6, Laws of North Borneo, 
1953. 
26. Civil Law Act 1956 (Revised 1972) (Laws of Malaysia, 
Act 67). 
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by s. 5 of the revised Act. There are separate provisions 
for Penang, Malacca, Sabah and Sarawak on one hand and 
the rest of the country on the other. 
S. 5(1) reads: 
In all questions or issues which arise or which 
have to be decided in the states of Johore, 
Kedah, Kelantan, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, 
Perlis, Selangor and Trengganu with respect to 
the law of partnerships, corporations, banks 
and banking, principals and agents, carriers by 
air, land and sea, marine insurance, average, 
life and fire insurance, and with respect to 
mercantile law generally, the law to be 
administered shall be the same as would be 
administered in England in the like case at the 
date of coming into force of this ordinance, if 
such question or issue had arisen or had to be 
decided in England, unless in any case other 
provision is or shall be made by any written 
law. 
S. 5(2) reads: 
In all questions or issues which arise or which 
have to be decided in the states of Malacca, 
Penang, Sabah and Sarawak with respect to the 
law concerning any of the matters referred to 
in the last preceding subsection, the law to be 
administered shall be the same as would be 
administered in England in the like case at the 
corresponding period, if such question or issue 
had arisen or had to be decided in England, 
unless in any case other provision is or shall 
be made by any written law. 
Prior to the extension of the Act to Sabah and Sarawak, 
s. 5(2) was applicable only to Penang and Malacca. 
The 
fact that these two states were 
Crown Colony of the Straits 
formerly part of the 
Settlements must have 
accounted for the distinction between s. 
5(l) and s. 5(2). 
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S. 5 is not the only provision in the Act for the 
reception of English law, although it is the only one 
which deals specifically with commercial law27. The 
provisions of s. 5 clearly originated from s. 6 of the 
Civil Law Ordinance 1878 of the Straits Settlements. The 
purpose of that provision was said to be 'to inspire 
confidence among merchants by assuring them that any 
question arising in regard to their commercial 
transaction will be decided as it would be decided at the 
corresponding period in England' unless local provisions 
28 
existed 
The reference in s. 5 to 'the law... as administered in 
England' rather than specifically to the common law, 
rules of equity and statutes of general application is 
perhaps due to the realisation that the use of the latter 
phrase could have prevented the importation of the Law 
Merchant and Maritime Law, which historically were not 
administered either by the Common Law Courts or the 
29 
Courts of Chancery in England. 
27. S. 3 provides for the application of the common law of 
England and the rules of equity as administered in 
England, in West Malaysia, and for the application of 
the common law, rules of equity and English statutes 
of general application in Sabah and Sarawak, in the 
absence of local statutory provisions. 
28. Seng Djit Hin v Nagurdas Purshotumdas & Co. (1921) 14 
SSLR 181 at p. 208, per Voules J. 
29. Bartholomew, GW, The Commercial Law of Malaysia; A 
Study in the Reception of English Law, Malayan Law 
Journal Ltd., Singapore 1965, pp. 33 - 34. 
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While there is no doubt that the 'law ... as administered 
in England' includes English statutes30, the conditions 
for their application are not entirely clear. All s. 5 
requires is that this must be in respect of an issue in 
the areas mentioned or in respect of mercantile law 
generally and that there are no local statutory 
provisions on that issue. The other requirement which is 
frequently found in such provisions - the suitability of 
the statute to local circumstances or the 'local 
circumstances proviso' - is not expressedly mentioned in 
this section. The existence of such a proviso however is 
normally implied when an English statute is applied 
pursuant to this provision3l. 
In the Malay States, the law to be applied under s. 5(1) 
is the law as administered in England on 7 April 1956 - 
the date the Act came into force in these states32. In 
Penang, Malacca, Sabah and Sarawak, according to s. 5(2), 
the law to be applied is the law of England at the time 
the question or issue arises. In considering the 
significance of this difference, a distinction must be 
made between the common law and the rules of equity 
30. In Mazzarrol v United Oriental Assurance Sdn. Bhd., 
[1984] 1 MLJ 260, the Federal Court held that the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) was applicable in the 
Malay States by virtue of s. 5(l) of the Civil Law Act 
1956. 
31. Shaik Sahied bin Abdullah Bajerai v Sockalingam 
Chettiar [1933] SSLR 101 (Court of Appeal) and 
(1933) 
2 MLJ 81 (Privy Council). 
32. Doris Rodrigues v Bala Krishnan [1983] 2 MLJ 77. 
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on one hand and English statutes on the other. 
The principles of common law and the rules of equity are 
timeless, everlasting and dateless. They do not change 
through time but exist as a single whole in the future as 
they do today and as they did in the past. According to 
the declaratory theory of the common law, judges do not 
legislate, they merely expound or expand what the law has 
always been. As such, there cannot be a difference 
between s. 5(l) and s. 5(2) as far as the importation of 
the common law and rules equity are concerned. 
It is only in relation to the application of English 
statutes that there can possibly be a distinction between 
the two sub-sections. The general trend of opinion33 
33. See eg. Sheridan, Op. cit., footnote 13, Wu, MA and 
Vohrah, B, The Commercial Law of Malaysia, Heinemann, 
Kuala Lumpur 1980, p. 3, and Ibrahim, AM and Joned, A, 
Sistem Undang Undang di Malaysia, Dewan Bahasa dan 
Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur 1985, pp. 89 - 90. In Singapore 
where there is a provision similar to s. 5(2), the 
same view is held. See eg. Lee, CY, The Law of 
Consumer Credit, Singapore University Press, 
Singapore 1980, p. 20 and Chan, HHM, An Introduction 
to Singapore Legal System, Malayan Law Journal 
Publishers, Singapore 1985, p. 16. The assumption that 
such a provision allows for the continuing reception 
of English statutes in Singapore has in fact prompted 
the Singapore legislature to amend the said provision 
in 1979 by the Civil Law (Amendment) Act 1979 which 
provided inter alia that any law enacted in the UK 
giving effect to a treaty or international agreement 
to which Singapore is not a party, shall not be 
applicable. This amendment was thought necessary due 
to the possibility that statutes passed in the UK in 
compliance with EEC agreements could be applicable in 
Singapore by virtue of the existing provision. 
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seems to be that this distinction is real and that s. 5(2) 
allows the continued reception of current English 
statutes in the four states mentioned. Any English 
statute however recent, which fits into the description 
in the provision would therefore be applicable in the 
four states. 
There is however a weakness 
It seems to be against all 
that a statute passed in 
applicable in a country 
independence and set up its 
without ever being formally 
that legislature. 
in the above interpretation. 
theories of Constitutional Law 
another country should be 
which has achieved its 
own sovereign legislature, 
adopted or even considered by 
When the prototype for s. 5(2) was introduced in the form 
of s. 6 of the Civil Law ordinance 1878 of the Straits 
Settlements, that part of the country was a Crown Colony 
of England. Similarly when Penang and Malacca were joined 
with the other Malay States to form the Federation of 
Malaya, the Federation was a Protectorate within the 
British Commonwealth and was still such a Protectorate in 
1956 when the Civil Law ordinance was passed. The 
'continuing reception' clause in this ordinance as in the 
1878 Ordinance could therefore be literally applied. The 
Federation of Malaya, including Penang and Malacca, 
however achieved full independence on 31 August 





and a Parliament which is the sole legislature 
for the country as a whole. As Parliament is completely 
independent of, and totally severed from, the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom, no part of the country should 
remain within the imperial legislative jurisdiction of 
the latter. There is something intrinsically wrong in a 
statutory provision which allows statutes passed in the 
United Kingdom after the birth of an independent nation 
and the setting up of an autonomous legislative body to 
be applied in that country35. The concept of 'continuing 
reception' of English statutes can only be interpreted 
literally for as long as the legislative structure of the 
receipient country remains linked to the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom. For Penang and Malacca, the 
'continuing reception' of English statutes under s. 5(2) 
must be taken to refer only to statutes passed prior to 
31 August 1957 - Malaysia's independence day. Sabah and 
Sarawak were both Crown colonies before they joined the 
Federation on 23 September 1965. Hence only English 
statutes passed in the United Kingdom before that date 
could be applicable in these states under the same 
provision. 
34. Federal Constitution, Art. 4(1). 
35. A similar argument has been used, not in relation to 
s. 5 but in relation to s. 3 of the Civil Law Act which 
provides for 'the reception of English Law generally, 
see Bartholomew, Op. cit., footnote 
e1 , pp. 102 - 105. 
For a consideration of similar provisions in some 
African countries see Allot, A, New Essays in African 
Law, Butterworths, London 1970. 
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While writers seem to be unanimous in their view that 
s. 5(2) literally allows for the continuing reception of 
English statutes in the four states, the courts have not 
made any definitive pronouncement on this issue. An 
opportunity to do so arose in Tan Chong & Sons Motor Co. 
(Sdn. ) Bhd. v Alan McKnight36 but the Federal Court 
judiciously avoided a decision on the issue. In this case 
the question arose as to whether the Sale of Goods Act 
1893 (UK) or the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (UK) was 
applicable in Penang. At the High Court it was held that 
the latter was applicable by virtue of s. 5(2) of the 
Civil Law Act. On appeal, the Federal Court declined to 
either confirm or contradict this finding. Accepting that 
English Law was applicable in Penang on the issue before 
them, the Federal Court did not decide which of the two 
Acts was in fact applicable. According to Salleh Abas FJ 
(as he then was): 
37 
[W]hatever English Act is applicable it is 
clear that in English Law before and after 
1979, a buyer is entitled to rely upon an 
implied condition as to fitness of the goods 
for which he bought them provided of course he 
communicated to the seller the intended use of 
the goods and relied upon their judgement. 
While the significance of the issue relating to the date 
36. [19831 1 MLJ 220. 
37. Ibid. at p. 230. 
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of reception of English statutes has been greatly reduced 
in most areas of commercial law by the introduction of 
local statutes which are applicable throughout the 
country38, it remains a thorn in the flesh in areas like 
insurance where the bulk of the substantive law continues 
to be based on the common law and in areas like Sale of 
Goods where local legislation applies only in certain 
parts of the country. 
39 
Apart from specifically mentioning certain aspects of 
commercial law, s. 5 also refers to 'mercantile law 
generally'. Whilst the main branches of insurance law 
namely Marine, Fire and Life are specifically mentioned, 
other areas such as Motor, Personal Accident and 
Liability Insurance come within the ambit of 'mercantile 
4 law generally'0. 
S. 5 refers only to the substantive law applicable in the 
areas mentioned; it does not allow the application of 
English rules of procedure and evidence in these areas. 
Hence whilst allowing the application of English Law in 
the area of Marine Insurance for instance, s. 5 does not 
38. Eg. Contracts Act 1950 (Revised 1974) and Partnership 
Act 1961 (Revised 1974). 
39. Eg. Sale of Goods (Malay States) Ordinance 1957. 
40. In King Lee Tee v Norwich Union Fire Insurance 
Society Ltd. (1933) 2 MLJ 187 it was held that while 
the Road Traffic Act 1930 (UK) was not within the 
scope of this provision, the Third Party 
(Rights 
Against Insurers Act 1930 (UK) was. 
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allow the use of English rule in relation to the 
discovery of a ship's papers in a claim upon a marine 
41 
policy. 
3.0 The Growth of the Insurance Industry 
3.1 Prior to the Arrival of the Western Concept of 
Insurance 
Before the arrival of the Western colonial powers, the 
Malay States were governed by their respective rulers in 
accordance with Muslim Law in respect of personal and 
family matters and in accordance with Malay Customary 
Law42 in respect of all other matters. 
Two different varieties of Malay Customary Law were 
applicable then. In Negri Sembilan it was the Adat 
Pepatih which was brought into the country by Malays from 
the Minangkabau region of Sumatra. In the other states, 
the Adat Temenggong, brought by Malays from the Palembang 
region of Sumatra, was followed. Some of the states had 
their own Codes which were based on either of these laws. 
The well-known Codes included the Maritime Code of 
41. Mohamed Sultan Maricar v Prudential Assurance Co. 
Ltd. (1941) 10 MLJ 26. 
42. For the sources and legal significance of Malay 
Customary Laws, see Hooker, MB, 'A Note on Malayan 
Legal Digest', (1968) 41 JMBRAS 157. 
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Malacca43, the Ninety-Nine Laws of Perak44 and the Laws 
45 Johore5. 
In Sabah and Sarawak, the Customary Law is based on the 
practices and customs of the different native tribes. 
These Laws are more developed and they still play an 
46 important role in the legal systems of the two states. 
The concept of insurance in its western form cannot be 
traced in any of these laws. There survives till today, 
however a Malay custom whereby members of a community 
make voluntary monetary or other contributions to the 
bereaved family of a deceased person in order to lessen 
their suffering and help with the funeral and other 
expenses. The fact that the loss of one is shared by 
other members of the community, albeit voluntarily, seems 
at the very basic level to resemble the concept of 
insurance. This however is more of an accepted practice 
rather than a srict principle of Customary Law and hence 
43. 'The Maritime Codes of the Malays'. Reprinted from a 
translation by Sir Stamford Raffles, (1879) 3 JSBRAS 
62. 
44. Rigby, J, 'The Ninety-Nine Laws of Perak', in Papers 
on Malay Subjects, Wilkinson and Rigby (Eds. ), FMS 
Government Press, Kuala Lumpur 1908, p. l. 
45. Logan, JR, 'A Translation of the Malayan Laws of the 
Principality of Johore', in Readings in Malay Adat 
Laws, Hooker, MB, (Ed. ), Singapore University Press, 
Singapore 1970, p. 83. 
46. See generally, Hooker, MB, Native Law in Sabah and 
Sarawak, Malayan Law Journal Ltd, Singapore 1980. 
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is not mentioned in any of the Malay Codes. There are 
however several provisions in the Codes on how certain 
types of losses were to be shared - not by the community 
as a whole but between persons having an interest in a 
particular subject matter or adventure. These laws seem 
to have drawn a distinction between losses that were 
intentionally caused and those that resulted from 
fortuitous events47. While the former must be borne by 
the party at fault, the latter was to be shared equally 
by all parties having an interest in the subject matter 
or the adventure. These parties must bear the 
consequences of such a loss because there was no means by 
which the risk of losses from such events could be 
transferred to a third party. 
The Native Customary Laws of Sabah and Sarawak deal 
mainly with family and land matters. Similarly, Muslim 
Law as applicable throughout the country deal exclusively 
with the personal laws of Muslims. As such, neither has 
principles relating to loss sharing or other matters even 
remotely resembling the western idea of insurance. 
47. Eg. according to the Maritime Codes of Malacca (Op. 
cit footnote 43) , if during heavy seas or 
high w inds 
a boat hit anoth er or struck a rock, it would not be 
considered as an accident but as'fault, because u nder 
such conditions the vessel should not have 
been at 
sea. The loss wa s to be divided in thre e parts, one 
to be borne by t he person to whom the damaged boat 
belonged and the other two parts by the persons who 
were responsible for the loss. 
20 
3.2 The Arrival of the Western concept of Insurance 
The western concept of insurance was formally introduced 
in Malaysia in the first half of the 19th century 
primarily through the Agency Houses48 which acted as 
agents for, and provided underwriting facilities on 
behalf of, London-based insurance companies. 
The Alliance British and Foreign Fire and Life Insurance 
Company was reputedly the first company to appoint such 
an agent. In 1827, just seven years after Stamford 
Raffles arrived in Singapore, the Alliance appointed the 
Agency House, Scott and Napier as their agents there49. 
Soon afterwards Guthrie was appointed agents for the 
Commercial Insurance50. In 1846, the Royal Insurance 
Group appointed Boustead as their agents51. 
Fire policies were the most popular in the early days, 
mainly due to the fact that most buildings then, 
including those in the towns, were made of wood and were 
48. For an account of the growth and activities of these 
Houses, see Drabble and Drake, 'The British Agency 
Houses in Malaysia: Survival in a Changing World', 
(1981) 12 J. of Southeast Asian Studies, 297. 
49. Kohli, RC, An Introduction to Insurance Practice and 
Principles in Singapore and Malaysia, Singapore 
Insurance Training Centre, Singapore 1982, pp. 9-10. 
50. Cheeseeman, HR, 'The Oldest Malayan Firm: The 
Story 
of Guthrie & Co. Ltd. ' (1955) Vol. V, British 
Malaya, 
37. 
51. Kohli, Op. cit., footnote 49. 
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therefore extremely prone to being destroyed by fire. 
Later, as Singapore, and to a limited extent, Penang and 
Malacca, became the focal points of maritime activities 
in the region, there began a noticeable growth in the 
area of Marine Insurance. Local marine policies then were 
issued primarily for cargoes; policies on hull were 
mainly underwritten in London. 
A parallel development took place in Sabah and Sarawak at 
about the same time. In fact by the end of the 19th 
century, publications in Sabah were already carrying 
advertisements inserted by agents who were providing 
underwriting facilities not only on behalf of 
London-based companies but also on behalf of those in 
5 
Hong Kong2. 
While the Agency Houses were the formal channel for the 
introduction of the western system of insurance into 
Malaysia, it is wrong to give them the full credit for 
this. At about the time when the Agency Houses started to 
provide underwriting facilities, a group of Indian 
immigrants were providing insurance and mortgage bond 
facilities along the lines of Bottomry and Respondentia 
Bonds in English Marine Insurance. Such policies were 
commonly known as 'Chitty' Insurance, a name most 
52. British North Borneo Herald, 1st January 1892. 
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probabaly derived from the group of Indian immigrants who 
introduced such facilities - Chitties or Chettiars being 
the name of the group of immigrants who came from the 
Chettinand district of Madras. Unlike most Indians, 
53 
they came to Malaysia not as labourers or plantation 
workers but as businessmen and financiers who dominated 
the country's moneylending sector in the 19th century and 
5 the first half of the 20th century4. 
A Chitty Insurance came into effect when a Chitty lent a 
sum of money to the owner of a ship or cargo. The owner 
would then assign the ship or cargo to the Chitty as 
security, subject to the standard clause that if the ship 
or cargo be totally lost by foundering, the borrower was 
relieved of any further obligation to pay the loan. Loss 
caused by any other peril must be borne by the borrower, 
ie. the loan must be paid in full. 
The courts in the Straits Settlements recognised and 
endorsed the validity of Chitty insurance contracts from 
the beginning. In as early as 1869, in Mootu Curpen 
53. A Chitty is also an old Anglo-Indian word for a piece 
of paper, a note of order or of sum owed, The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, 6th Edition 1978. 
54. Mahajani, U. The Role of Indian Minorities in Burma 
and Malaya, Vora and Co., India 
1960, and 
Arasaratnam, S, Indians in Malaysia and Singapore, 
Oxford University Press, London 1970. 
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Chitty v Lee Toh55, it was held that such contracts were 
not void as wagers under English Law. In fact in AMK 
Raman Chitty v Chuah Eu Kay and Ors. 
56, in determining 
whether a loss was caused by foundering, the court 
applied English principles relating to proximate cause. 
In Virappa Chitty v Ventre57, it was held that if a 
foreign vessel was the subject of such an insurance, the 
seaworthiness of the vessel was to be determined 
according to the law of the flag. 
The close of the 19th century saw not only an increase in 
the number of Agency Houses providing underwriting 
facilities for London-based companies but also the 
setting up of local branches by these companies. The 
improvement in the facilities provided by these companies 
and the growth of other sources of credit resulted in a 
decline in the popularity of Chitty Insurance. 
3.3 Developments in the 20th Century 
3.3.1 The First Half of the Century 
The early part of the 20th century saw two major 
developments - the influx of branch offices not only 
for 
55. (1869) WOC Appendix III. 
56. (1868) SLR 261. 
57. Op. cit., footnote 55. 3 
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London-based companies but more significantly for 
companies based in Hong Kong, Canada, India, Australia 
and the USA, and the birth of locally incorporated 
insurance companies. 
The Sze Hai Tong Bank which was established in Singapore 
in 1906, was the first local company to provide 
underwriting facilities. It was not, however, set up for 
this purpose - it was a commercial bank which provided 
such facilities as part of the services for its 
customers58. The Great Eastern Life Insurance Company, 
incorporated in Singapore in 1908, was in fact the first 
local insurance company59. They were followed in 1920 by 
the overseas Assurance Corporation which was incorporated 
in the Straits Settlements with an authorised capital of 
(M)$20 million. 
The first three decades of the 20th century were a period 
of tremendous growth for both foreign and local 
companies. By 1931 there were in West Malaysia and 
Singapore, 18 life, 46 motor, 81 fire and 50 marine 
6 
insurance companies providing underwriting facilities0. 
58. Lock, LK, 'The Development of Insurance Law in 
Malaysia', (Unpublished Project Paper) Faculty of 
Law, University of Malaya, l980, p. 2- 
59. (1938) Vol. 13, British Malaya, 93. 
60. Eley, WA, 'Insurance', in Singapore -A Handbook of 
Information, Rotary Club of Singapore, 
Singapore 
1933, pp. 70 - 71. 
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In the area of life insurance alone the volume of 
6 l. business for that year was (M)$45 million 
Throughout this period, the principles and practices of 
the industry closely followed those in England although 
certain modifications were made. In the area of life 
insurance for instance, different scales of premiums were 
set for Americans and Europeans in one category and for 
locals and Asiatics generally in another. In fact there 
was at first a general reluctance to underwrite whole 
life policies for locals. It was only as late as the 
1930s, that some insurers were willing to issue whole 
life policies, not for locals generally, but on 'selected 
Chinese lives'62. This, coupled with the fact that most 
locals then viewed insurance as a form of savings for 
their old age rather than as a means for providing for 
their dependants, made endowment policies very popular. 
The Second World War and the Japanese occupation caused 
considerable dislocation to the insurance industry. 
Recovery was however relatively quick due to the tin and 
rubber boom which followed. 




period of the Emergency between 1948 and 196063. The 
terrorist activities of the outlawed Malayan Communist 
Party were directed mainly at rubber estates, rubber 
mills and at vehicles on public roads. Insurance claims 
increased considerably resulting in increases in premiums 
for life, fire and civil commotion covers64. A racial 
riot in Singapore in 1950 also resulted in a noticeable 
increase in claims particularly from owners of vehicles 
6 which were either damaged or destroyed5. 
The ease with which foreign companies could establish 
themselves locally meant that the industry was still 
dominated by foreign-based companies, particulary 
British, even after the first half of the 20th century. 
In 1955, foreign companies made up about 95% of the 
6 local insurance market6. 
3.3.2 The Period of the 'Malayan Mushrooms' 
The post Second World War tin and rubber boom which 
brought relative prosperity to Malaysians generally, had 
63. This was the period during which the country was 
seriously threstened by Communist insurgents. 
64. Mackenzie, KE, Overseas Economic Surveys - Malaya: 
Economic and Commercial Conditions in Federation of 
Malaya and Singapore, HMSO, London 1952, p. 84. 
65. Ibid. 
66. Goh, CH, 'Past Present and Future of Insurance 
Industry', paper presented at the First ASEAN 
Life 
Seminar, Kuala Lumpur, 1984. 
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an adverse effect on the insurance industry. The 
availability of ready cash in the hands of the public 
tempted the greedy and the dishonest to find new ways to 
reach the pockets of the masses. There was a -spectacular 
growth of new insurance companies offering life policies 
on terms and at premiums no ordinary insurer could have 
provided67. Although the growth of such companies was 
foreseen by the authorities from as early as 192468 and 
was generally regarded as an inevitable growing up 
problem for any country new to the insurance industry, it 
was not until the late 1950s that the horror caused by 
these companies was experienced in Malaysia. 
These companies dealt exclusively with life policies. 
They captured the market by introducing policies that 
were unusually attractive and unorthodox and by targeting 
people who were either tooold or too ill to qualify for 
genuine life policies. According to one source69, the 
67. Central Bank of Malaya, Annual Report and Statement 
of Account 1961, Kuala Lumpur 1962, p. 21. 
68. In tabling the Life Assurance Companies Bill 1924 
before the Federal Council, the Legal Adviser of the 
Federated Malay States said: 
The object... is to prevent the springing up of 
mushroom companies which receive money from 
policyholders and carry on for a few years and 
then collapse. 
Proceedings of the Federal Council of the Federated 
Malay States for the year 1924, FMS Government 
printing office, Kuala Lumpur 1924, pp. B25-B26. 
69. Drake, Financial Developments in Malaysia and 
_Singapore, 
Australian Natonal University Press, 
Canberra 1969, p. 181. 
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average age of the lives insured with such companies was 
between 69 and 70 years and there was even a policy 
issued on the life of a man who was 101 years old. 
A typical policy issued by a 'mushroom' company required 
a registration fee of between (M)$3 - (M)$5 and a similar 
amount in monthly instalments. If the life insured died 
within nine months after the issue of the policy, his 
beneficiaries would not get a cent. If he survived this 
period, his beneficiaries could get anything between 
(M)$400 - (M)$700 on his death. After 10 years the policy 
would automatically become a fully paid-up policy and 
only the annual charge needed to be paid thereafter. 
As the same flat rates of premiums were charged 
irrespective of the age and state of health of the life 
insured70, these policies were particularly attractive to 
those with money and some gambling instincts, especially 
those with old and sick relatives. Others even resorted 
to insuring the lives of strangers. The issue of such 
policies without the usual fuss of the life insured 
having to fill in detailed proposal forms and to undergo 
thorough medical check-ups made them doubly atractive to 
the illiterate and the rural populace. These policies 
were particularly popular among the Chinese 
in the tin 
70. Ibid. 
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mining state of Perak. At their peak it was estimated 
that such companies were receiving about (M)$100,000.00 
71 monthly in premiums in that state alone. 
As the policies were mainly taken out on the lives of 
people who were virtually on their death beds, few 
survived the initial nine months and so all the premiums 
paid were lost. The companies were reaping huge profits 
until the bubble burst in the late 1950s. With about one 
million such policies issued, the directors of these 
companies began closing their offices and leaving the 
country. People with genuine claims could not recover 
them and those who had paid premiums discovered that 
their insurance companies were no longer in existence. 
It was in the face of this mammoth scandal that the 
government realised that they could do very little under 
existing legislation to curb the activities of such 
companies. As a result, the Life Assurance Act 196172, 
the Life Assurance (Amendment) Act 196173 and the 
Insurance Companies (Compulsory Liquidation) Act 196274 
were speedily introduced to make it more difficult to 
start life insurance businesses, to tighten controls over 
71. Dale, M, ' 'Mushroom' Insurance Firms', Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 27th April 1961, p. 175. 
72. FM Act No. 48 of 1961. 
73. FM Act No. 20 of 1961. 
74. FM Act No. 1 of 1962. 
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existing ones and to enable the government to wind-up 
existing 'mushroom' companies. By the end of 1962,39 
such companies were wound up with claims made in respect 
of 1.3 million policies5. 
7 
a 
The facts surrounding the compulsory liquidation of Poh 
Sin Insurance Co. of Penang, the 38th company to be 
liquidated under the 1962 Act clearly reflected the 
extent of the scandal. Starting with a capital of 
(M)$400,000, it had been carrying on business for just 17 
months when it was compulsorily liquidated. Yet it was 
insolvent to the tune of (M)$8.5 million and had 
collected more than (M)$3 million in premiums76. 
Undeniably the period of the 'Malayan Mushrooms' was an 
inglorious event in the history of the insurance industry 
in Malaysia although some good did come out from it. It 
generated new and widespread public interest in the 
insurance industry as a whole. More people became aware 
" of the idea of insurance and 
the benefits that could be 
obtained by insuring with genuine and reputable 
insurers 
- either because they 
had lost their money to the 
'mushroom' companies or because they were interested 
75. Central Bank of Malaya, Annual 96port8nd 
Statement 
of Account 1962, Kuala Lumpur 
1963, p-38- 
76. 'The Malayan Mushrooms', Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 
9th August 1962, p. 268" 
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bystanders during the scandal. The aftermath of the 
scandal also saw the introduction of a comprehensive 
piece of insurance legislation in the form of the 
Insurance Act 1963, which not only introduced extensive 
regulatory measures but also certain changes to the 
substantive law. 
3.3.3 Post 1963 Developments 
By the time the Insurance Act 1963 was passed, most of 
the problems caused by the mushroom companies had been 
ironed out. The years after 1963 saw the efforts of the 
government being concentrated primarily on domestication 
or Malaysianisation of the industry. In establishing and 
projecting a Malaysian profile for the industry, local 
capital ownership was stimulated, steps were taken to 
facilitate the transfer of managerial expertise to locals 
and requirements were introduced to ensure the retention 
of a percentage of the insurance funds within the 
country. The setting up of new local companies was 
encouraged and branches of foreign-based ones were 
persuaded to be domestically incorporated, some were 
simply deregistered while others voluntarily ceased to 
carry out underwriting business 
77. Lloyd's of London ceased to underwrite general 
insurance in the country in 1984 - Information 
Malaysia - 1985 Yearbook, Berita 
Publishing, Kuala 
Lumpur 1985, pp. 226-228. 
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In line with the government's New Economic Policy78, the 
participation of locals, particularly the Malays who were 
more economically backward, at the executive and 
technical levels were actively encouraged. To this end 
the Insurance Training Centre was set up and the MARA 
Institute of Technology introduced diploma courses in 
Insurance. Insurance companies were also expected to play 
a wider role by facilitating and participating in, the 
implementation of the government's socio-economic 
policies. 
Motivated by the realisation of the importance of 
insurance companies as a non-banking source of both 
public and private sector finances and the desire to 
reduce the country's invisible trade deficit, conscious 
efforts were made to ensure the retention of at least a 
percentage of the insurance funds for investments within 
the country. Since 1963, the government has consistently 
increased the percentage of premium incomes which must be 
invested locally, a fraction of which must be in 
government stocks79. 
78. A government development strategy which 
has as its 
objectives the restructuring of society 
and the 
eradication of poverty. 
79. At present no less than 80% of thetotal avalue ssets 
of 
and insurer's assets must be Malaysian 
investments in government securities must 
form no 
less than 25% of the insurer's entire assets - 
Insurance Act 1963, s. ll. 
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In spite of these efforts there were sti 
huge outflows of insurance funds overseas 
form of premiums for reinsurance as there 
local reinsurance facilities. In 1973 the 
up the country's national reinsurance 
Malaysia National Reinsurance Berhad. 
11 until 1972, 
mainly in the 
were then no 
government set 
company, the 
Since 1963, the Insurance Act has undergone numerous 
amendments including a revision in 1972, which were 
intended mainly to tighten control not merely on 
insurance companies but also on their directors, agents, 
brokers and adjusters, in an effort to give the insuring 
public greater protection. Self - regulation within the 
industry was also encouraged by introducing mandatory 
requirements for membership of approved associations for 
the insurers and their intermediaries. 
The introduction of an Islamic system 
by the Takaful Act 1984, did not a 
industry although it is a landmark in 
the insurance industry in the country 
first time consumers have a choice 
systems of insurance to choose from. 
of mutual insurance 
ffect the existing 
the development of 
in that for the 
of two different 
4.0 Insurance Legislation in Malaysia 
4.1 Legislation Affecting Life Insurance Companies 
The earliest piece of legislation 
in this respect was the 
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Life Assurance ordinance 1941 of the Straits 
Settlements80. It was modelled on the Assurance Companies 
Act 1909 of the United Kingdom but was restricted in its 
application to companies carrying life insurance 
business. Similar legislation were subsequently 
introduced in the Federated Malay States1 and Johore 
82 8 
. 
In 1948, the existing legislation was replaced by a 
consolidated statute applicable throughout the Federation 
of Malaya - The Life Assurance Companies ordinance 
194883. The period of the 'Malayan Mushrooms' 
necessitat ed stricter controls over life insurance 
companies and amendments to the 1948 Ordi nance were 
introduced by the Life Assurance Act 1961 and the Life 
Assurance Companies (Amendment) Act 1961. New powers for 
compulsory liquidation were given by the Insurance 
Companies (Compulsory Liquidation) A 
8 
ct 19624. 
In Sabah, provisions relating to life insurance companies 
were first introduced by the Life Assurance Companies 
Ordinance 195085. Sarawak had no specific legislation in 
this area but its Companies ordinance 1956 had special 
8 
provisions dealing with insurance companies6. 
80. SS Ordinance No. 145. 
81. Life Assurance Companies Enactment 1924 
(Cap. 60). 
82. Johore Enactment No. 129. 
83. FNS Ordinance No. 38 of 1948. 
84. Su ra. p. 30. 
85. Sabah Ordinance No. 20 of 1950 (Cap. 
7). 
86. Cap. 65, Laws of Sarawak 1958, s. 130. 
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4.2 Legislation Affecting Fire Insurance Companies 
The Straits Settlements again led the rest of Malaysia in 
this respect by the introduction of the Fire Insurance 
Companies ordinance 1917. This too followed the 
87 
Assurance Companies Act 1909 of the United Kingdom. The 
Federated Malay States and Johore followed soon 
afterwards by the introduction of similar legislation88. 
All these statutes were replaced by the Fire Insurance 
8 Companies ordinance 1948 of the Federation of Malaya9. 
Sabah introduced its Fire Insurance Companies ordinance 
9 in 19500. As in the area of life insurance, Sarawak had 
no specific legislation in this respect. 
4.3 Legislation Introducing Compulsory Insurance 
Compulsory Third Party Motor Insurance was introduced in 
the Federated Malay Skates in 1937 by the Road Traffic 
(Third Party Insurance) Enactment 193791 which was based 
on similar provisions in the Road Traffic Act 1930 of 
England. This was perhaps prompted by the decision in 









SS Ordinance No. 164 of 1917. 
PMq ordinance No. 3 of 1918 (Cap. 59) and Johore 
Enactment No. 130. 
FM Ordinance No. 39 
Sabah Ordinance No. 
Insurance Companies 
FMS Enactment No-17 
Op. cit. footnote 4 
of 1948. 




replaced by Fire 
46. 
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was held that the 1930 Act of England including the 
provisions relating to compulsory insurance therein, was 
inapplicable in the Straits Settlements under s. 5(l) of 
the Civil Law Ordinance of 1909 as the 1930 Act did not 
come within the scope of that provision. 
Similar legislation was subsequently introduced in the 





The 1938 Straits Settlements ordinance was replaced by 
the more comprehensive Road Traffic ordinance 194197 
which included provisions relating to compulsory third 
party insurance in Part II. All were subsequently 
repealed and replaced by the Road Traffic ordinance 1958 
98 . 
the Federation of Malaya 
In Sabah, compulsory third party motor insurance was 
introduced by the Road Traffic (Third Party Insurance) 
Ordinance 195099. in Sarawak, similar provisions were 
found in the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) 
93. SS Ordinance No. 5 of 1938. 1938. 
94. Road Traffic (Third Party Insurance) Enactment 
95. Road Traffic Enactment No. 16 of 1356 
96. Motor Vehicle. Enactment No. 16 of 1356 
(1938 AD). 
98. FMS Ordinance No. 49 of 1958. 
99. Sabah Ordinance No. 27 of 1950, 
later replaced by 
Road Traffic (Third Party Insurance) 
Ordinance (Cap. 
129, Revised Laws of North Borneo). 
97" 55 C rd'inAnco- No. 17 of 1941.37 
Ordinance 19491. In 1984, the Road Traffic Ordinance 
1958, of the Federation of Malaya was extended to Sabah 
and Sarawak, and the existing state Ordinances were 
repealed. 
2 
Another form of compulsory insurance was introduced 
during the Second World War - Compulsory War Risks 
Insurance On Goods. In an attempt to give the trading 
community some measure of financial protection against 
the effects of war, a risk which was not then ordinarily 
insurable with commercial insurers, the governments of 
both the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay 
States introduced a scheme of compulsory insurance for 
certain goods3 against war risks under the War Risks 
(Goods) Insurance ordinance4 and War Risks (Goods) 
Insurance Enactment 
5 
respectively. A War Risks Insurance 
fund which provided insurance by policy for most 
commodities and insurance by way of fee collection for 
tin and tin ore, was set up by both governments. After 
the war, the Board of Management of the Fund was 
temporarily reconstituted as a claims settling body. 
1. Laws of Sarawak Cap. 130. 
2. Malaysia Act 1963, s. 74 and Modification of Laws (Road 
Traffic Ordinance) (Extension and Modification) Order 
1984, PU(A) 136/84. 
3. As to the definition of 'Goods', see: Straits Echo 
Press Ltd. v Board of Management of War Risks (Goods) 
Insurance Fund (1941) 10 MLJ 211. 
4. SS Ordinance No. 19 of 1941. 
5. FMS Enactment No. 6 of 1941. 
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4.4 Workmen's Compensation Legislation 
In the area of Workmen's Compensation, there used to be 
three pieces of legislation applicable in different parts 
of the country. In the Federation of Malaya it was the 
Workmen's Compensation ordinance 19526 while Sabah and 
Sarawak had their own Ordinances7. The Federation of 
Malaya ordinance was subsequently extended to the two 
states in 19818. Employers are required by the ordinance 
to insure their potential liability to employees9. The 
significance of this ordinance and the reliance of 
employers on Employer's Liability Insurance however have 
been greatly reduced since the introduction of a scheme 
of social insurance for employment injury and invalidity 
benefits under the Employees' Social Security Act 196910 
as participants in this scheme are not entitled to 
benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance. As 
the new scheme is financed wholly by contributions from 
employers and employees, commercial insurers do not have 
a role to play. 
4.5 The Insurance Act 1963 
This Act is the main piece of insurance legislation in 
6. FM Ordinance No. 85 of 1962. 
7. Sabah Ordinance No. 14 of 1955 and Cap. 
Sarawak. 
8. Modification of Laws (Workmen's 
(Extension and Modification) Order 1981. 
9. s. 26. 
10. Laws of Malaysia, Act 4. 
80, Laws of 
Compensation) 
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Malaysia at present. It repealed all the existing 
insurance legislation in the Federation of Malaya except 
the Insurance Companies (Compulsory Liquidation) Act 
1962. When first introduced, the Insurance Act was 
applicable throughout the whole of the Federation 
including Singapore. After Singapore left Malaysia in 
1965, it introduced its own Insurance Act and the 1963 
Act ceased to be applicable there". The 1963 Act was 
extended to Sabah and Sarawak in 196512 
Numerous amendments have been made to the Act since 1963. 
It remains Still the main source of insurance regulation 
in the country and, albeit in a very limited sense, the 
only local Act with some provisions relating to the 
substantive aspects of Insurance Law. 
11. Insurance Act 1965 (Singapore), s. 267. 





1.0 Essentials of a Valid Contract Generally 
In Malaysia all contracts are subject to the provisions 
of the Contracts Act 19501. The Specific Relief Act 
19502, too, has provisions applicable to contracts such 
as those relating to specific performance3, rescission4 
and rectification5. Other written laws as well as usages 
or customs of trade which are not inconsistent with the 
Contracts Act may also be applicable. 
6 
Under the Contracts Act, what is termed an 'offer' in 
English law is known as a proposal. A proposal made by 
one party to another triggers the mechanism for the 
formation of a contract. A proposal is made when one 
party signifies to another his willingness to do or 
abstain from doing anything, with a view to obtaining the 
consent of that other party, to the act or abstinence7. 
The proposal must be communicated to the other party and 
1. Revised 1974, Laws of Malaysia, Act 136. 
2. Revised 1974, Laws of Malaysia, Act 137. 
3. s. ll - s. 27. 
4. s. 30 - s. 33. 
5. s. 34 - s. 37. 
6. Contracts Act 1950, s. 1(2). 
7. s. 2(a). 
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such communication is complete when the proposal comes to 
the knowledge of the other party. If the proposal is 
8 
accepted, such acceptance must be communicated to the 
proposer. 
9 
The communication of an acceptance is complete as against 
the proposer when it is put in a course of transmission 
10 to him so as to be out of the power of the acceptor. If 
an acceptance is conveyed by post, it binds the proposer 
from the time the letter of acceptance is posted, even if 
the letter fails to reach him. The acceptance only binds 
the acceptor when the letter in fact reaches the 
proposerll. Similar rules apply to the revocation of 
l 
either a proposal or an acceptance2. 
When the letter of acceptance is in the post there 
exists, technically, an impossible situation where the 
contract binds only one of the contracting parties. This 
has not resulted in any particular problems in relation 
to contracts of insurance because such contracts 
stipulate the date and time when the provision of cover 
under the policy commences. Should such a problem arises, 
the solution provided in the case of Ignatius v Bell 
13 
8. s. 4(1). 
9. s. 4. 
10. s. 4(2)(a). 
11. s. 4(2)(b). 
12. s. 4(3)(a) and (b). 
13. (1913) 2 FMSLR 115. 
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ought to be followed. It was held in that case that if 
the parties contemplated the use of the post as a means 
of communicating the acceptance, then there would be a 
valid contract from the time the letter of acceptance was 
posted, even if the letter did not reach the proposer at 
all. 
A contract to be valid must be made by the free consent 
of the parties and for a lawful consideration and must 
l 
not be expressed to be void under the Contracts Act4. 
An intention to create legal relations is not expressedly 
required under the Act as a pre-requisite for a valid 
contract. It is however generally assumed that such a 
l 
requirement must be implied in all contracts5. 
There is no requirement under the Contracts Act that a 
contract must be in writing. The Act however recognises 
that this may be required in relation to particular 
contracts by related statutes16. Although the Insurance 
Act has provisions relating to the the type of forms, 
policies and brochures used by insurers, there 
is no 
specific requirement that a contract of 
insurance must 
14. s. 10(l). 
15. Sinnadurai, V, The Law of Contract 
in MalUysiarsand 
Singapore; Cases and Commentary, Oxford 
Press, Kuala Lumpur 1979, pp. 28-29. 
16. Contracts Act 1950, s. 5(l). 
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be in writing. The definition of the word 'policy' as 
given in the Act in fact seems to imply that there can be 
an unwritten contract of insurancel7. 
2.0 Formation of a Contract of insurance 
2.1 Proposal and Acceptance 
In a contract of insurance, the proposal is commonly, 
though not necessarily, made by the insured when he fills 
in the proposal form and the proposal is communicated 
when it is submitted to the insurer. If, having submitted 
the proposal form the insured decides to withdraw it, he 
can do so before the insurer communicates their 
acceptance. Once accepted by the insurer, the proposal 
cannot generally be revoked8. 
1 
The insurer's response to the proposal can be either an 
acceptance or a counter-proposal. It is an acceptance if 
the insured's proposal is unequivocally accepted and no 
new terms are introduced. An acceptance must be expressed 
either in the form prescribed in the proposal or in a 
usual and reasonable manner, and must be made within a 
17. 'Policy' includes any contract of insurance whether 
or not embodied in or evidenced by an 
instrument in 
the form of a policy; Insurance Act 1963,1st 
Schedule. 
18. Contracts Act, s. 5(1). 
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reasonable time after the receipt of the proposa119. 
If the insurer's response to the proposal includes the 
introduction of new terms and conditions, it is a 
counter-proposal which can be either accepted or 
rejected. 
Unless the proposal form stipulates to the contrary, an 
insured in making a proposal for insurance is presumed to 
be asking for the insurer's usual policy. This is so even 
if the particular insurer's policy contains terms which 
are not common amongst insurers generally. In Pang Lim v 
China Insurance Co. Ltd. 
20, the appellant had a 
comprehensive motor policy issued by the respondent. The 
cover note stated that he was held covered 'in the terms 
of the company's usual form of Comprehensive Policy'. The 
policy which was subsequently issued to the appellant had 
deleted a clause which provided cover whilst he was 
driving another car. He sought a declaration that the 
deletion was null and void and rectification of the 
policy. According to the evidence the deletion of such a 
clause though not illegal, was in breach of the Code of 
Ethics of the Malaysian Insurance Association (MIA) of 
which the respondent was a member. 
19. s. 7(a) and (b). 
20. [1975) 1 ML, 7 239. 
It was held that the 
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policy was valid and the appellant was not entitled to 
the declaration sought, because he had asked for and 
obtained the insurer' usual policy. According to Chang 
Min Tat J: 
21 
The basic difficulty encountered by the 
appellant was that in a contract with his insurers, it was the insurer's usual form of 
policy that he asked for and was given, not the 
common policy of the MIA, and that he could not dispute that the insurer's usual policy as used 
at the relevant time was with the sub-clause 
deleted. 
2.2 Consideration 
Like other contracts, a contract of insurance must be for 
2 lawful consideration2. To be lawful, consideration must 
not be forbidden by law, or be intended to defeat any 
law, or be fraudulent, or involve or imply injury to 
others, or be immoral or opposed to public policy23. 
In a contract of insurance, the insurer promises to pay 
either to the insured or to a third party, policy moneys 
on the occurrence of the insured event. The consideration 
provided by the insured is the premium which he pays to 
the insurer, either in lump sum at the beginning of the 
contract, or periodically in the case of long-term 
21. Ibid. at p. 240. 
22. Contracts Act 1950, s. 2(d). 
23. s. 24. 
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policies. If the premium payable at the commencement of 
the contract is not paid, the contract will be void for 
want of consideration. If the premium for a long-term 
policy is not paid when it falls due the contract too 
lapses for want of consideration 24 .A life policy which 
has been in force for three years or more however will 
25 not lapse for the non-payment of premium. 
2.3 Parties to the Contract and their Capacity 
To be competent to contract, a person must be of the age 
of majority, of sound mind, and not disqualified from 
26 
contracting by any law to which he is subject. 
A person attains the age of majority on his eighteenth 
birthday. The Insurance Act however allows a person 
27 
below that age to enter into a contract of insurance. 
41(1) reads: 
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, a 
person over the age of ten years shall not by 
reason of being only under the age of majority 
lack the capacity to enter into a contract of 
insurance; but a person under the age of 
sixteen years shall not have the capacity to 
enter into such a contract except with the 
consent in writing of his parent or guardian. 
S. 
24. Lai Ah Heng & Anor. v China Underwriters Ltd. 
(1948-49) MLJ (Supp. ) 85. 
25. Insurance Act 1963, s. 43(2). See Chapter 
Six - 
Premiums. 
26. Contracts Act 1950, s. 11- 
27. Age of Majority Act 1971, s. 2. 
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One who is above sixteen years of age therefore has the 
full capacity to enter into a contract of insurance while 
one who is between ten to sixteen years of age has such 
capacity if supported by written consent from his parent 
or guardian. 
The rationale behind s. 41(l) is unclear. It allows minors 
to enter into contracts of insurance, but does not allow 
them to enter into other contracts which, though not in 
themselves contracts of insurance, may involve or relate 
to such contracts. It does not allow, for instance, a 
minor to enter into a contract of assignment of a policy 
either as an assignor or assignee. Nor does it allow a 
minor to enter into a contract to mortgage the policy or 
to use it as a security for a loan. As these are not 
'contracts of insurance' they are not within the purview 
of s. 41(l). 
The Life Insurance Act 1945 of Australia has a provision 
allowing minors to enter into a contract of life 
insurance28. This provision however goes a step further 
than the Malaysian provision. It provides that a minor 
between ten and sixteen years old can also be assigned a 
policy of insurance with the written consent of 
his 
parent or guardian. One who is above sixteen years old 
28. s. 85(1). 
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not only can be assigned a policy with the written 
consent of his parent but he can also exercise all the 
powers and privileges of a policyholder as if he has 
29 attained the age of majority. 
Apart from being restricted only to life insurance, the 
Australian provision clearly provides minors with a 
greater degree of freedom in dealing with their policies. 
The Malaysian provision only allows a minor to enter into 
a contract of insurance; to do anything else with his 
policy he has to wait until he attains the age of 
majority. 
S. 41(l) as it stands seems to be of little, if any, 
practical utility. If the rationale behind this provision 
is to allow minors to protect their interests, this can 
be done by the use of other existing provisions and legal 
principles. In the area of life insurance, a parent who 
wishes to provide security for his child through the 
instrumentality of an insurance policy can do so by 
naming such child as a beneficiary to his (the parent's) 
own life policy, thereby creating a trust in favour of 
the minor30. A parent or guardian can also take out a 
policy on the life of the minor because under the 
29. s. 85(2) and (3). 
30. See Chapter Twelve - Assignment and Trusts. 
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Insurance Act, a parent or guardian has an insurable 
interest in the life of a child or ward who is below the 
age of majority at the time the insurance is effected31 
By using either of these two ways, the interest of the 
minor is protected without sacrificing any of the rights 
and privileges of a policyholder. 
The only interest a minor can have in immoveable property 
is as a beneficiary under a trust2. In such a situation 
3 
his interest can be protected by the trustees themselves 
insuring the trust property. There is no necessity for 
the minor himself to enter into a contract of insurance 
to protect his beneficial interest in the property. 
S. 41(l) does not therefore provide any wider protection 
for the interest of the minor than that already provided 
by other existing provisions and principles in Insurance 
Law. Rather s. 41(1) can be a dangerous trap for unwary 
minors and their parents or guardians. It allows a minor 
to enter into a contract of insurance but not thereafter 
to deal with it in any way until the minor reaches the 
age of majority. 
31. Insurance Act 1963, s. 40(2). 
32. No alienation of, nor any other 
dealings in such 
property can be made in favour of a minor - 
National 
Land Code 1965, s. 43 and s. 205(2). 
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m 
Apart from individuals, other legal entities such as 
firms, companies and corporations too have the capocity 
to enter into a contract of insurance. Such power is 
usually provided by the laws under which such entities 
are set up, be it the Partnership Act 1967, the Companies 
Act 1965 or the Act of Parliament which sets up the 
particular corporation. 
If such an entity enters into a contract 
the insured, the contract is entered int 
or directors for and on its behalf. The 
the person who signs the contract but 
persons for whom the entity intends 
insurance protection. 
of insurance as 
o by its partners 
insured is not 
the person or 
to provide the 
In Poh Sin Mining Co. v Welfare Insurance Co. Ltd. 
33, the 
plaintiff company made a claim under a workmen's 
compensation policy issued by the defendant. The 
defendant denied liability on the ground that the policy 
was not issued to the plaintiff company but to two 
individuals, Lau and Hah. In the proposal form it was 
stated that the policy was to be in the names of 
these 
two persons but it was also stated that the workmen 
to be 
covered by the policy were in the employment 
of the 
plaintiff company. The cover note was 
issued in the names 
33. [1971) 1 MLJ 65. 
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of Lau and Hah. It was held that the insured under the 
policy were the plaintiff's workmen and therefore the 
insurer was liable. 
The requirement of insurable interest in contracts of 
insurance also means that a person without such interest 
34 has no capacity to enter into a contract of insurance. 
In the case of the insurer, its capacity to enter into a 
contract of insurance depends on whether it is authorised 
to carry out such insurance business5. An insurer who is 
3 
not registered with the Director-General of Insurance 
cannot carry out insurance business and hence lacks the 
capacity to enter into such contracts36. 
2.4 Consent/Consensus Ad Idem 
To be valid, a contract must be entered into with the 
free consent of the parties37. Consent is free if it is 
free from coercion, undue influence, fraud, 
misrepresentation or mistake38. Except where 'high 
pressure' methods are used by intermediaries, it can be 
34. See Chapter Three - Insurable Interest. 
35. Insurance Act 1963, s. 3(2)(a). 
36. As to the effect of contracts with such insurers, see 
infra. pp. 74 - 75. See also Chapter 
Fourteen 
Statutory Regulation of the Insurance Industry. 
37. Contracts Act 1950, s. 10(l). 
38. s. 14. 
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generally presumed that an insured enters into a contract 
of insurance with free consent. The insured is deemed to 
consent to all the terms and conditions in the insurer's 
usual policy. This is so even if the insured does not get 
precisely what he bargained for9. 3 
The Contracts Act does not mention consensus ad idem as a 
separate element for the validity of a contract. A 
meeting of the minds is in fact a necessary constituent 
of the element of free consent which is defined as the 
agreement between two or more persons upon the same thing 
40 
and in the same sense. 
In insurance, it is the element of consensus ad idem 
rather than that of consent that is frequently emphasised 
by the courts. The former has not however been given a 
meaning which is substantially different from or wider 
than, the latter. 
If there is consensus ad idem between the contracting 
parties but the policy fails to reflect this, either 
party can seek a rectification of the policy. Such an 
action will not succeed if the parties have never 
been ad 




the insurer claimed that a motor policy 
issued by 





40. s. 13. 
41. (1953) 19 MLJ 38. 
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them did not cover liability to a pillion rider. The 
appellant contended that such liability was covered by 
the policy or if it was not so covered, that he was 
entitled to a rectification of the policy to include such 
liability. Brown J refused to allow the policy to be 
rectified because: 
42 
[R]ectification can only be granted where the 
document fails to represent the common 
intention of the parties, and in order to make 
it conform to what they have agreed... there was 
never agreement between the parties that death 
or injuries sustained by a pillion rider should 
be covered... the parties were at no time ad 
idem on this matter. 
If a contract of insurance is tainted with illegality and 
one of the parties is unaware of this, there can be no 
consensus ad idem between the parties43. Parole evidence 
is admissable to show that parties to a contract were ad 
4 
idem on a particular matter4. 
3.0 Cover Notes 
A cover note is a document issued by the insurer prior to 
the issue of a policy. It provides evidence of the 
existence of insurance cover for a temporary period. 
A 
cover note serves the dual purpose of providing 
the 
42. Ibid. at p. 41. 
43. Asia Insurance Co. Ltd. v American 
International 
Assurance Co. Ltd. (1953) 19 MLJ 
87. See infra. p. 73. 
44. Ibid. at p. 88. 
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insured with immediate cover whilst giving the insurer 
the opportunity to consider and make a final decision on 
whether or not to issue a policy and thereafter, if 
necessary, to prepare the said policy. 
Being as its name suggests, merely a note, a cover note 
contains only the minimum of details about the cover 
provided. It does not exhaustively define the scope of 
the cover nor does it stipulate all the terms and 
conditions which are applicable thereto. The terms and 
conditions in the insurer's usual policy are often made 
applicable to the holder of a cover note by means of a 
clause which incorporates such terms and conditions into 
the cover note. The effect of an incorporation clause is 
to make all the terms and conditions in the insurer's 
usual policy applicable to the holder of the cover note. 
This is so even if he has no knowledge of those terms and 
conditions. 
In Chop Eng Thye Co. v Malaysia National Insurance 
Bhd. 
45, in March 1971 the plaintiff applied to the 
defendant for a fire policy for their smoke-house and its 
contents, for a period of one year from 2nd April 
1971. 
Pursuant to this, a cover note was issued. Four 
days 
later the smoke-house and its contents were 
destroyed by 
45. [1977) 1 MLJ 161. 
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fire. As the defendants failed to settle the claim, the 
plaintiffs filed an action against them on 16 May 1972. 
In denying liabilty, the defendant relied on a condition 
which stipulated that they would not be liable for any 
loss or damage after the expiration of twelve months from 
the happening of the loss unless the claim was the 
subject of a pending action or arbitration46. This 
condition was not in the cover note itself but was in the 
insurer's usual fire policy. The defendants contended 
that the condition was applicable by virtue of an 
incorporation clause in the cover note. Citing the 
English cases of Queen Insurance Co. v William Parsons47 
and General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation 
Ltd. v Shuttleworth48, Ajaib Singh J accepted the 
defendant's contention. According to the learned judge: 
49 
[B]y incorporating the clauses and conditions 
of the defendant's fire insurance policy in the 
cover note in that form and content both 
plaintiffs and the defendants rendered 
themselves bound by those clauses and 
conditions. 
According to the Privy Council in Queen Insurance Co. v 
William Parsons, there was no duty on the insurer to show 
that the incorporation clause in the cover note had been 
46. As to the legality of this and similar clauses, see 
infra. pp. 69 - 73. 
47. (1881-82) 7 App. Cas. 96. 
48. (1938) 60 L1. LR 30. 
49. Op. cit. footnote 45 at p. 165. 
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brought to the notice of the insured or that he had in 
fact had the opportunity of knowing what those terms and 
conditions were. Implicit in the decision in Chop Eng 
Thye is the recognition of the validity of such a ruling 
in Malaysia. 
Given the special circumstances characterising the 
Malaysian insurance market which put the insured in a 
particularly vulnerable position, such as the use of 
English in policies, the lack of professionalism among 
intermediaries coupled with a heavy reliance upon them by 
the insuring public and the low level of consumer 
awareness about insurance transactions generally, the 
application of such a ruling in Malaysia seems unduly 
harsh. 
While there is no necessity to prohibit the use of 
incorporation clauses altogether, measures can be taken 
to regulate their use. The insurer should be statutorily 
compelled to issue with every cover note, a specimen copy 
of their usual policy for the particular type of 
insurance for which the cover note is issued. This will 
provide the holder of a cover note with the opportunity 
of finding out the terms and conditions to which his 
cover is subject. Compliance with such a requirement can 
be ensured by introducing a provision which makes an 
incorporation clause in a cover note ineffective unless 
the cover note is issued together with a specimen copy of 
the policy. 
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Normally the duration of the validity of the cover note 
is stated in the note itself. In such a case unless 
extended, the cover note expires on the date stated. If a 
policy is issued prior to that date, the cover note 
ceases to be valid from the date the policy is issued. 
Once a cover note ceases to be valid, it no longer forms 
part of the contractual documents between the insurer and 
the insured and cannot therefore be used for the purpose 
50 of construing a policy. 
4.0 Commencement and Termination of a Contract of 
Insurance 
4.1 Commencement 
In a contract of insurance, the commencement of a 
contract and the commencement of the cover provided by 
the policy need not necessarily coincide although the 
latter cannot commence before the former. 
A contract is complete when the proposal is accepted by 
the person to whom it is made and such acceptance is 
communicated to the proposer 
l. Generally commencement of 5 
the risk or the cover provided by a policy of insurance 
can be at any time after the formation of the contract. 
50. Poh Sin Mining Co. v Welfare Insurance 
Co., op. cit. 
footnote 33. 
51. Contracts Act 1950, s. 7. 
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In non-life insurance however, the Insurance Act makes 
the payment of a premium, or a deposit or at least a 
guarantee that the premium will be paid within the 
stipulated time, mandatory before the risk under the 
policy can commence52. Although there is no parallel 
provision for life insurance, the commencement of cover 
thereunder is normally postponed until a stipulated date 
or until a certain condition is satisfied, such as the 
payment of the first premium by the insured or the issue 
of policy by the insurer or both. 
Whilst the date on which the cover provided by a policy 
commences is vital for determining when the policy is in 
fact operative, the date on which the contract commences 
or is formed is equally important as it is from that date 
that the parties are bound by the contract. It is also 
from that date that the duty of disclosure ceases. 
There can, however, be times when the distinction between 
the formation of the contract and the commencment of 
cover under the policy is blurred. In Borhanuddin 
bin 
Haji Jantara & Ors. v American International Assurance 
Co. Ltd. 
53, 
Azian an air stewardess was killed when the 
plane in which she was on duty crashed on 
4 December 
52. Insurance Act 1963, s. 14A. 
53. [1986) 1 MLJ 246 (High Court) and 
[19871 1 MLJ 22 
(Supreme Court). 
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1977. Just prior to that, Azian had completed a proposal 
form for an insurance policy on her life, with the 
respondent. The proposal was dated 21 November 1977 and 
in it she proposed to insure her life for (M)$50,000 to 
mature on her death or on her reaching the age of 55 
years, whichever is sooner. She also asked for an 
additional cover of (M)$50,000 for death by accident. The 
premium was proposed to be paid on a monthly basis. At 
the bottom of the proposal form was a declaration signed 
by Azian that 'the assurance herein applied for shall not 
take effect unless and until a policy is issued and 
delivered ' and 'the first premium thereon actually paid 
in full' during her lifetime and in her good health and 
that 'if the premium be paid in cash at the time of 
signing the application and a conditional receipt issued 
thereto, the provisions of the receipt shall apply'. 
Azian's proposal form reached the respondent's 
underwriting department on 5 December 1977. There was 
evidence that Azian had, on a different occasion before 
the crash, paid (M)$118 to the respondent's cashier 
for 
which a receipt had been issued. It was not 
indicated 
what the payment was for. At the back of the receipt, 
under 'Conditions of Payment' it was stated 
that the 
receipt of the money in no way committed 
the respondent 
to the acceptance of the proposal and that 
the respondent 
was entitled to return the money to 
the payer. 
rn 
Action was brought by the administrators of Azian's 
estate alleging that she had a valid policy on the day of 
the fatal crash. The respondent contended that there was 
no concluded contract because the issue of a policy was a 
condition precedent for the commencement of cover and 
Azian had not been issued with a policy. The plaintiffs 
argued that there was a concluded contract from the time 
the respondent received the (M)$118 and that the notice 
at the back of the receipt was not binding. 
The High Court dismissed the action on the grounds that 
there was no concluded contract because no policy had 
been issued and because the exact amount of the premium 
payable was never determined. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
High Court for two reasons. First they accepted the 
evidence of the respondent's life underwriter that the 
payment made by Azian was in fact the first premium. 
Second, they held that the condition at the back of the 
receipt was inapplicable because the proposal form stated 
that such condition was applicable only if payment was 
made at the time the proposal form was signed. 
Azian made 
her payment on a different occasion, after she 
had signed 
and submitted the proposal form. 
According to the Supreme Court there was 
a contract in 
existence and as Azian, by paying 
the premium, had 
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performed her part of the bargain, it was the insurer's 
duty to issue and deliver the policy to her, otherwise 
they would be in breach of contract. 
The decision of the High Court which was based on the 
non-existence of a contract rather than the 
non-commencement of the cover leans more favourably 
towards the insurer. It unnecessarily lengthens the 
period of disclosure and allows the insurer to take into 
account an increase in risk even at the stage where the 
provision of cover has been agreed to, simply because 
either the policy has not been issued or the premium has 
not been paid or both. The decision of the Supreme Court 
that there was a valid policy and that the risk had 
commenced from the moment the insured performed her part 
of the bargain, is therefore a welcome development. A 
logical consequence of this decision is that the duty of 
disclosure also ceases once the insured has performed her 
part of the bargain. 
The Supreme Court decision seems to be consistent with 
English decisions like Canning v Farquhar54 where it was 
said that once the premium was accepted, there existed a 
valid contract, as the insurer had the right 
to refuse 
the risk only before the premium was accepted. 
A similar 
54. (1886) 16 QBD 727 at pp. 731 - 732, per Lord 
Esher MR. 
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view was expressed in relation to a contract for the 
renewal of cover in Solvency Mutual Guarantee Co. v 
5 Froane5. 
Neither the payment of the premium nor the issue of a 
policy is a pre-requisite for the formation of a 
contract. Where the provision of cover before payment of 
premium is prohibited or where the insurer agrees to 
provide cover subject to the fulfillment of these 
conditions, there exists a valid contract. However, the 
provision of cover thereunder is postponed until such 
conditions are satisfied. By drawing a distinction 
between the two, the interest of the insured can be 
safeguarded, as an insurer who thereafter refuses to 
accept the premium tendered or to issue a policy will be 
in breach of contract. The duty of disclosure also ceases 
from the time the contract is formed, not from the time 
the provision of cover commences. 
4.2 Termination 
A contract of insurance for a specific period comes 
to a 
natural end once that period has expired. 
In a long term 
insurance contract, where the premium 
is payable 
periodically, while the contract 
is generally regarded 
55.158 ER 369 at p. 373, per Bramwell 
B. 
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as being for the entire term, its continuance is subject 
to the periodic payment of the premiums. if the premium 
is not paid when it is due or after the expiration of the 
days of grace, if any, the contract ceases for failure of 
consideration; the periodic payment being part of the 
consideration for the contract. A life policy which has 
been in force for three years or more however will not 
lapse for non-payment of the premium56. It shall instead 
remain valid subject to modification by the insurer as to 
the period for which it is to remain in force or as to 
the amount of benefits payable thereunder or both. 
An insured who has had a life policy 
policy for a period of three or six 
can also voluntarily terminate 
surrendering the policy for its 
exchanging it for a fully paid-up po 
or a home service 
years respectively 
the contract by 
surrender value or 
57 licy. 
A contract of insurance can also be cancelled by the 
insurer if the insured has breached a condition in the 
policy58. If such cancellation is communicated by post to 
the insured, it is effective from the date the notice of 
cancellation is posted. This is so even if the notice 
failed to reach the insured. In Lee Seng Heng & Ors. v 
56. Insurance Act 1963, s. 43(2). 
57. s. 43(1) and (2). 
58. Lee Cheng Oo v China Insurance Co. Ltd. 
(1962) 28 MLJ 
297. 
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Guardian Assurance Co. Ltd. 59, the plaintiff insured 
their stock-in-trade and furniture under the defendant's 
fire policy for a period of one year from 6 February 
1931. The policy was effected and the premium was paid 
through an agent in Malacca as the defendant's head 
office was in Singapore. A fire destroyed the plaintiff's 
entire premises. 
The defendant denied liability claiming that they had 
effectively cancelled the policy prior to the fire and 
that such cancellation had been communicated to the 
plaintiff by means of a letter sent through the post. The 
letter was delayed in the post and by the time it was to 
be delivered, the plaintiff's premises had been burnt 
down so it was returned to the defendant. It was held 
that the cancellation was effective from the date the 
letter was posted and so the defendant was not liable 
under the policy. 
The validity of this decision in Malaysia today is 
suspect. It was decided in Singapore and the law 
applicable there was the English Law. The Contracts 
Enactment 1899 of the Federated Malay States which 
preceded the Contracts Act 1950, was not applicable 
there. Although the present Contracts Act does not 
have a 
provision relating to the communication of a notice 
of 
59. (1932) 1 MLJ 17. 
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cancellation of a contract, it has provisions relating to 
the revocation of an acceptance. Such communication is 
complete as against the person to whom it is addressed 
only when it comes to his knowledge60. Thus the risk of 
delay or non-delivery when the revocation is communicated 
by post is borne by the sender. If the cancellation of an 
existing contract can be equated with the revocation of 
an acceptance, the above provision should at least be 
used as a guiding principle in determining when a notice 
of cancellation which is sent by post is effective. 
In a contract of insurance on goods, the insured must 
have an insurable interest in the goods both at the 
inception of the policy as well as at the time of loss. 
Such a contract of insurance therefore lapses if the 
insured ceases to have an insurable interest in the 
subject matter of the insurance. In Roslan bin Abdullah v 
New Zealand Insurance Co. 
61, the appellant was injured in 
a collision between a lorry driven by him and another 
driven by one Lee and belonging to the United Malaya 
Co. and allegedly insured with the respondent. Having 
obtained but failed to enforce judgements against 
both 
Lee and the United Malaya Co., the appellant sought 
to 
recover the damages from the respondent as 
insurers of 
the lorry. The respondent denied liability on the ground 
60. Contracts Act 1950, s. 4(2)(a). 
61. [1981] 2 MLJ 324. 
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that they were insurers of the said lorry when it 
belonged to its previous owner, Messrs. Wee & Wee. As the 
lorry had been sold by them to the United Malaya Co., the 
policy had lapsed. Both the High Court and the Federal 
Court upheld the respondent's contention. 
While an insured under a long-term policy in England has 
a statutory right of cancellation within a stipulated 
time without having to give any reason62, the Malaysian 
insured is in a less envious position. The Insurance Act 
gives the insured under a life policy (including a home 
service policy), the right to cancel the policy only if 
he objects to any term or condition in the policy. In 
such a case he is required to return the policy together 
with the objection in writing, to the insurer within 
fourteen days (or twenty eight days in the case of a home 
service policy) after the delivery of the policy to him. 
Such a policy is deemed to be returned to the insurer 
when the policy and the objections are received by the 
insurer or if they are sent by registered post, from the 
time they are posted63. 
As the provisions do not specify the nature of the 
objection, presumably an insured can object to any term 
or condition in the policy on any ground. An 
insurer to 
62 Insurance companies Act 1982 c. 31, s. 
75 and s. 76. 
. 
63. Insurance Act 1963, s. 15D(1) and s. 
18B(1). 
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whom such a policy has been returned cannot challenge the 
validity of the objection. Upon receiving the policy and 
the objection, the insurer is required to 'forthwith 
refund any premium which has been paid in respect of the 
policy which shall thereupon be cancelled'. 
Hence, if within fourteen (or twenty eight) days after 
the receipt of the policy, the insured decides not to 
proceed with the insurance, all he has to do is to put 
down in writing his objection to any term or condition in 
the policy and return the policy together with the 
objection to the insurer. The insurer is then legally 
bound to cancel the policy and return his premium. 
With some ingenuity, the above provisions can be regarded 
as indirectly providing the insured with a 'cooling-off 
period' for life policies. The effective use of this 
provision however can be hampered by several factors. The 
average insured may not be aware of these provisions as 
the insurer is not required to bring them to his notice. 
Even amongst those who may be aware, the idea of having 
to prepare a written complaint to be sent to an insurance 
company may seem a daunting task. Intermediaries might 
also discourage the insured from exercising such an 
option in case their commissions might 
be lost or 
reduced. 
The interest of long-term policyholders can 
be better 
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served by having provisions similar to those in England. 
The insured should be given an unconditional right to 
cancel the policy within a stipulated time and the 
existence of such a right must be informed to the insured 
when the policy is delivered to him. The inclusion of a 
simple cancellation form together with such information 
will also greatly help those who may find it difficult to 
draft their own notices of cancellation. 
5.0 Contracts Tainted with Illegality 
The Contracts Act draws no distinction between illegal 
and void contracts64. All contracts which are illegal are 
void. A contract of insurance can be tainted with 
illegality in a number of ways. Since a contract is 
illegal if it involves an unlawful purpose or object65, a 
contract of insurance which is intended to serve an 
illegal purpose will be illegal and void. A contract of 
insurance may also be illegal if one of the contracting 
parties is prohibited from entering into such a contract, 
such as when the insured lacks insurable interest or 
where the insurer is not registered in accordance with 
the Insurance Act. A contract of insurance is also 
64. The terms 'void' and 'illegal' are used 
interchangeably in the Act. See eg. s. 24 which 
provides that a contract with an unlawful object or 
consideration is void. This includes both 
illegal and 
void considerations under English law. See generally, 
Sinnadurai, Op. cit., pp. 356 - 358. 
65. Contracts Act 1950, s. 24. 
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illegal if it contains a clause in restraint of legal 
proceedings66 or if the events leading to it are tainted 
with illegality7. 
6 
S. 29 of the Contracts Act provides that any agreement by 
which any party thereto is restrained from enforcing his 
rights by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary 
tribunals or which limits the time within which he may 
enforce his rights, is void to that extent. There are a 
number of exceptions, one of which is that a clause which 
provides that the parties agree to refer disputes to 
arbitration is not illegal. 
Policies of insurance usually require the insured to make 
any claim arising thereunder within a specified period. 
Other policies go a step further by providing that if 
this is not done, the insurer is absolved of all 
liability for the loss. The validity of such a clause 
depends on whether it amounts to a restraint of legal 
proceedings. 
In Corporation Royal Exchange v Teck Guan68, the 
defendant insured his shop and its contents under a fire 
policy issued by the plaintiff. A fire on 25 November 
66. s. 29. 
67. Asia Insurance Co. Ltd. v American International 
Assurance Co. Ltd. Op. cit. footnote 
43. See also 
infra. p. 74. 
68. (1921) 2 FMSLR 121. 
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1911 totally destroyed the shop and its contents. Details 
of the claim were submitted to the insurer on 8 December 
1911. On 5 January 1912, the insurer wrote to the insured 
repudiating the policy and denying liability for the 
loss. On 6 May 1912, the insured filed a suit against the 
insurer. In denying liability, the insurer relied on 
Condition 13 in the policy which stated: 
If a claim be made and rejected and an action 
or suit be not commenced within three months 
after such rejection... all benefits under this 
policy shall be forfeited. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial 
judge that the clause was void by virtue of s. 28 of the 
Contracts Enactment 1899 of the Federated Malay States 
which is in pari materia with s. 29 of the Contracts Act. 
According to Sercombe-Smith CJC: 
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[T]he Limitation Enactment 1896 allows 6 years 
from the time when a contract in writing is 
broken within which a suit for compensation for 
the breach of such a contract will lie. 
It seems clear to me that the effect of 
Condition 13 is to cut down the period within 
which an assured may bring a suit for 
compensation for breach of a written contract 
to a period less than that sanctioned by the 
Limitation Enactment 1896. This being so, that 
condition is rendered void to that extent by 
s. 28 of the Contracts Enactment... 
A provision similar to that in the Limitation Enactment 
is found in the present Limitation ordinance 1953. 
69. Ibid. at p. 123. 
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Unfortunately, this provision together with the above 
decision have neither prevented insurers from including 
similar clauses in their policies nor prompted the courts 
to be more wary in giving effect to such clauses70. This 
is clearly illustrated by the case of Chop Eng Thye & Co. 
71 v Malaysia National Insurance Sdn Bhd. A clause in a 
fire policy read: 
In no case whatever shall the company be liable 
for any loss or damage after the expiration of twelve months unless the claim is the subject 
of pending action or arbitration. 
70. In India a similar provision in the form of s. 28 of 
the Contracts Act 1872, has been given a restrictive 
meaning. The courts there distinguished between 
agreements which expressly restricted parties from 
enforcing their rights after the expiry of a specific 
period of time, and those which had no such 
restriction but merely provided for a forfeiture or a 
release of rights if no suits were brought within the 
stipulated time. Only the former was held to be 
within the purview of such a provision. In the area 
of insurance, this distinction is illustrated by two 
cases, namely Ma Ywet v China Life Insurance Co. 
(1911) 11 IC 765 and Baroda Spinning and Weaving Co. 
Ltd. v Satyanarayen Marine and Fire Insurance Co. 
(191-4) ILR 38 Bom. 344. In the first case, a 
condition in the policy which clearly stipulated that 
no suit could be brought after one year, was held 
void under s. 28 of the Contracts Act 1872. In the 
second case, a clause in a fire policy which read: 
'If any claim is made and rejected and an action or 
suit be not commenced within three months after such 
rejection, all benefits under the policy shall be 
forfeited' was held to be valid. See further, Pollock 
and Mulla, Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, 
9th Ed., Triparthi, Bombay 1972, pp. 295 - 296. Such a 
fine and technical distinction seems both artificial 
and unnecessary - it allows insurers to manipulate 
the words used in the policy in order to defeat the 
provision. 
71. Op. cit. footnote 45. 
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This clause was successfully used by the insurer to 
defeat the insured's claim. Neither the earlier case of 
Corporation Royal Exchange nor s. 29 of the Contracts Act 
was considered by the Court. 
If the contract of insurance itself is not illegal but 
the events leading to its formation have an element of 
illegality, then whether such illegality affects the 
validity of the contract depends on whether it affects 
the bargain between the parties, ie. whether the 
illegality results in the absence of a consensus ad idem 
between the parties. 
In Asia Insurance Co. Ltd. v The American International 
Assurance Co. Ltd. 
72, 
Bien Hoe Co. insured their stocks 
of rubber with the plaintiffs who reinsured part of the 
risk with the defendant. On a claim under the policy, the 
plaintiffs paid their total liability and then sought to 
recover part of that amount from the defendant. The 
defendant resisted this claim on several grounds one of 
which was that Bien Hoe had stored the rubber without a 
licence as required by the Municipal Ordinance and the 
Rubber Dealers Ordinance. They contended that as Bien Hoe 
was committing an illegal act in storing the rubber, the 
policies issued in relation to such storage, 
including 
the reinsurance policy, were void. 
72. Op. cit. footnote 43. 
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The plaintiffSargued that this fact did not invalidate 
any of the policies. Citing inter alia the case of 
Goulstone v Royal Insurance Co. 73, they contended that 
the fact that an illegal act had been committed in 
relation to the subject matter of the insurance did not 
invalidate the contract. Brown J however distinguished 
the facts in the cases cited from those before him: 74 
[T]he reason for the decision in all these cases was 
that the illegality which was committed by one of 
the contracting parties did not affect the bargain 
which the parties had made.. . the contracting parties knew what they were bargaining for and got it... 
[T]he conditions which precluded the Bien Hoe Co. 
from obtaining a licence were such that their 
illegal act... goes to the root of these contracts... 
The parties were not ad idem... If the plaintiff did 
not know of Bien Hoe's illegality, they did not 
disclose this knowledge to the defendant; and the 
defendants were not ad idem with the plaintiffs when 
they entered into the contract of insurance. 
Whether the same line of argument can be used in 
determining the status of a contract of insurance with an 
unauthorised insurer remains to be seen. So far there has 
been no reported Malaysian case which challenges the 
authority of an insurer to enter into such a contract. 
In England there are at least three recent decisions with 
three different solutions to this problem. In Bedford 
Insurance Co. Ltd. v Instituto de Ressaguros du Brazil75, 
73.197 ER 725. 
74. Op. cit. footnote 43 at pp-88 - 89. 
75.11984 1 Lloyd's Rep. 210. 
74 
it was held that such a contract was illegal and void. 
Later, in Stewart v oriental Fire and Marine Insurance 
Co. 
76, it was held that the contract was only enforceable 
by the innocent party, ie. the insured. In Phoenix 
General Insurance Co. of Greece SA v Halvanon Insurance 
Ltd. 
77, it was held at first instance that the contract 
was enforceable by the innocent party and that if the 
party failed or could not enforce the contract than it 
could recover damages from the insurer which was equal in 
amount to what it would have been entitled under the 
contract, for breach of an implied warranty that the 
insurer would have the requisite authority to enter into 
such a contract. This decision was reversed by the Court 
of Appeal whose decison focussed mainly upon the 
construction of the related statutory provisions it 
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remains to be seen how a Malaysian court will react to a 
similar problem as neither the Contracts Act nor the 
Insurance Act seem to provide them with any solution79. 
76. [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 109. 
77. [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 599 (HC) and [1986] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep. 552 (CA). 
78. The importance of the Court of Appeal decision in the 
UK has however been diminished by s. 132 of the 
Financial Services Act 1986. This provision allows 
the insured to decide whether or not to treat the 
contract as enforceable. If he decides to treat the 
contract as unenforceable, he can claim for a return 
of his premiums as well as compensation for any loss 
which he has incurred as a result. See further, 
Birds, J, 'Illegal Contracts Again. ', [1987] JBL 49. 
79. Under s. 24 of the Contracts Act 1950, an agreement 
is 
void if its consideration or object is prohibited 
by 
law. A contract with an unauthorised insurer does not 




1.0 The Origins of the Concept 
The freedom to contract has always been so jealously 
guarded by the common law courts that even wagering 
contracts per se were neither unlawful nor 
unenforceable 
1. 
The courts would only refuse to enforce 
such a contract if it was intended to encourage immoral 
acts2, was injurious to a third party3 or was contrary to 
public policy4. 
With the growth of the insurance industry, insurance was 
soon conveniently used as a new form of wagering. The 
common law courts tolerated insurances on ships5, entire 
marine adventures and subsequently on the lives of others 
by people whose sole interest was to make a quick gain on 
the occurrence of the insured peril. Where however the 
courts regarded a particular contract of insurance to be 
one of indemnity, no claim was allowed if the insured 
1. March v Piggot 98 ER 471 and Good V Elliot 100 ER 808. 
2. Gilbert V Sykes 104 ER 1045. 
3. Da Costa v Jones 98 ER 1331. 
4. Atherfold V Beard 100 ER 328, see further, Merkin, R, 
'Gambling by Insurance -A Study of the Life Insurance 
Act 1774', (1890) 9 Anglo-American Law Review 
331. 
5. Depaba V Ludlow 92 ER 1112. 
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could not show an interest in the subject matter6. To 
dispense with the requirement of interest, 'Honour 
Policies' or 'Policy Proof of Interest (P. P. I) Policies' 
were introduced and clauses such as 'without benefit of 
salvage to the insurer' were commonly inserted in marine 
policies. 
The abuse and perversion of insurance contracts led to 
early legislative attempts to rescue the industry from 
being turned into merely an avenue for gambling. The 
first attempt was made in 1745 with the passing of the 
Marine Insurance Act7. This Act did not introduce the 
requirement of insurable interest as such; it merely 
prohibited the issue of policies which dispensed with 
proof of interest or policies by way of gaming or 
wagering. 
8 
The first mention of the requirement of insurable 
interest as a means of combating gambling in the area of 
non-marine insurance was made in the Life Assurance Act 
17749. S. 1 of this Act provides that no insurance shall 
be made where the personSto whom such policies are issued 
qr6 
have no interest, orKby way of gaming or wagering. 
6. Goddart v Garrett 23 ER 774. 
7.19 Geo. II, c. 37. 
8. s. l. 
9.14 Geo. III, c. 48. 
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The 1774 Act has numerous limitations. While its 
expressed purpose was to check 'a mischievous kind of 
gaming'10, the Act does not make it an offence for a 
person to enter into a contract of insurance in which he 
has no interest, it merely declares such a contract to be 
null and void. 'Interest' is not defined and the time at 
which that interest must exist is not specified. The Act 
also fails to determine the nature of interest that is 
necessary to satisfy its requirements. These are issues 
which have subsequently proven to be of utmost importance 
in this area of the law. 
In 1845, the Gaming Act which provides that all contracts 
or agreements by way of gaming or wagering are void was 
passedll. As a contract of insurance by someone without 
an interest is a wager, it is void by virtue of this Act. 
This Act has a special relevance to certain areas of 
insurance which are not covered by the earlier Acts, such 
as insurance on goods. 
The final contributions made by the English legislature 
to the development of the concept of insurable interest 
10. See Preamble to the Act. 
11.8 &9 Vict. c. 109, s. 18 
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came in the form of the Marine Insurance Act 190612 and 
the Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act 190913. 
Under the former, every contract of marine insurance made 
without interest or by way of gaming or wagering is 
void14. It also provides the only statutory definition of 
the term insurable interest15. The 1909 Act provides 
criminal sanctions for persons effecting marine insurance 
policies without bona fide interest or a bona fide 
expectation of acquiring an interest in the subject 
matter. Persons effecting such a policy as well as any 
broker or person through whom, and any insurer with whom 
the policy is effected are all guilty of criminal 
16 
offences. 
Apart from being intended to be the panacea for gambling 
by means of insurance, the requirement of insurable 
interest was also intended to prevent the fraudulent 
destruction of the subject matter of insurance. The 
Marine Insurance Act 1745 declared in its preamble that 
the issue of policies to parties having no interest 'had 
been productive of many pernicious practices, whereby 
great numbers of ships, with their cargoes , have either 
been fraudulently lost or destroyed or taken by enemy in 
12.6 Edw. VII c. 41 
13.9 Edw. VII c. 12 
14. s. 4(2). 
15. s. 5. 
16. s. 1(2). 
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A 
time of war'. The Life Insurance Act 1774 in its preamble 
mentioned the need to prevent 'a mischievous kind of 
gaming'. 
The other justification for the requirement of insurable 
interest frequently mentioned17 hinges upon the indemnity 
nature of certain insurance contracts, ie. that such 
indemnity contracts can only be maintained by the 
requirement of insurable interest. 
While the requirement of insurable interest might have 
succeeded in curbing most of the gaming activities at the 
time the statutes were passed, the prevention of gaming 
is no longer a valid justification for the requirement of 
insurable interest - at least not since 1845 in England 
and since 1899 in Malaysia. The Gaming Act 1845 of 
England and the Contracts Enactment 1899 of the Federated 
Malay States18 made all contracts by way of gaming or 
wagering null and void irrespective of their nature or 
content. Since then there is no longer any necessity of 
requiring an element of interest in insurance contracts 
17. See eg. Harnet and Thornton, 'Insurable Interest in 
Property: A Socio Economic Re-evaluation of a Legal 
Concept', (1948) 48 Columbia LR 1162 and Editorial 
Note, 'Insurable Interest in Property: An Expanding 
Concept', (1958-59) 44 Iowa LR 513. 
18. At present in Malaysia provisions similar 
to that in 
the Gaming Act are found in s. 31(l) of the 
Contracts 
Act 1950 and s. 27 of the Civil Law Act 
1956. See 
infra. pp. 93 - 94. 
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over and above that required by these statutes. 
Even in the absence of statutes prohibiting wagers, it is 
extremely doubtful to what extent the requirement of 
insurable interest can effectively curb gaming. Only the 
Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) Act 1909 (UK) makes 
it an offence to purchase, issue or otherwise deal with 
policies where there is no insurable interest. There are 
no similar provisions in relation to non-marine insurance 
and although it takes two parties to wager, the insured 
bears all the consequences of taking out a policy without 
insurable interest. The issue of policies without 
interest cannot be effectively curbed if the insurer is 
not only not penalised but in fact allowed to accept the 
premiums and then decide whether to raise the absence of 
insurable interest as a defence to the insured's claim. 
Even if the requirement of insurable interest still does 
to a limited extent prevent gaming, there are other areas 
in which insurance law neutralises such an effect. The 
law allows a life policy to be assigned and re-assigned 
ad infinitum to anyone the assignor chooses and the 
assignee is not required to have any insurable interest 
in the life insured. An assignee of a policy on the life 
of another can be as much a gambler as another who takes 
out a policy on the life of someone in whom 
he 
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has no insurable interest. 
The prevention of fraudulent destruction of the subject 
matter of insurance as a justification for the 
requirement of insurable interest is also not without 
weaknesses. 
The criminal law of both England and 
Malaysia in fact adequately protect persons and property 
from such unlawfully inflicted harm or destruction. 
Insurable interest can only possibly play a peripheral 
role in this respect, by removing one of the incentives 
for the commission of such crimes. It may also discourage 
the commission of crimes by the use of long-drawn and 
subtle methods where both mens rea and actus reus may be 
difficult to prove. 
It is also grossly unfair and extremely naive to presume 
that everyone who takes out a policy without insurable 
interest is a potential criminal while everyone who can 
show such interest is free from criminal intentions. In 
property insurance, it may not always be possible to show 
interest at the inception of the policy either because 
the existence of the subject matter or the existence of a 
legally recognised relationship between the insured and 
the subject matter cannot at that time be clearly 
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identified. In life insurance it would be simplistic to 
assume that a potential criminal would insure the life of 
someone in whom he has no insurable interest for the 
purpose of making a quick gain. It would be less 
suspicious for him to take out a policy on someone in 
whom he in fact has an insurable interest. 
There is also in existence in both England and Malaysia 
as in most other countries, the principle that a person 
cannot benefit from his own crime. The application of 
this universal legal principle is in itself sufficient to 
prevent the commission of crimes for the purpose of 
making insurance claims. In fact this principle is more 
effective in preventing fraudulent destruction because it 
is applicable across the board and does not presume that 
the temptation to destroy for the purpose of financial 
gains plagues only those without insurable interest in 
the subject matter to be destroyed. 
The principle of indemnity in relation to insurance means 
that the insurer is supposed to make good, in pecuniary 
terms, the loss suffered by the insured and the insured 
cannot recover more than he los/es. The requirement 
of insurable interest however is neither the sole nor 
the 
most effective yardstick for determining this. 
Rather 
than support the principle of indemnity, the requirement 
of insurable interest can sometimes 
destroy it, because 
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whether a person suffers a loss on the occurrence of the 
insured event does not always depend upon the existence 
of such an interest. This is clearly illustrated by 
Macaura v Northern Assurance Co. 19. Macaura, the sole 
shareholder of a limited company, had lent substantial 
sums of money to that company, so he insured, in his own 
name, timber which was owned by the company. Although the 
loss of the timber would have resulted in the value of 
Macaura's shares in the company to fall, the House of 
Lords held that Macaura as a shareholder had no insurable 
interest in the timber owned by the company. 
While the main criticism against the requitrnent of 
insurable interest in indemnity policies is that it does 
not always effectively promote indemnity, the 
alternatives too are not without their limitations. 
Although a principle of compensation for actual losses 
which results from the insured event, up to the maximum 
amount insured seems attractive, its implementation may 
prove difficult without an element like insurable 
interest which links the losses to the insured event. The 
use of vague formulas based on reasonable 
foresight, 
proximity or direct consequence may be even more 
problematic and perhaps open the floodgates of 
litigation 
19. [19251 AC 619. 
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even further. One solution which has been considered and 
in fact adopted in several countries is to alter the 
definition of insurable interest from one that requires 
proprietary interest to a more flexible one that 
recognises lawful and substantial economic interest. 20 
2.0 Sources of the Law Relating to insurable interest 
2.1 The Law in England 
The law on insurable interest in England today consists 
of the statutory provisions as mentioned earlier coupled 
with the case law that has since evolved. Where statutory 
provisions are exhaustive, such as in marine insurance, 
the cases merely illustrate the application and 
interpretation of such provisions. In areas such as life 
and property insurance where statutory provisions merely 
provide the bare skeleton of the law, case law forms an 
extremely important source of this aspect of the law. 
In the area of marine insurance, provisions -relating to 
insurable interest are found in the Marine Insurance Act 
1906. S. 4(l) declares every contract of marine 
20. Australian Law Commission Report No. 
20, Insurance 




insurance by way of gaming or wagering void. S. 4(2) 
provides that a contract made without interest or without 
an expectation of acquiring an interest is void. A person 
has an interest in a marine adventure 'where he stands in 
any legal or equitable relation to the adventure or to 
any insurable property at risk therein, in consequence of 
which he may benefit by the safety or due arrival of 
insurable property, or may be prejudiced by its loss or 
by damage thereto... 21 
The requirement of insurable interest in life and 
property insurance is based on the Life Insurance Act 
1774 but this Act has not had the same effect on life and 
property insurance as the 1906 Act had on marine 
insurance. The 1774 Act merely states in general terms 
that insurance without interest or by way of gaming or 
wagering are void22. It also provides that it shall not 
be lawful for policies to be made without inserting the 
name or names of the person or persons interested in the 
policy23 and that no greater sum shall be recovered 
from 
the insurer by the insured than the amount of the value 
of his interest in the subject matter of the 
insurance24. 
21. s. 5(2). 
22. s. l. 
23. s. 2. 
24. s. 3. 
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The brevity and generality of the provisions of the 1774 
Act has resulted in the development of a considerable 
body of case law in this area. For instance, although the 
Act does not state when interest must exist, it is now 
the law that in life insurance, insurable interest must 
be shown to exist only at the inception of the 
2 
contract5. This interest must be of a pecuniary nature 
26 
and following the definition in the Marine Insurance Act 
190627, this pecuniary interest must be based upon a 
legal or equitable relationship. Insurable interest is 
presumed to exist and proof thereof is dispensed with 
when a person takes out a policy on his own life28 or on 
29 
the life of his spouse. 
The 1774 Act also applies to insurance on property other 
than goods and merchandises30. As such insurance is one 
of indemnity, interest thereof must not only be shown to 
exist at the inception of the policy, as is required by 
, the Act, but also at the time of the loss31 
There are no specific statutory provisions requiring 
25. Dalby v India and London Life Assurance 
Co. 139 ER 
465. 
26. Halford v Kymer 109 ER 619. 
27. s. 5(2). 
28. Wainright v Bland 150 ER 334. 
29. Griffiths v Fler ing [1909] 1 KB 
805 and 
2M 
' Farl755. V 
(1886) TLR 
The Royal London Friendly society 
30. s. 1 and s. 4. 
31. Sadler's Co. v Badcock 26 ER 733. 
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insurable interest in non-marine insurance on goods and 
merchandises. However this does not mean that insurable 
interest is irrelevant to such policies for contracts of 
insurance without interest are wagers and are void under 
the Gaming Act 1845. Hence some form of interest must be 
shown at the inception of the contract. And as an 
insurance on goods is based on the principle of 
indemnity, interest must also be shown at the time of the 
loss. 
2.2 The Law in Malaysia 
The law relating to insurable interest in Malaysia is a 
reflection of the extent to which early English statutes, 
the common law and local statutes can all contribute to 
the moulding of just one legal concept. 
Prior to the passing of the Insurance Act 1963, there 
were no local statutory provisions relating to insurable 
interest. There were, however, already in existence 
provisions declaring agreements by way of wagers to 
be 
void. Such a provision was found in the earliest version 
of the Contracts Act, ie. the Contracts Enactment 
1899. 
S. 31 of the present Contracts Act 1950 
is identical to 
the earlier provision and is similar to s. 
18 of the 
Gaming Act 1845 (UK). The Civil Law Act 
1956 also 
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contains a similar provision32. 
A drastic change to the law of insurable interest in life 
insurance was introduced by the Insurance Act 1963. 
Although essentially regulatory in nature, this Act 
introduced a few radical changes to the substantive law. 
One such change is in relation to insurable interest in 
3 life insurance3. 
Assuming that the provisions in the English statutes are 
applicable, there are in Malaysia six different statutes 
which either directly or indirectly, provide the basis 
for the law relating to insurable interest. They are the 
Life Insurance Act 1774 (UK), the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 (UK) and the Marine Insurance (Gambling Policies) 
Act 1909 (UK), the Insurance Act 1963, the Contracts Act 
1950 and the Civil Law Act 1956. 
2.2.1 The Applicability of English statutes 
There being no parallel local statutes, the marine 
Insurance Act 1906 (UK) and the Marine Insurance 
(Gambling Policies) Act 1909 (UK) are applicable in 
Malaysia by virtue of s. 5 of the Civil Law Act 1956. 
These Acts provide the law relating to insurable 
interest 
in marine insurance. 
32. See infra. p. 95. 
33. See infra. p. 93. 
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While prior to 1963 the Life Insurance Act 1774 (UK) was 
applicable in toto by virtue of the same provision of the 
Civil Law Act, the same may no longer be the case. The 
1774 Act is applicable to life as well as property 
insurance except those on 'goods and merchandises'. While 
s. 40 of the Insurance Act 1963 has introduced a 
provision relating to insurable interest in life 
insurance, there is nothing in that Act in relation to 
insurable interest in the other areas to which the 1774 
Act is applicable. One possible deduction that can be 
made from this is that s. 40 has completely replaced the 
provisions of the 1774 Act as far as life insurance is 
concerned. Thus paradoxically the Life Insurance Act 
1774 (UK) is only applicable in Malaysia in relation to 
non-life policies, excluding those on 'goods and 
merchandises'. The other possible deduction is that as 
s. 40 does not conflict with the provisions of the 1774 
Act, this provision has not replaced the latter but has 
merely widened its scope. Thus in the area of life 
insurance, the provisions of both the Acts should be read 
together. This deduction can be supported by the fact 
that the 1963 Act does not, either in s. 40 or elsewhere, 
make any reference to the 1774 Act, so the 1774 Act 
has 
not been repealed either wholly or in parts. The 
1963 Act 
is also not a code on insurance law but 
is mainly an Act 
to regulate the business of insurance. 
It has not 
introduced a completely new law of insurance. 
Therefore 
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in the absence of a provision to that effect, it cannot 
be presumed that this Act has repealed the 1774 Act. 
2.2.2 S. 40 of the Insurance Act 1963 
The two most important provisions of s. 40 are subsections 
(1) and (2). They read: 
(1) A life policy insuring the life of anyone 
other than the person effecting the insurance 
or a person connected with him as mentioned in 
subsection (2) shall be null and void unless the person effecting the insurance has an insurable interest in that life at the time the insurance is effected; and the policy moneys 
paid under such a policy shall not exceed the 
amount of the insurable interest at that time. 
(2) The lives excepted from subsection (1), 
besides that of the person effecting the 
insurance, are those of that person's child or 
ward being under the age of majority at the 
time the insurance is effected, and of anyone 
on whom that person is at that time wholly or 
partly dependent. 
S. 40 has an obscure and mysterious history. It was in the 
original Bill that was tabled in Parliament but was not 
in the Draft Proposal of the Act in the Report Upon 
Insurance Legislation for the Federation of Malaya as was 
submitted by SW Caffin in 196034. 
34. Caffin, SW, Report Upon Insurance Legislation for the 
Federation of Malaya, 1960. SW Caffin was a former 
Insurance Commissioner of Australia who was appointed 
by the government of the Federation to prepare the 
Report and to draft a comprehensive insurance 
legislation. 
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The Minister of Finance when tabling the Insurance Bill 
justified the inclusion of s. 40 in the following words: 35 
It is well known that much of the business of the 'mushroom' life insurance companies 
consisted of policies closely akin to gambling. 
People insured the lives even of beggars in the 
street in the hope that they would die at an 
early date. The passing of the Bill will end 
this sort of thing. If a person does not have a 
pecuniary interest (what is in law called an 
insurable interest) in the life of another, any 
policy effected by him on the life of that 
other person shall be void. Exceptions to these 
are policies effected by a wife on the life of 
her husband, by a husband on the life of his 
wife, parents on the lives of their children 
and guardians on the lives of their wards. 
While the above justification might have been valid in 
the days prior to 1774, it is submitted that such a 
justification was not valid at the time when the Bill was 
introduced. Even prior to 1963, the Life Insurance Act 
1774 (UK) together with the English cases were applicable 
in Malaysia. There were also already in existence 
provisions relating to wagers in both the Contracts Act 
1950 and the Civil Law Act 1956. The proliferation of the 
'mushroom' companies was not because of any defects in 
the law relating to insurable interest but because there 
was hardly any regulation or supervision over the growth 
of such companies. The 1963 Act has introduced various 
effective measures for the regulation and control 
35. Dewan Rakyat Debates, 22nd December 
1962, Government 
Printers, Kuala Lumpur 1962, p. 3880. 
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of insurance companies, but 
serve such a purpose. 
s. 40 does not and canr. ot 
2.2.3 Statutory Provisions on Wagering Contracts 
S. 31(1) of the Contracts Act 1950 reads: 
Agreements by 
suit shall be 
alleged to be 
any person to 
other uncerta 
made. 
way of wagers are void; and no 
brought for recovering anything 
won on any wager, or entrusted to 
abide the result of any game or 
in event on which any wager is 
The above provision seems to share common deficiencies 
with s. 18 of the Gaming p, ct 1845 of England. Both merely 
declare agreements by way of wagers to be void but do not 
3 
make them illegal6. There are no penalties in either of 
the provisions for persons entering into such agreements. 
A wager is not defined in either of the provisions. The 
classic definition of a wager which has not only been 
affirmed by the Court of Appeal37 but has also been 
accepted by leading writers38 is that given by Hawkins J 
36. Seong Sam v Goon Food On (1933-34 
37. [1893] 1 QB 256. 
38. See eg. Guest, AG, (Ed. ) Anson's 
25th Ed., Clarendon, oxford 1979, 
MP, (Ed. ), Cheshire Fifoot & 
Contract, 11th Ed., Butterworths, 
FMSLR 169. 
Law of Contract, 
p. 334 and Furmston, 
Furmston's Law of 
London 1986, p. 308. 
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in Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. 39. 
A wagering contract is one by which two 
persons, professing to hold opposite views touching the issue of a future uncertain event, 
mutually agree that, dependent on the termination of that event, one shall win from 
the other, and the other shall pay or hand over to him, a sum of money or other stake; neither 
of the cýbtracting parties having any other interest in that contract than the sum or 
stake he will so win or lose, there being no 
other real consideration for the making of such 
contract by either of the parties. 
The absence of any other real interest in the contract 
apart from the wager itself distinguishes wagering 
contracts from insurance contracts. Furthermore, in a 
wager the intention is to create a speculative risk upon 
which to wager. In an insurance contract the intention is 
to transfer an existing risk from one party to another. 
Thus while a wager results in loss to one party and gain 
to another, insurance results in the payment of 
compensation to a party that has suffered loss by another 
who has been paid the premium for so doing. 
In insurance the element of insurable interest forms that 
'other interest' that distinguishes insurance contracts 
from wagers. If this 'other interest' is absent, then a 
contract of insurance can no longer be distinguished 
from 
a wager and thereby falls within the scope of a provision 
39. [18921 2 QB 484 at p. 490- 
40. Emphasis added. 
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like s. 31(l). Thus even in the absence of a specific 
requirement of insurable interest every contract of 
insurance must have some kind of interest so as to 
distinguish it from wagers and to bring it outside the 
purview of a provision against wagers. This interest 
however is wider and more general in its scope than 
insurable interest in insurance law. Although not defined 
in s. 31(l), 'interest' here seems to be used in its 
ordinary, non-technical and non-legal context. It should 
therefore include not merely interest which is based on a 
legally enforceable right as is the accepted notion of 
interest in insurance law41, but also interest based on 
the broader concept of factual expectation. A contract of 
insurance which does not contravene s. 31(l) cannot 
therefore be automatically presumed to have satisfied the 
requirement of insurable interest. 
It is noteworthy that apart from s. 31(1)of the Contracts 
Act, s. 26 of the Civil Law Act 1956 also declares 
agreements by way of wagers to be void. The courts 
however have almost always referred to the provision in 
41. Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Op. cit., footnote 
19. However in the Canadian case of Constitution 
Insurance Co. of Canada v Kosmopoulos, (1987) 34 DLR 
(4th) 208, where the facts are almost identical to 
that in Macaura, the Canadian Supreme Court applied 
the factual expectation theory and held that the sole 
shareholder of a company had an insurable sinterest 
i 
the company's property. See further, 
JBL 309. 
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the Contracts Act rather the one in the Civil Law Act in 
4 dealing with wagers2. 
3.0 Insurable Interest Defined 
In general terms insurable interest is the particular 
relationship or nexus between the person taking out an 
insurance policy and the subject matter of the insurance 
which must exist for there to be a valid contract of 
insurance. It is in determining which relationships are 
recognised and which are not that a more exhaustive 
definition is called for. 
The Insurance Act 1963 does not define insurable 
interest. Neither can a definition be found in the few 
Malaysian cases on this aspect of insurance law. The only 
statutory definition of this concept in Malaysia, as in 
England, is found in the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK): 
S. 5(l) Every person has an insurable interest 
who is interested in a marine adventure. 
S. 5(2) In particular a person is interested in 
a marine adventure when he stands in any legal 
or equitable relation to the adventure or to 
any insurable property at risk therein; in 
consequence of which he may benefit by the 
safety or due arrival of the insured property, 
or he may be prejudiced by its loss or by 
damage thereto, or by the detention thereof, or 
may incur liability in respect thereof. 
42. This can be perhaps be explained by the 
fact that 
while the Contracts Act deals specifically with 
contracts, the Civil Law Act is more general 
in its 
nature; see the Long Titles of both 
Acts. 
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As opposed to the statutory definition there is the 
definition given by Lawrence J in Lucena v Craufurd: 43 
A man is interested in a thing to whom 
advantage may arise, or prejudice happen from 
the circumstances which may attend to it... 
[I]nterest does not necessarily imply a right 
to the whole, or part of a thing, nor 
necessarily or exclusively that which may be 
subject of privation, but having some 
relationship to, or concern in the subject of 
insurance, which relation or concern by the 
happening of the perils insured against may be 
so affected as to produce a damage, detriment 
or prejudice to the person insuring; and where 
a man is so circumstanced with respect to 
matters exposed to certain risks or dangers, as 
to have a moral certainty of advantage or 
benefit ... To be interested in the 
preservation of a thing, is to be so 
circumstanced with respect to it as to have 
benefit from its existence, prejudice from its 
destruction. 
The definitions given above represent the two opposing 
views as to the exact scope of insurable interest. While 
the statutory definition emphasises the existence of a 
legal or equitable right, that given by Lawrence J 
is 
based on the wider premise of factual expectation of 
detriment from the loss or destruction of the property or 
advantage from its continued existence. 
The factual expectation theory was first articulated 
by 
Lord Mansfield in Le Cras v Hughes44 which was 
decided 
43.127 ER 630 at p. 642. 
44.99 ER 549. 
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twenty four years before Lucena v Crauwfurd. Since then 
however this definition has hardly ever been utilised in 
England as the English judges have always insisted on the 
existence of a legally enforceable right45. 
In Malaysia no case has arisen which requires the court 
to decide which of the two definitions to adopt. Should 
such a situation arise it is highly probable that 
following the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) and the 
i{ 
judicial trend in England, the definen based on a 
legally enforceable right will be adopted. 
4.0 insurable Interest in Life Insurance 
Under English law there are two basic rules governing 
insurable interest in life insurance. First, for there to 
an 
be kinsurable 
interest there must be pecuniary interest of 
some kind. Second, insurable interest is presumed to 
exist when a person insures his own life or that of his 
46 
spouse . 
S. 40 of the Insurance Act retains the first rule and 
enlarges the second. Insurable interest is presumed to 
exist not only when a person insures his own life or 
that 
45. Supra. p. 84. 
46. Op. cit. footnotes 28 and 29. 
9ý 
of his spouse, but also when he insures the life of his 
child or ward who is below the age of majority at the 
time the insurance is effected and when he insures the 
life of anyone upon whom he is at that time wholly or 
partly dependent. 
4.1 Insurable Interest in One's Own Life 
The Life Insurance Act 1774 (UK) itself makes no 
exceptions to the requirement of insurable interest in 
life insurance. The common law however has long 
recognised that insurable interest need not be proven 
when a person insures his own life47. The requirement of 
insurable interest in such a situation could not have 
been justified either by the aim of avoiding wagers or 
preventing destruction. A man would not commit suicide to 
get insurance moneys not for himself but for his 
estate 
48. 
In Malaysia the common law principle has been given 
statutory recog/nition. While s. 40 of the Insurance Act 
refers to a policy insuring the life of anyone 'other 
47. In M'Farlane v The Royal London Friendly 
Society 
(1886) 2 TLR 755 at p. 756, Pollock B said that there 
was nothing to prevent any person 
from insuring his 
own life a hundred times. 
48. The insurance by a man on his own life 
is not within 
the mischief of the Act as a man 
does not gamble his 
own life to gain a Pyrrhic victory 
by his09]nl 
ddeath, [19091 
per Kennedy LJ in Griffiths v 
Fleming 
at p. 821. 
99 
than the person effecting the insurance', s. 40(2) lists 
the lives excepted from subsection (1) 'besides that of 
the person effecting the insurance'. 
4.2 Insurable Interest in the Life of One's S ouse 
Under the common law this is the only family relationship 
where the existence of insurable interest is presumed. 
The fact that a husband is presumed to have an insurable 
interest in the life of his wife and that it was 
unnecessary to give affirmative evidence to that effect 
was first recognised in Griffiths v Flerning49 where it 
was held that insurable interest was to be presumed 
irrespective of whether the husband did or did not depend 
upon his wife in the pecuniary sense50. The same is true 
as regards the interest of the wife in the life of her 
husband. It was held in Reed v Royal Exchange Assurance 
Co. 51 that a wife insuring the life of her husband need 
not prove that she had an interest therein. 
In Malaysia s. 40(2) provides that one of the exceptions 
to the requirement of insurable interest is, when a person 
49. Ibid. 
50. Griffiths v Flerming was decided 
after the Married Women's Property Act 
1882 was 
passed. Prior to the passing of this Act a 
wife was 
the property of her husband. See generally, 
Holcombe, 
L, Wives and Property, Martin Robertson, 
Oxford 1983. 
51.170 ER 198. 
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effects a policy on the life of his or her spouse. Taus 
in this area too the law does not materially differ from 
that in England. However the application of this 
principle amongst Muslims in Malaysia may result in some 
practical differences. A Muslim marriage being 
polygamous, a Muslim man can have up to four wives at any 
one time. This means that a man who in fact has four 
wives is presumed to have an insurable interest in the 
lives of all his wives. As the law requires that such an 
interest be shown to exist only at the inception of the 
policy, if he divorces all the four and marries another 
set of four, he is able to insure the lives of all his 
new wives whilst retaining the policies on his ex-wives. 
4.3 Insurable Interest in the Lives of One's Minor. 
Children and Wards 
It is in relation to insurable interest in the lives of 
one's minor children and wards that s. 40 of the Insurance 
Act radically changes the common law. Under the common 
law, the case of Halford v Kymer52 made it clear that in 
the absence of evidence of pecuniary interest, a parent 
does not have an insurable interest in the life of his 
minor child. Neither does a guardian in the life of 
his 
ward. 5.40(2) exempts from the requirement of 
insurable 
52. Op. cit. footnote 26. 
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interest, a policy taken out by a person in the life of 
his minor child or ward who is below the age of 
majority53 at the time the policy is effected. 
The origin and rationale of this provision is unclear. 
Interestingly the Life Insurance Act 1945 of Australia 
has a similar though not identical provision. S. 86(l) of 
the Australian Act provides that a parent of a child 
under twenty one years of age, or a person in loco 
parentis with such a child has an insurable interest in 
the life of that child. 
As the raison d'etre for the introduction of the above 
provision has never been explained, what could have so 
strongly motivated the legislature to introduce a 
provision which represents a departure from the 
established common law principle remains a mystery. In 
all the other relationships where insurable interest is 
presumed to exist under s. 40, there runs a common 
connecting thread, ie. there is some form of dependence 
whether pecuniary or otherwise, by the person insuring 
upon the life insured. The same form of dependence cannot 
be said to be present in a parent - minor child or 
53. According to s. 2 of the Age of Majority Act 
1971, a 




guardian - minor ward relationship. The dependence if any 
in such a relationship is that of the child or ward upon 
the life of his parent or guardian, rather than the 
reverse. Parents and guardians are certainly not 
pecuniarily dependent upon such child or ward. Neither 
can it be logically said that they are emotionally 
dependent upon the lives of such children or wards in the 
same way as they are so dependent upon the lives of their 
spouses. If the contrary is to be presumed then the law 
should not discriminate between children who have 
attained the age of majority and those who have not. 
Similarly, if the justification for such a provision is 
based upon the extremely vague notion of 'expected 
dependence', ie. that the parent or guardian having taken 
care of the minors are entitled to expect to depend upon 
them for pecuniary returns in future, then again this 
provision should not be restricted to minor children and 
wards only. Parents and guardians often support the 
children long after they have reached the age of 
majority. 
If the reason for presuming insurable interest in such 
policies is to enable the parent or guardian to provide 
for the future security of such a child or ward, then 
there are other more effective ways of doing so. 
One 
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such means was 
v Kymer: 
54 
suggested by Bayley J in Halford 
If a father, wishing to give his son some 
property to dispose of, makes an insurance on his son's life in his (son's) name, not for his (the father's) benefit, but for the benefit of his son, there is no law to prevent his doing 
so ... 
In Malaysia s. 41 of the Insurance Act in fact allows a 
child above the age of ten years to enter into a contract 
of insurance provided that if he is under sixteen years 
of age he must have the written consent of his parent or 
55 
guardian 
Provisions for the future security of the child can also 
be effected by means of a trust policy under s. 23 of the 
Civil Law Act, ie. by the parent taking out a policy on 
56 
his own life and naming the child as a beneficiary. 
A parent or guardian is also free to assign a policy on 
his own life to his child once the child has reached the 
age of majority. 
There therefore seems to be no valid justification for 
presuming the existence of insurable interest on the part 
54. Op. cit. footnote 26 at p. 621. 
55. See Chapter Two - Contractual Formalities. 
56. See Chapter Ten - Assignments and Trusts. 
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of a parent or guardian in the life of his child or ward. 
Such a provision in fact defeats one of the very 
justifications for the requirement of insurable interest, 
ie. the removal of the temptation to destroy the subject 
matter of the insurance on the part of the insured. The 
presumption that a parent or guardian has an insurable 
interest in his child or ward may only encourage child 
neglect and abuse as there is little to prevent a parent 
having taken out a policy on the life of his child to 
neglect or even to use other subtle means to hasten the 
child's death. 
In England, in the past, it was common practice for 
parents to effect child's deffered assurance on the life 
of a child. Apart from being in breach of the requirement 
of insurable interest, such policies had several 
disadvantages. Parents could not get tax relief on such 
policies; the title to the policy remained vested in the 
parents unless the policy was effected by him as a 
trustee for the child or the policy had been assigned to 
the child. There were also uncertainties as' to whether 
the parent was entitled to take a loan or surrender such 
57 
a policy during the deferred period. 
57. Davies, BPA, Houseman & Davies Law of Life Assurance, 
10th Ed., Butterwoths, London 1984, p. 277. 
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The contemporary practice in England is for the parent to 
effect a child's deferred assurance which is designed 
either to provide a cash sum to the child when he attains 
a certain age or to enable the child to convert it into a 
policy on his own life at a low rate of premium58. As 
such a policy is effected not on the life of the child 
but on that of the parent no question of insurable 
interest arises. The premium will cease if the parent 
dies before the child reaches the specified age. The 
parent is also entitled to tax relief on the premium. 
In Malaysia it is still very common for parents to effect 
child's deferred assurance on the life of their child 
even though there is no tax relief for premium paid on 
the life of a child59. By virtue of s. 40(2) however, such 
policies, unlike those issued in England in the past, are 
issued not in breach of the requirement relating to 
insurable interest. 
4.4 Insurable Interest in the Life of a person on whom 
One is Wholly or Partly Dep endent 
Finally, insurable interest is deemed to exist under 
s. 40(2) when a person takes out a policy on the life of 
58. Ibid. at p. 278. 
59. Lee, KK, Life Insurance in Malaysia, Life 
Insurance 
Association of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 
1984, pp. 23 - 
24. 
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another on whom he is either wholly or partly dependent. 
Assuming that its rationale is defensible, the primary 
weakness of this provision is its generality. 'Persons on 
whom one is either wholly or partly dependent' is so 
broad and vague in its meaning that it is difficult to 
determine with certainty which relationships come within 
its purview and which do not. 
The degree of dependence that is required is also not 
reflected in this provision. While 'wholly dependent' may 
be clear in its meaning, 'partly dependent' can range 
from minimally dependent to totally dependent. 
Furthermore it is not clear if this dependence must be 
exclusively pecuniary in nature or whether emotional or 
physical dependence may also suffice. Whatever the nature 
of the dependence, there is then the further question of 
whether it must be based on a legally recognised 
relationship or whether mere factual dependence 
is 
sufficient. 
Because of its extreme generality and because this 
provision has yet to be tested in a court of 
law, the 
actual scope of this particular provision 
in s. 40(2) 
remains a matter for speculation. For 
instanc e has a 
paraplegic who depends upon the generosity 
of his 
neighbour to co ok his evening meals, 
an insurable 
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interest in the life of that neighbour? And has a younger 
brother an insurable interest in the life of his elder 
sibling upon whom he depends for pocket money? 
It is also not clear whether this provision covers 
policies taken out by a company in the lives of its key 
personnel - the so-called 'key man insurance'. If partial 
or total dependence is the sole criteria than there 
certainly is such dependence by the companies upon their 
key employees. Perhaps the answer to this question hinges 
upon whether the phrase 'any person' in S. 40(2) is wide 
enough to include not just individuals but companies and 
other corporate entities. 
In spite of the numerous uncertainties as to its precise 
scope, certain types of relationships will definitely be 
within the scope of this provision. A child who is 
dependent on his parent or other relatives for support 
and education can certainly be deemed to have an 
insurable interest in the life of the parent or relative. 
Similarly parents who are dependent upon their children 
for financial support will also come within this 
provision. Outside the sphere of family ties, it is 
submitted that a common law wife can be presumed to have 
an insurable interest in the life of the of the man who 
supports and maintains her. Homosexual couples too should 
be able to insure the lives of their partners 
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without having to prove pecuniary interest. All these and 
other relationships that come within the category of 
total or partial dependence should come within the scope 
of this provision. To what extent the Malaysian courts 
will be willing to give a liberal interpretation to this 
provision and to regard its vaguenss as providing this 
area of the law with a degree of flexibility remains to 
be seen. 
S. 86(l) of the Life Insurance Act 1945 of Australia has a 
similar though much narrower provision. A person is 
deemed to have an insurable interest in the life of 
another upon whom he is either wholly or partly dependent 
for support or for education. In stipulating the nature 
of the required dependence, the Australian provision is 
much clearer though more restrictive in its meaning. 
4.5 Insurable Interest in the Lives of Others 
The Insurance Act has not changed the common law as 
regards insurable interest in the lives of persons other 
than those considered earlier. In all other circumstances 
therefore, whether a person has an insurable interest in 
the life of another depends on whether he has a pecuniary 
interest in the life of that person. Presumably 
particular situations where insurable interest has been 
held to exist under the common law will also be so held 
in Malaysia. A creditor, for instance, has an insurable 
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interest in the life of his debtor60 and where there is a 
contract of employment, the employee has an insurable 
interest in the life of the employer to the extent of the 
contract61 and so does the employer in the life of the 
6 
employee2. The sole determinant in all these situations 
is whether there exist a pecuniary interest based on a 
legally enforceable relationship. 
4.6 Time at which Insurable Interest must Exist 
The Life Insurance Act 1774 (UK) does not stipulate the 
time at which insurable interest must exist. The courts 
however have, in the case of Dalby v The India and London 
Life Assurance Co. 
63, by overulling the earlier decision 
in Godsall v Boldero64, made it clear that interest must 
exist at the inception of the policy. This is also the 
position under s. 40(1) of the Insurance Act. 
By endorsing the decision in Dalby and incorporating it 
into a statutory provision, the question as to when 
insurable interest must be shown to exist in life 
policies has been made 'judge-proof'. The wisdom and 
utility of converting a case law 
into a statutory 
60. Godsall v Boldero 103 ER 500. 
61. Hebdon v West 122 ER 218. 
62. Green v Russell [19591 2 All ER 
525. 
63.139 ER 465. 
64. Op. cit. footnote 60. 
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provision is dubious. Case law can react more quickly to 
changes in the commercial world. Judges are known to have 
reinterpreted, overruled and widened the scope of 
existing decisions. 
Even in the absence of any statutory provision 
incorporating it, the decision in Dalby would have been 
the law in Malaysia anyway. By having a crude provision 
requiring insurable interest to exist at the time the 
insurance is effected, the legislature has overlooked 
much of the subtlety of the decision in Dalby. It has 
been said that in Dalby there was not merely interest at 
the time the policy was effected but there was also then 
an expectation that the interest would subsist until the 
occurrence of the insured event, ie. the death of the 
Duke65. When the policy was effected there was not merely 
an insurable interest in existence but there was also a 
reasonable expectation that such interest would continue 
to exist until the occurrence of the insured event. The 
fact that the interest would not actually last until that 
time was not then foreseeable. 
The decision in Dalby is therefore only an authority for 
65. MacGillivray, ' EJ, MacGillivray and Parkington on 




the narrower principle that if there is insurable 
interest at the inception of the policy coupled with a 
reasonable expectation that this interest will subsist 
throughout the duration of the policy, then it matters 
not if in fact there is no interest at the time of the 
loss. The expectation of the continued existence of the 
insurable interest until the time of loss is important as 
it effectively replaces the indemnity principle in 
ensuring that life policies are not used for wagering. It 
serves as a sieve to separate the gamblers from persons 
with a bona fide interest in the life insured. 
By requiring interest only at the time the policy is 
effected, s. 40(l) has not only failed to accurately 
reflect the common law but has also brought the law in 
Malaysia in this respect to a standstill while the common 
law remains open to continued interpretation. 
4.7 Insurable Interest and the Amount Recoverable under 
a Life Policy 
S. 40(l) of the Insurance Act provides that the policy 
moneys paid under a life policy shall not exceed 
the 
amount of the interest at the time 
the policy was 
effected. The Life Insurance Act 
1774 (UK) on the 
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contrary does not state the time at which the value of 
the interest is to be determined; it merely provides that 
the amount recoverable from the insurer shall not be 
greater than the amount of the value of the insured's 
interest66. As according to Dalby as long as insurable 
interest exists at the inception of the policy, the full 
policy moneys are payable on the occurrence of the 
insured event irrespective of pecuniary loss, the effect 
of the two provisions seem to be the same. Both underline 
the fact that a contract of life insurance is not one of 
indemnity. 
4.8 Effect of the Absence of Insurable Interest on a 
Life Policy 
Inspite of the fact that the purpose behind the 
introduction of s. 40 was to prevent gambling on people's 
lives, the Insurance Act imposes no penalty for the 
contravention of s. 40. A contract of life insurance made 
in contravention of that provision is void but if the 
insurer agrees to honour such policies, there is no way 
for the state to effectively check such practices. 
For the Insurance Act which is almost two centuries 
younger than the Life Insurance Act 1774 (UK) to repeat 
66. s. 3 
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the omission of the 1774 Act in not including a penalty 
for persons entering into contracts of life insurance 
without insurable interest is regrettable. Long before 
the Insurance Act was passed it was already clear that 
the primary defect of the 1774 Act is its failure to 
impose such a penalty. 
5.0 Insurable Interest in Non-Life Insurance 
5.1 Insurable Interest in Insurance on Goods 
The absence of any specific statutory requirement of 
insurable interest in insurance on goods does not mean 
that this concept is totally irrelevant in this branch of 
insurance. Some form of interest must be shown in an 
insurance on goods by virtue of two distinct principles 
of law. The first is the unenforceability of agreements 
by way of wagers and the second is the indemnity nature 
of such an insurance. While the first principle requires 
some form of interest at the inception of the policy, the 
second requires interest at the time of the occurrence of 
the insured event. 
The requirement of interest at the inception of a goods 
policy was explained by Lord Pearce in Hepburn v 
Tomlinson: 67 
67. [1966] AC 451 at p. 477. 
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The Life Insurance Act, 1774, extended similar principleSto other contracts of insurance, but 
excepted insurance on goods against land risk. These, although made without interest were enforceable until 1845 when the Gaming Act was passed. That Act rendered void all contracts 
which in substance are wagers made without interest in the subject matter of the insurance. Thus if insurance was effected by a 
person without insurable interest he could not 
recover. 
By replacing the Gaming Act 1845 (UK) with either the 
Contracts Act 1950 or the Civil Law Act 1956 (both of 
which contain provisions similar to that in the 1845 Act) 
the above statement is equally applicable in the 
Malaysian context. 
A person who has a legal or equitable right over the 
goods has an insurable interest in such goods. This 
includes not merely the owner of the goods but also 
persons having other identifiable legal or equitable 
relationship with the goods. A bailee for instance, has ° 
insurable interest and can insure the full value of the 
goods provided he holds the proceeds in trust for the 
owners68. As a general rule, possession of the goods 
coupled with a degree of legal responsibility over them 
provides a basis for the existence of insurable interest 
69 in such goods 
68. Waters v Monarch Fire and Life Assurance Co. 119 ER 
705 and Hepburn v Tomlinson, Ibid. 
69. Robertson v Hamilton 104 ER 701. 
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In one of the few local cases on insurable interest it 
was held that an executor de son tort has an insurable 
interest in the goods belonging to the deceased. The 
plaintiff in Pacific and Orient Insurance Co. Sdn. Bhd. v 
Lim Sew Chong & Anor. 
70 
sought a declaration that a 
policy issued by them to one Ng Hwee Bin, deceased, in 
respect of a lorry was void. The defendants were the 
administrators of the deceased's estate. The said policy 
was issued at the request of Ng Moh Chee, the deceased's 
son, after his father's death. The proposal form was 
signed by Ng Moh Chee and in the column for the 
proposal's name he wrote 'Ng Hwee Bin - Deceased'. On 
every occasion when the policy was renewed Ng Moh Chee 
always disclosed to the plaintiff's agent that his father 
who owned the lorry had died and that he (Ng Moh Chee) 
was managing his father's estate. The plaintiff sought to 
avoid the policy inter alia on the ground that as Ng Moh 
Chee was not the registered owner of the lorry, he had no 
insurable interest therein. It was held that in managing 
the estate of his deceased father, Ng Moh Chee 
had 
assumed the role of an executor de son tort and as such 
he had an insurable interest in the lorry. 
An interesting side feature of the above case 
is the fact 
that it was generally assumed by the court 
that a policy 
70. [1985] 2 MLJ 60. 
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on the lorry was a goods policy. This may seem correct in 
the light of what was said by Roche J in Williams v 
Baltic Insurance Association: 71 
A motor car is the subject matter of the insurance, and a motor car is a chattel or 
goods ... 
However, the policy in Williams was a comprehensive 
policy, covering not only liability to a third party but 
also loss or damage to the car itself and it was this 
fact that was used by Roche J to support y pport his finding: 
This is an insurance on the motor car, although 
incidentally the policy contains provisions as 
to third party risks. 
The policy in the Pacific and orient case was, on the 
contrary, strictly and exclusively a policy against third 
party risks. It should therefore have been regarded as a 
liability insurance rather than a goods insurance. 
Another important issue in relation to insurable interest 
in goods is the effect of either an agreement to sell or 
a contract of sale on such interest, ie. when the 
interest of the seller ceases and when the interest of 
the buyer commences. This question was considered by the 
71. [1924] 2 KB 282 at p. 290. 
72. Ibid. 
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Federal Court in Nanyang Insurance Co. Ltd. v Salbiah and 
Anor. 
73. 
A car was bought by one Lau and was duly 
registered and insured in his name with the appellant. 
Subsequently Lau entered into an agreement to sell the 
car to one Karim for (M)$3,400. The first instalment of 
(M)$1000 was to be paid on the delivery of the car while 
the balance was to be paid within one month after such 
delivery. As Karim was unable to pay the (M)$1,000, both 
parties orally agreed that this sum was to be paid in 
instalments and that meanwhile Lau would lend the car to 
Karim. After Karim took possession of the car, it was 
involved in an accident which resulted in injuries to the 
respondent. Having obtained a judgement against Karim the 
respondent sought to enforce it against the appellant. 
The High Court ordered the appellant to pay but the 
appellant appealed to the Federal Court, contending that 
they could not be liable as Lau no longer had any 
insurable interest in the car at the time of the 
accident. The Federal Court rejected this contention and 
upheld the decision of the High Court. Evidence relating 
to the oral agreement was held to be admissable as it was 
an agreement to modify an existing agreement and 
therefore came within the proviso to s. 90 of the Evidence 
Act 1950 -a provision on parole evidence. 
73. [1967] 1 MLJ 94. For the decision of the High Court 
see: Salbiah and Anor. v Nanyang Insurance Co. Ltd. 
[1966] 2 MLJ 16. 
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According to the Federal Court it was clear from this 
oral agreement that Lau intended to retain the property 
in the car until Karim had paid the (M)$1000. 
The court also referred to the provisions of the Sale of 
Goods (Malay States) Ordinance 1957 in considering when 
property passes to the buyer in the sale of specific 
goods. In a contract of sale of specific goods, property 
is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties 
intend it to be transferred74. Unless a contrary 
intention is shown, where there is an unconditional 
contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable 
state, the property therein passes to the buyer when the 
contract is made. It is immaterial whether the time of 
payment or the delivery of the goods is postponed75. 
Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's 
risk until the property therein is transferred to the 
buyer and once the property is transferred to the buyer, 
the goods are at his risk irrespective of whether 
7 delivery has been made6. 
As the risk generally shifts from the seller to the buyer 
simultaneously with the passing of the property in the 
goods from the former to the latter, it is also at this 
74. s. 19(1). 
75. s. 20. 
76. s. 26. 
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time that the seller ceases to have, and the buyer 
acquires, an insurable interest in the goods. But as this 
general rule is subject to the intention of the parties, 
the parties can agree that property in the goods and 
hence the risk and insurable interest therein be 
transferred at a time of their choice. 
5.2 Insurable Interest in Insurance on Land 
As there are no specific local statutes which deals with 
the law relating to insurable interest in land, by virtue 
of s. 5 of the Civil Law Act 1956, the law applicable in 
Malaysia is basically the same as that in England. 
The indemnity nature of an insurance on land clearly 
mandates that insurable interest must exist at the time 
of the loss and that the insured cannot recover except to 
the extent of his loss77. Whether there is a requirement 
of insurable interest over and above that required by the 
indemnity nature of such contracts, and, whether in 
particular, the Life Insurance Act 1774 is applicable to 
78 
insurance on land has yet to be definitively answered. 
The strongest judicial pronouncement so far which seems 
77. Sadler's Co. v Badcock Op. cit. footnote 31. 
78. For a consideration of this problem in England and 
Australia, see Evans, RC, 'The Operation of the Life 
Insurance Act (UK) 1774 in Relation to the Insurance 
of Buildings in England and Australia', 
(1983) 14 
Melbourne University Law Review, 262. 
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to favour the application of the Act is the dictum of 
Lord Denning in Re King79: 
[W]hen you take out a policy of fire insurance 
of a building (as distinct from goods), you 
must insert in the policy the names of all the 
persons interested therein, or for whose use or benefit it is made. No person can recover 
thereon unless he is named therein, and then 
only to the extent of his interest. That is 
clear from the Life Insurance Act 1774 (14 Geo. 
3 c. 48) Ss. 2,3 and 4, which by its very terms 
applies to 'any other event' as well as life. 
The fact that the 1774 Act refers to insurance on lives 
'and any other event' whilst expressly excluding 
insurances on ships, goods or merchandises seems to be 
the strongest argument in favour of the application of 
the Act to insurance on land. 
The argument to the contrary is that the 1774 Act was 
never intended to apply to such insurance. Being 
contracts of indemnity, they did not come within the 
mischief that this Act was seeking to prevent80. The 
application of the Act to such policies is also opposed 
on practical grounds - that the restrictive nature of the 
Act makes its application to real property difficult, if 
79. [1963] Ch. 459 at p. 458. In MacGillivray, this 
decision is regarded as having resolved the whole 
problem in the affirmative, see p. 65, para. 
151. 
80. Ivamy, EH, Fire and Motor Insurance, 4th Ed., 
Butterworths, London 1984, p. 184. 
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not impossible81. In the context of life insurance the 
1774 Act has been interpreted as requiring interest at 
the inception of the policy. If this Act is applied to 
real property, then the same interpretation must apply82. 
And if, in line with the accepted definition of insurable 
interest, this interest must be based on a legal right, 
difficulties will be caused to prudent purchasers who 
want to protect their interest in the property before 
they acquire a legal right thereto. In buying property at 
auction, for instance, a potential purchaser usually 
obtains insurance cover before the auction, at which time 
he has no legal right to the property. Under the 1774 Act 
such a policy is null and void. Even when property is 
purchased in an ordinary transaction, a prudent purchaser 
would get insurance cover before the exchange of 
contract, or in Malaysia, before the registration of his 
title. Such policies would also be null and void under 
the 1774 Act for lack of insurable interest at the 
inception of the policy. 
The application of sections 2 and 3 of the 1774 Act 
may also lead to other unreasonable consequences. S. 
2 
81. Birds, J. Modern Insurance Law, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1982, pp. 38-39. 
82. MacGillivray, p. 13, para. 23. 
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requires the name of the person for whose benefit the 
policy is made to be inserted in the policy. S. 3 provides 
that no greater sum shall be recovered by the insured 
from the insurer than the amount of his interest. In 
insurance on real property it is common for a person to 
insure the property on his own behalf as well as on 
behalf of others who are also interested in the property. 
A landlord for instance may insure not just his interest 
but his tenants' as well. 
In the more recent Court of Appeal decision in Mark 
Rowlands v Berni Inns Ltd. 
83, it was said that although 
s. 2 of the 1774 Act referred to 'other events', the Act 
was not intended to apply, and does not apply, to 
indemnity insurance84. 
As the views expressed in the two Court of Appeal cases 
were obiter, the precise legal position in this respect 
remains a matter for speculation. The main problem in 
applying the 1774 Act to real property lies in the fact 
that even if the insured complies with s. 2 and gives the 
names of all those having an interest in the property, 
under s. 3, on the occurrence of a loss, he can only 
recover to the extent of his own interest. It has 
been 
83. [1986] 2 QB 211. 
84. Ibid. at p. 227, per Kerr LJ. 
123 
suggested that this problem can be resolved either by 
regarding s. 3 as inapplicable to insurance on land or by 
construing the word 'insured' therein to include not just 
the policyholder but also others who are named in 
accordance with s. 2850 
Apart from persons with absolute legal ownership over 
property, the interests of certain others with lesser 
legal titles are also insurable. This includes the 
trustees and beneficiaries under a trust86 as well as 
mortgagors and mortgagees87 of the property. Where the 
property is the subject of an agreement to sell, both the 
vendor and purchaser have an insurable interest 
therein88. The interest of the vendor extends and 
continues to exist until a formal conveyance has taken 
place and he ceases to have a legal title over the 
property. As the risk in the property generally passes to 
the purchaser on the signing of the agreement unless 
otherwise agreed, the purchaser has an insurable interest 
from such date although there has been, no formal 
89 
conveyance of the property. 
85. Birds, p. 39- 
86. Rhind v Wilkinson 127 ER 1068. 
87. Smith v Lascelles 100 ER 101 and Samuel & Co. v Dumas 
[1932] 1 KB 592 at p. 615. 
88. See further Chapter Ten - Assignment and Trusts. 
89. Poole v Adams (1864) 10 LT 287. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NON-DISCLOSURE, MISREPRESENTATION AND FRAUD 
1.0 Non-Disclosure 
1.1 The Duty of Disclosure 
1.1.1 Its origins 
Contracts of insurance are contracts uberrimae fidei - of 
utmost good faith. This special characteristic imposes 
upon the parties to such a contract a duty of disclosure, 
ie. a duty to disclose facts which are material to the 
risk and which are not known by the other party. 
The origins of the doctrine of utmost good faith and the 
duty of disclosure clearly reflect the domination and 
influence of marine insurance in the development of the 
general law of insurance in England. In the early days, 
when a shipowner or a merchant wished to insure a 
particular ship, cargo or even an entire marine 
adventure, he would pass around a document known as the 
'slip' to the various underwriters at Lloyd's. This 
'slip' would contain a brief description of the subject 
matter for which the cover was sought. 
All the 
underwriters who were willing to insure 
the said risk 





the risk which they were willing to 
It was not uncommon that when the 'slip' was being passed 
around, the subject matter of the insurance would already 
have started its voyage and would already be in the high 
seas. In the absence of the sophisticated means of 
communication which are available to modern day 
underwriters, it was certainly then beyond the means of 
the individual underwriters to verify the truth or 
accuracy of the information given in the 'slip'. The 
'slip' was thus the sole yardstick with which the 
underwriter could assess the risk of a particular 
adventure and decide whether to provide the cover sought 
and if so the premium to impose. It was the only means 
of communication between the proposer and the underwriter 
prior to the contract. Even so the 'slip' contained few 
details, unlike the proposal forms of today. Honesty and 
trust between the parties was thus an absolute imperative 
for the survival of the industry. This bond of trust and 
honesty was further nurtured by the fact that both the 
insurers and the people seeking insurance were a 
1. For accounts of the practices at Lloyd's of London, 
see eg. Vance, WR, A Handbook of Insurance Law, 3rd 
Ed., Minnessota 1951, at pp. 17 - 19, Raynes, HE, A 
History of British Insurance, 2nd Ed., Pitman, London 
1964, at pp. 24 - 27 and Hodgson, G. Lloyd's of London; 
A Reputation at Risk, Penguin, London 1986, at pp. 7 - 
43. 
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community, held together by their common interest in 
maritime adventures. The symbiotic co-existence between 
them could only continue to flourish provided the utmost 
good faith continued to be the basis of their dealings 
with one another. 
What started as a rule of practice soon matured into a 
principle of law, not only in marine insurance but also 
in non-marine insurance. Judicial acceptance of the 
practices at Lloyd's as a formal legal principle in 
non-marine insurance was made by Lord Mansfield in Carter 
v Boehm"2 
Insurance is a contract upon speculation. The 
special facts upon which the contingent chance 
is to be computed, lie most commonly in the 
knowledge of the insured only; the underwriter 
trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon 
confidence that he does not keep back any 
circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead the 
underwriter into a belief that the circumstance 
does not exist, and to induce him to estimate 
the risque as if it does not exist. 
Carter v Boehm was not a case in marine insurance. It 
involved a policy which insured a fort in Sumatra against 
the risk of being attacked by the enemy. 
2.97 ER 1162 at p. 1164. Lord Mansfield himself in this 
judgement gave no credit to the traditions and 
practices at Lloyd's. Rather, he regarded 
the doctrine 
of utmost good faith as a principle 
'applicable to all 
contracts and dealings'. There 
is however no evidence 
of the existence of such a principle either 
in the 
cases decided prior to or following 
Carter v Boehm. 
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In the early days it was the proposer or the potential 
insured who was deemed to know the facts relevant to a 
particular risk. It was he therefore who was expected to 
disclose these facts to the insurer. The doctrine of 
utmost good faith as it developed into a principle of law 
recognises and in fact demands that the utmost good faith 
be observed by both the insurer and the insured. Today 
3 
this reciprocal duty has not only been upheld but an 
insurer has in fact been made to pay damages to the 
insured for failing to disclose information in their 
possession which was material to the risk and not known 
by the insured. 4 
Inspite of the calls and recommendations for reforms, the 
English law on the doctrine of utmost good faith and the 
duty of disclosure is, with the exception of marine and 
motor vehicle insurance which have seen some statutory 
intervention, the sum total of the various judicial 
interpretations and reinterpretations of the rule as laid 
down by Lord Mansfield. 
3. The reciprocal duty of utmost good faith was endorsed 
by Farwell LJ in In re Bradley and Essex and Suffolk 
Accident Indemnity Society, [1912] 1 KB 415 at p. 430. 
In marine insurance the insurer's reciprocal duty of 
good faith is provided in s. 17 of the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 (UK). 
4. Banque Keyser Ullman SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co. 
Ltd. & Ors. [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 69. 
5. The Law Commission, Insurance Law - Non-Disclosure and 
Breach of Warranty, Cmnd. 8064, HMSO, London 1980. 
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1.1.2 Time for Disclosure 
The duty of disclosure revolves around the fact that all 
material facts must be made known to the insurer at the 
time when he makes his decision, first, whether to accept 
or reject the risk and, second, if he decides to accept 
the risk, as to the rate of premium to be charged. This 
duty therefore extends from the time of negotiation until 
the time when the contract is concluded. This includes 
the time when the proposal form, if any, is filled in. If 
the policy is a short-term policy which is subject to 
renewal, then every renewal is a fresh contract and the 
duty of disclosure must be complied with prior to every 
such renewal. 
In Lee Bee Soon and ors. v Malaysia National Insurance 
Bhd. 
7, 
the plaintiffs had a Hull Policy dated 29 May 1972 
in respect of a motor vessel, with the defendant. The 
vessel having sank in bad weather, the plaintiff made a 
claim for (M)$80,000 under the policy. When the vessel 
sank it was carrying a cargo of sand and stones. In the 
proposal form for the said policy, a question was asked 
as to the type of cargo which would be carried in the 
vessel. The answer given was 'Passenger - cargo carrying 
vessel, sundry goods'. The insurer denied liability inter 
7. [1980) 2 MLJ 252. 
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alia on the ground of non-disclosure of 
According to the evidence, the vessel 
material facts. 
carried sand and 
stones only from 15 September 1972 onwards and the 
plainti ff contended that he was not bound to disclose 
this fact as the time for disclosure had ended. Referring 
to s. 21 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK) on when a 
contract of marine insurance is deemed to be concluded, 
Yusoff J said: 
8 
In this sense the duty of the assured to 
disclose all material facts to the insurers 
must be done before the contract is concluded. 
Hence if everything material be communicated up 
to the time of initialling the 'slip' (or 
proposal) by the underwriter but something 
material arising between that time and the time 
of executuing the policy is not disclosed, 
there is no non-disclosure so as to vitiate the 
policy... 
A rather strange decision in relation to the time for 
disclosure was reached in The South British Insurance Co. 
V Haji Ismail9. The defendant by a proposal form dated 11 
November 1958, was issued with a policy against third 
party risks in respect of his car. The policy provided 
cover from 11 November 1958 to 10 November 1959. In 
answer to a question in the proposal form the defendant 
stated that he was the registered owner of the car. On 
25 September 1959, whilst still registered in the 
8. Ibid. at p. 253. 
9. (1964) 30 MLJ 16. 
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defendant's name, the car was involved in an accident. 
The insurer sought to avoid liability inter alia for 
non-disclosure of a material fact, ie. that the car had 
been sold to one Wong Fun on 14 November 1958. The 
learned judge held that there was no need for disclosure 
as the sale had taken place after the proposal form had 
been submitted and the contract of insurance entered 
into. 
It is not clear why non-disclosure was relied upon not 
only by the insurer but also by the learned judge in this 
case. Unless the the sale was regarded as ineffective, 
and there was no evidence to that effect, clearly the 
defendant's policy should have lapsed from the date of 
the sale as thereafter he no longer had any insurable 
interest in the car. Thus irrespective of the question of 
non-disclosure, the insurer should not and could not have 
been made liable under the policy. 
1.1.3 Answers in the Proposal Form and the Duty of 
Disclosure 
The duty of disclosure is not synonymous with the 
obligation to answer the questions in the proposal 
form 
correctly. The proposal form is just one of the means 
by 
which the diclosure of material facts can 
be made, so the 
proposer is not relieved of his duty merely 
by correctly 
answering the questions therein. In 
United Malayan 
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Insurance Co. v Lee Yoon Hengl°, the insurer sought to 
avoid a policy on the ground that the exact type of the 
vehicle which was insured was not disclosed. The 
insured's contention that he was not required to disclose 
such information because in the proposal form he was 
asked only the make of the vehicle, not its type, was 
rejected by the learned judge. 
In Teh Say Cheng v North British and Mercantile Insurance 
Co. Ltd. 
ll, 
one of the arguments raised by the insured in 
denying non-disclosure was that as a person who had never bEVN 
insured before and was ignorant of insurance law, he was 
justified in assuming that the insurer required no more 
information than was sought for by the questions in the 
proposal form. In response to this argument Whiteley JC 
said: 
12 
In order then, that the plaintiff may derive 
any benefit from this line of argument, it is 
necessary for him to establish the proposition 
that his duty of disclosure is limited to the 
subject matter of the question. There is an 
abundance of authority to contradict such a 
contention... 
1.1.4 Effect of Non-Disclosure 
Non-disclosure of a material fact makes a contract of 
insurance voidable at the option of the party to whom 
the 
10. (1964) 30 MLJ 45. 
11. (1921) 2 FMSLR 248. 
12. Ibid. at p. 253. 
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disclosure ought to have been made. Although there are 
instances where the insurer initiates proceedings for a 
declaration that a contract of insurance is void for 
non-disclosure, there is in fact no legal requirement 
that the insurer obtains such a declaration first before 
using non-disclosure as a ground for denying the 
insured's claim under the policy. In Teh Say Cheng, the 
insured in denying non-disclosure also argued that even 
if there had been such a non-disclosure, the proper 
course for the insurer on discovering it was to take 
action to rescind the contract and return the premium. To 
this argument Whiteley JC gave the following response: 
13 
No doubt the defendants might have pursued that 
course. But in so far as it is argued that, 
because they might have obtained relief by way 
of rescission, they are precluded from 
defending the suit generally, the proposition 
is one which I am unable to accept. 
While non-disclosure by the insured enables the insurer 
to avoid the policy, non-disclosure by the insurer 
enables the insured to avoid the contract and claim for 
a return of premium. However as these remedies might not 
be enough if the loss incurred is great, it has recently 
been recognised that a party aggrieved by the 
non-disclosure of material facts by the other party can 
also sue that party for damages. According to Steyn J in 
Banque Keyser Ullman SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance Co. 
13. Ibid. at p. 251. 
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Ltd. & Ors. : 
14 
Once it is accepted that the principle of 
utmost good faith imposes meaningful reciprocal 
duties, owed by the insured to the insurers and 
vice versa, it seems anomalous that there 
should be no claim for damages for breach of 
those duties in a case where that is the only 
effective remedy. 
1.1.5 Onus of Proof 
The legal burden of proving non-disclosure of a material 
fact rests upon the party alleging the non-disclosure15. 
Once this burden has been discharged, the onus. then 
shifts to the other party to rebut it either by showing 
that there had been a disclosure or that the fact 
allegedly not disclosed was in fact not material 
16. 
As to the quantum of proof that is required to rebut an 
allegation of non-disclosure, the words of Whiteley JC in 
Teh Say Cheng are instructive: 
'7 
It is beyond dispute, I think, that the burden 
of proof is on the defendants in the first 
instance, but to quote from Spencer Bower on 
'Actionable Non-Disclosure' p. 166, 'Very slight 
prima facie evidence, indeed, if non-disclosure 
has already been either admitted or proved is 
14. Op. cit. footnote 4 at p-96- 
15. Goh Chooi Leong v Public Life Assurance Co. Ltd. 
(1964) 30 MLJ 5. 
16. Pana Vana Letchumanan Chettiar v The Jupiter General 
Insurance Co. Ltd. (1939) 8 MLJ (Rep) 31. 
17. Op. cit. footnote 11 at p. 252. 
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sufficient to cast on the party charged from that point onwards the burden of establishing 
that the party complaining had acquired knowledge of the undisclosed fact through other 
channels than a direct communication from the 
party charged himself'. 
1.2 Materiality 
1.2.1 Test of Materiality 
It is unfortunate in Carter v Boehm that although Lord 
Mansfield explained in detail the scope and application 
of the duty of disclosure, his Lordship did not delve 
into the question of the materiality of the non-disclosed 
information. This omission was perhaps justified by the 
fact that in that case the materiality of the 
non-disclosed information, ie. the weakness of the fort 
and the likehood of its being attacked by the enemy, was 
so obvious that it needed no lengthy consideration. 
Furthermore it was also held in that case that the facts 
allegedly not disclosed were either already known to the 
insurers or could have been discovered by their own 
efforts. 
Cases that were decided in England after Carter v Boehm 
show that at least two different tests can be used in 
determining the materiality of a particular fact. The 
first is that a fact is material if the prudent insurer 
considers it to be a material fact for the purpose of the 
insurer making a decision in relation to the risk to be 
insured. The second is that a fact is material if a 
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reasonable insured considers it to be material for making 
such a decision. 
The reasonable insured test was applied by the trial 
judge in Becker v Marshall18. One of the facts allegedly 
not disclosed in a proposal for a policy against burglary 
was the fact that the insured was of foreign origin. To 
this argument the learned judge responded: 
19 
I find that he in good faith did not realise 
that these were things material to be 
disclosed, and I find that the average 
businessman, the average reasonable man, would 
not have taken that view, and ... would have disclosed and would have known that it was 
necessary to disclose. 
On appeal the above test was endorsed by the Court of 
20 
Appeal. 
The prudent insurer test was applied in Ionides v 
Pender21 where it was said that all should be disclosed 
which would affect the judgement of a rational insurer 
governing himself by the principles and calculations on 
which underwriters do in practice act. This test was 
endorsed by the Privy Council in Mutual Life Insurance 
18.11 Ll. L Rep. 114. 
19. Ibid. at p. 118. 
20.12 L1. L Rep. 413. 
21. LR 9 QB 531. See also Zurich General Accident and 




Co. of New York v Ontario Metal Products Co. Ltd. 
_ 
22 
The lingering doubt as to which of the two tests ought to 
be applied was settled once and for all by the Court of 
Appeal decision in Lambert v Co-operative Insurance 
Society Ltd. 23 which favoured the prudent insurer test. 
This test has since been consistently applied although 
there are calls for the re-introduction of the reasonable 
insured test on the ground that such a test would be less 
2 
onerous to the consumers4. 
In CTI v Oceanus Mutual Undewriting Association Ltd. 
25, 
a 
case in marine insurance, it was held at first instance 
that the application of this test meant that an insurer 
could only succeed on a defence of non-disclosure if they 
could show that a prudent insurer would have declined the 
risk altogether or would have charged a higher premium if 
they had known the non-disclosed facts. This however was 
unanimously rejected by the Court of Appeal. According to 
the Court of Appeal, to succeed on such a defence it was 
sufficient if the insurer could show that the 
underwriting judgement of, or the assessment of risk by, 
22. [1925] AC 344. 
23. [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 485. 
24. The Law Commission Report, Op. cit. footnote 
5. 
25. [1982] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 178 (1st Instance) and 
[1984] 
Lloyd's Rep. 476 (CA). 
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a prudent insurer would have been influenced by such 
facts. There was no necessity to show that the final 
decision reached by such insurer would in fact have been 
different. Following the Court of Appeal decision in 
Lambert that in relation to non-disclosure, there is no 
difference between marine and non-marine insurance, it 
was held in Highlands Insurance Co. v Continental 
Insurance Co. 
26 that the test laid down in CTI was 
applicable in non-marine insurance as well. 
In Malaysia, as in England, the test of materiality in 
two areas of insurance law are determined by statute. 
These are in the areas of marine insurance and third 
party motor insurance. S. 18(2) of the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 (UK) provides that every circumstance is 
material which would influence the judgement of a prudent 
insurer in fixing the premium or in in determining 
whether he will take the risk. In relation to third party 
motor insurance, s. 80(5) of the Road Traffic ordinance 
1958 defines 'material' as 'of such a nature as to 
influence the judgement of a prudent insurer in 
determining whether he will take the risk, and if so at 
what premium and on what conditions'. 
In the other areas of insurance law 
the concept of 
26. [1987] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 476. 
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materiality has not been statutorily defined. The courts 
in Malaysia however, unlike the English courts, seem to 
have consistently applied the prudent insurer test even 
in cases which were decided prior to the Court of Appeal 
decision in Lambert. 
In Teh Say Cheng v North British and Mercantile Insurance 
Co. Ltd. 27, a case involving a fire policy, an attempt 
was made to persuade the court to reject the prudent 
insurer test in favour of the reasonable insured test. It 
was argued that the case of Ionides v Pender whereby the 
former test was enunciated by Lord Blackburn applied only 
to cases of marine insurance and that with the exception 
of the doubtful cases of Trail v Baring 
28 
and Anderson v 
29 
Commercial Union Insurance Co., the said test had not 
at that time been applied in areas other than marine 
insurance. This argument was flatly rejected by Whiteley 
JC: 
30 
The question which I have to consider is not 
whether it has been applied or not, but whether 
it ought to be applied. The rule has not only 
been followed by subsequent cases, it has been 
incorporated in s. 18(2) of the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906. Is there any good ground for holding 
that a rule which is obviously proper in marine 
insurance is too severe to apply in fire 
insurance? In my opinion there is not. The 
contract of fire insurance is as much a 
27. Op. cit. footnote 11. 
28.46 ER 941. 
29. (1885) 55 LJ QB 146. 
30. Op. cit. footnote 11 at p. 258. 
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contract of uberrimae fides as is a contract of 
marine insurance. It follows that the duty to 
disclose material facts cannot be higher in the 
one form of insurance than in the other... 
The case of Teh Say Cheng thus saw the judicial 
endorsement of the prudent insurer test in all areas of 
l. 3 insurance in Malaysia 
Whiteley JC in endorsing the prudent insurer test in fire 
insurance could see no reason why a rule which was proper 
in marine insurance could be too severe when applied in 
fire insurance. It is submitted that there is indeed an 
extremely good justification for making such a 
distinction. Most contracts of marine insurance are 
entered into either by shipping or other companies or by 
individuals whose business it is to to deal with such 
policies. These people are all backed with the necessary 
skill and expertise in this branch of insurance law. On 
the contrary in most other areas of insurance, one does 
not take out a policy because it is in the course of 
one's business to do so. Rather policies are taken out by 
the man in the street who is not familiar with either the 
law or the practice of insurance and who wishes to have 
some form of protection either for himself or 
for his 
31. Although Whiteley JC used the phrase 
'rational 
insurer' in this case, it is submitted that the 
attributes of such an insurer 
do not differ from 
those of the prudent insurer. 
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family in case of certain eventualities. Thus a test 
which is not too severe in marine insurance can be and in 
fact is, too severe when applied in other branches of 
insurance. 
Whiteley JC also reasoned that the duty to disclose could 
not be higher in one form of insurance than in the other. 
But if the disparity between the bargaining position of 
the insured in marine insurance and in non-marine 
insurance is appreciated, such an argument has no basis. 
The application of the reasonable insured test in 
non-marine insurance does not result in the imposition of 
a lower duty of disclosure. As the insured in marine 
insurance is either himself an expert in that field or is 
advised by such an expert, he is certainly in a position 
to know what facts would or would not affect the decision 
of the prudent insurer in deciding on a particular risk. 
As the insured in non-marine insurance is seldom in such 
a position, he cannot be expected to have the same wisdom 
and foresight in deciding what facts would or would not 
affect the decision of the prudent insurer. Hence it is 
the application of the same test, ie. the prudent insurer 
test, in both marine and non-marine insurance that will 
result in the imposition of a higher duty of disclosure 
upon the insured in non-marine insurance. Only by the 
application of a different test, ie. the reasonable 
insured test, in such cases, could an equality in the 
burden of disclosure between the insured in marine and 
141 
non-marine policies be achieved. 
The applicability of the prudent insurer test in fire 
insurance was re-affirmed in Wong Lang Hung v National 
Employees' Mutual General Insurance32, albeit again in a 
rather unsatisfactory manner. The plaintiff brought an 
action to claim (M)$20,000 under a fire a policy from the 
defendant. The defendant denied liability, alleging inter 
alia non-disclosure of a material fact. In the proposal 
form the plaintiff had written the answer 'No' to a 
question whether the premises to be insured were attached 
to other buildings, when the premises were in fact so 
attached. It was held that there was, by virtue of the 
answer, a non-disclosure of a material fact and the 
plaintiff's claim failed. 
BTH Lee J in his judgement implied that it did not matter 
if the insured himself did not appreciate the materiality 
of the non-disclosed fact, what mattered was whether such 
a non-disclosure would have influenced the prudent 
insurer in making his decision33. This view was however 
not shared by the Federal Court in Abu Bakar v 
oriental 
Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. 
34 In a proposal form 
for a fire policy, the appellant was asked, 
'For what 
32. [19721 2 MLJ 191. 
33. Ibid. at p. 195. 
34. [1974) 1 MLJ 149. 
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purposes are the premises occupied? '. The appellant wrote 
'Sundry shop downstairs, dwelling first floor'. When a 
fire broke out on the ground floor of the insured 
premises, the respondent denied liability on the ground 
that the appellant had failed to disclose the existence 
of four electrically operated grinding mills used for 
commercial purposes, at the back of the shop. Both the 
Sessions Court and the High Court decided in favour of 
the insurer. On appeal to the Federal Court, the decision 
of the lower courts was reversed. The dissenting 
judgement of Gill FJ focussed mainly on the existence of 
the basis of contract clause and hence according to his 
Lordship the question of materiality did not arise. 
Ong Hock Sim FJ was of the view that the insurer had not 
been misled (contrary to the findings of the trial judge) 
as to the nature of the insurance which the appellant 
wished to take out and in respect of what goods. 
According to his Lordship too there was no evidence of 
the way the presence of the grinding mills could be 
considered to have increased the risk to the property 
insured. As this is a case of non-disclosure and not 
misrepresentation, the question as to whether the 
insurer 
had in fact been influenced or in anyway misled is, it is 
felt, irrelevant. In a case of non-disclosure the 
question is whether such non-disclosure 
influences the 
insurer in deciding whether to accept the risk and 
if so 
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the level of premium to be charged. Surely the existence 
of four electrically operated grinding mills used for 
commercial purposes is material to a fire policy on the 
premises. 
The most interesting judgement on the question of 
materiality was that of the Lord President, Azmi LP. 
Without referring to any local cases on this issue, his 
Lordship endorsed the prudent insurer test: 35 
[T]he test hinges on whether the representation 
is of such nature as to influence the judgement 
of a prudent insurer, not on whether the 
representation influences the particular 
insurer looking at the proposal. 
Having stated the test to be applied, his Lordship then 
proceeded to introduce two qualifications: 
36 
T would further add that if a fact even though 
material is one which the proposer did not and 
could not have been expected to know, or if its 
materiality could not have been apparent to the 
reasonable man, his failure to disclose should 
not in my view be regarded as breach of his 
duty. 
The first qualification, that one can only disclose facts 
which one knows or is expected to know, is not new. After 
all in the words of Fletcher-Moulton LJ in Joel v Law 
Union and Crown Insurance Co.: 
37 
35. Ibid. at p. 150. 
36. Ibid. at p. 151. 
37. 19081 2 KB 863 at p. 884. 
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The duty is a duty to disclose and you cannot 
disclose what you do not know. The obligation 
to disclose therefore, necessarily depends upon 
the knowledge you possess. 
The second qualification however calls for further 
consideration. Paraphrased, it reads that even though a 
fact is material in the eyes of a prudent insurer, it 
need not be disclosed if the insured himself is not able 
to appreciate that the prudent insurer will regard such 
fact as material. This introduces an interesting gloss on 
the prudent insurer test - not only must a non-disclosed 
fact be material to the prudent insurer but such 
materiality must have been obvious or apparent to the 
reasonable insured. The introduction of this 
qualification seems to a certain extent to strike a happy 
median between the prudent insurer and the reasonable 
insured tests of materiality. 
Azmi LP himself cited no authorities in support of the 
above qualification. The idea of such a qualification 
however is not a novel one. There are at least two 
well-known English cases which seem to support such a 
requirement. A thorough consideration of these two cases 
however raises doubts as to whether it is an across the 
board qualification for the prudent insurer test of 
materiality. The two cases namely, Fowkes v Manchester 
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and London Assurance Association38 and Joel v 
-- 
39 1 .1 
Law Union 
ana crown insurance co. are ootn cases on life 
insurance. In Fowkes a person proposing to insure his 
life was asked, 'Have you ever been afflicted with 
gout? '. He answered 'No'. There was evidence that he had 
been treated for a very slight attack of 'supressed 
gout. ' The surgeon who treated him for this could not 
recall whether the insured was informed of this attack. 
In directing the jury, Cockburn CJ said: 
40 
As to the first answer, to the question whether 
he had ever been afflicted with gout, no doubt 
it must be considered with some reasonable 
latitude, and the answer would not be false, 
merely because he had some symptons which an 
experienced medical man might see indicated the 
presence of the gout in the system. You will 
probably consider whether there was gout in a 
sensible, appreciable form, and in considering 
that question you will bear in mind that the 
medical man himself described the only attack 
which preceded the policy, as the slightest 
possible case of gout, and that there is no 
positive evidence that the deceased knew that 
he had gout. 
Similarly Joel too involved questions regarding the 
medical history of a proposer for life 
insurance. A 
question in the proposal form which asked 
if the insured 
had suffered from mental derangement was answered 
in the 
negative although evidence subsequently revealed 
that the 
38.176 ER 198. 
39. Op. Cit. footnote 37. 
40. Op. Cit. footnote 38 at p. 199. 
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insured had, though she was unaware of the fact, been 
confined for acute mania. 
Fletcher-Moulton J in his judgement explained what was 
meant by the requirement that the materiality of a 
particular fact must be appreciated by the insured: 41 
Your opinion of the materiality of that 
knowledge is of no moment. If a reasonable man 
would have recognised that it was material to 
disclose the knowledge in question, it is no 
excuse that you did not recognise it to be so. 
But the question always is, was the knowledge 
you possess such that you ought to have 
disclosed it? 
The learned judge then gave the example of a person who, 
like most people, occasionally had a headache. One of 
those headaches would have told a brain surgeon of a 
hidden mischief. But because to the ordinary man that 
particular headache would not have been distinguishable 
from the rest, no reasonable man would have considered it 
material for the insurance company to know. The 
non-disclosure of that headache would not have been a 
breach of the duty of disclosure. 
Both the cases considered above are cases of life 
insurance. Both also involved the non-disclosure of 
particular medical records, the materiality of which the 
41. Op. cit. footnote 3i. 
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insured was unable to appreciate due to his lack of 
medical knowledge. Such a rule is indeed logical in the 
area of life insurance because the average insured cannot 
be expected to appreciate the symptons which are only of 
significance to persons trained in medicine. To have any 
other rule is to impose a standard of disclosure which is 
impossible for the layman to fulfill. 
A similar rule may perhaps be reasonably applied in other 
areas where expert knowledge is required before the 
materiality of a particular fact can be appreciated, 
although there has yet to be a case to this effect. A man 
taking out a policy on his house, for instance, cannot be 
reasonably expected to appreciate the materiality of and 
hence to disclose, the existence of a small crack in an 
inconspicous corner of the house even though that might 
have told a qualified surveyor that the surface beneath 
the house was undergoing serious subsidence. 
In Abu Bakar, Azmi LP was of the opinion that the insured 
could not have appreciated the materiality of information 
relating to the existence four electrically operated 
grinding mills which were used for commercial purposes, 
to a proposal for a fire policy. Even assuming that his 
Lordship was correct in applying the appreciation of 
materiality qualification to a non-life policy, it is 
submitted that in trying to reach a decision in favour of 
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the insured, his Lordship had grossly under-estimated the 
intelligence of the insured. Surely no expert knowledge 
is required for a person to appreciate the fact that the 
existence of such mills could increase the risk of fire. 
Was the introduction of the 'appreciation of materiality' 
qualification by Azmi LP an innovative new step which was 
consciously introduced to strike a balance between the 
interest of the insurer and that of the insured or was it 
merely the result of a failure to appreciate the fact 
that in England such a qualification was only limited to 
life policies? If it is the former, then provided that 
the insured's foresight and intelligence is not always 
under-estimated by the courts to the detriment of the 
insurers, this qualification serves as a useful temporary 
measure to protect the interest of the insured in this 
area of the law until such time when the legislature 
deems it fit to change the test of materiality from one 
that is based on the prudent insurer to that based on the 
reasonable insured. The 'appreciation of materiality' 
requirement can thus pose as a second and perhaps more 
difficult hurdle for the insurers in their attempt to 
resort to the doctrine of good faith to deny a claim. For 
while it may be easy for them to overcome the prudent 
insurer hurdle by inviting members of their profession to 
give evidence in favour of the materiality of a 
particular fact, it may not be as easy for them to adduce 
evidence to convince the court that the 
fact of such 
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materiality was, or should have been, appreciated by the 
insured. 
A second appellate court decision on 
clear the air as to the extent of the 
this qualification in the test of 
Malaysia. As it stands, the case of Abu 
represent a bold step forward by the Ma 
in this area of the law. 
this -issue will 
applicability of 
materiality in 
Bakar seems to 
laysian judiciary 
1.2.2 Materiality and the Basis of Contract Clause 
Most proposal forms contain a 'basis of contract' clause, 
ie. a declaration signed by the proposer to the effect 
that that he warrants the truth of the answers therein 
and that such answers form the basis of the contract 
between him and the insurer. By virtue of this clause, 
all answers in the proposal form are accorded the status 
of warranties, the breach of which would enable the 
insurer to avoid the contract irrespective of the issue 
of materiality. On the contrary, if the proposal form 
does not have such a clause and there is an incorrect 
answer given in the proposal form, the insurer can only 
avoid the contract if they can prove that by giving the 
incorrect answer the proposer has failed to disclose or 
has misrepresented a material fact. By giving the status 
of warrranties to all the answers in the proposal 
form, 
the insurer can avoid a policy by merely pointing to 
the 
breach of such a warranty. This saves them 
the whole 
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trouble of proving materiality42. 
The widespread use of the 'basis of contract' clause does 
not however effectively replace the law relating to 
disclosure. As mentioned earlier, over and above 
correctly answering the questions in the proposal form, 
there remains upon the insured the residual duty of 
disclosure, ie. a duty to volunteer information which is 
material to the risk although such information is not 
solicited by the proposal form. The 'basis of contract' 
clause has therefore only partially eclipsed the law 
relating to disclosure. This fact can be clearly 
appreciated from the Federal Court decision in Abu Bakar. 
There was a 'basis of contract' clause in the proposal 
form but both Azmi LP and Ong FJ made no reference to 
this clause because both were of the view that the 
questions in the proposal form had been correctly 
answered. Instead their Lordships proceeded to consider 
whether inspite of correctly answering those questions, 
there had been a breach of the residual duty of 
disclosure. On the contrary, Gill FJ in his dissenting 
judgement was of the view that the questions in the 
proposal form had not been correctly answered and so 
hinged his judgement on the existence of the 'basis of 
contract' clause. 
42. See Chapter Five - Warranties and Conditions. 
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1.2.3 Evidence of Materiality 
In Carter v Boehm evidence was given by an insurance 
broker to the effect that if the information allegedly 
not disclosed had been known to the insurers, he did not 
believe they would have agreed to provide insurance 
cover. Lord Mansfield was not impressed with this 
evidence: 
43 
It is mere opinion; which is not evidence. It 
is opinion after an event. It is opinion 
without the least foundation from any previous 
precedent or usage. It is an opinion which, if 
rightly formed, could only be drawn from the 
same premises from which the court and jury 
were to determine the cause; and therefore it 
is improper and irrelevant in the mouth of a 
witness. 
Despite this strong criticism by Lord Mansfield there has 
been a marked tendency in the cases after Carter v Boehm 
for judges not merely to regard as relevant, but often to 
rely wholly upon, the evidence of persons from within the 
insurance industry in determining the materiality or 
otherwise of a particular fact. This change of trend was 
perhaps necessitated by the application of the prudent 
insurer test in determining materiality -a post-Carter v 
Boehm development. Although materiality is a question of 
law, whether a particular fact is material is a question 
43. op. cit. footnote 2 at p. 1168. 
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of fact. Like all questions of fact, evidence can be 
adduced to prove the materiality of a particular fact but 
4 the ultimate decision rests upon the judge4. 
When a fact is obviously material, judicial notice 
should be taken of its materiality. It is only when the 
court itself cannot form an opinion as to the materiality 
or otherwise of a fact that evidence should be called for 
to assist the court in making a decision45. The claims 
history of the insured in relation to the same type of 
insurance for instance is clearly a material fact. This 
was obviously not realised by the learned judge and the 
parties involved in Tan Kang Hua v Safety Insurance Co. 
46 
The issue in this case was the materiality of information 
relating to previous claims made by the insured under a 
motor policy in a proposal for motor insurance. The 
insurer called not only its own officer but also an 
officer of an independent company to give evidence as to 
the materiality of that fact. The trial judge considered 
this evidence before deciding that such information was 
material. 
44. In Roselodge v Castle [1966] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 105 for 
instance, the evidence of a Lloyd's underwriter that 
the fact that the proposor had long before been 
caught for stealing apples was material was ridiculed 
by MacNair J. 
45. Per Scrutton LJ in Glicksman v Lancashire and General 
Assurance Co. [1925] 2 KB 593 at p. 609- 
46. [1973] 1 MLJ 6. 
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Where the materiality of a particular fact is less 
apparent, there seems to be two parallel practices 
adopted by the Malaysian courts. The first is where the 
insurer concerned merely calls as witnesses officers of 
their own company to give evidence as to the materiality 
of a fact. In Abu Bakar for instance, at the Sessions 
Court, the insurer's Branch Secretary gave evidence to 
the effect that if the presence of the grinding mills had 
been known to them, they would have charged a different 
premium. This evidence which was not substantiated by any 
independent witnesses was unconditionally accepted by the 
Sessions Court, the High Court as well as the Federal 
Court. 
In contrast, judges in England seem to be more wary of 
the dangers of accepting the particular insurer's 
evidence as to materiality. In Godfrey v Brittanic 
Assurance Co. Ltd. Pape J cautioned: 
47 
[E]vidence may be given by the defendant as to 
its practice. But although such evidence is 
admissible as part of the circumstances 
existing at the time of the proposal, it does 
not of itself establish materiality ... it does 
not of necessity establish that a prudent 
insurer would have regarded it as material. 
47. [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 515 at p. 518. See also Bates v 
Hewitt (1867) LR 2 QB 595 and Zurich General Accident 
v Morrison [1942] 2 KB 53. 
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An approach similar to that taken by the Malaysian courts 
in Abu Bakar was however taken by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Henwood v Prudential Insurance Co. 48 where the 
court, relying largely on the uncontradicted evidence of 
the insurer's own medical and underwriting experts given 
during the trial, held that information relating to 
visits to a psychiatrist for treatment of a nervous 
disorder was material for a life policy. 
It is exceptionally easy for an insurer to have one of 
its own officers to give evidence as to the materiality 
of a particular fact. The materiality of a particular 
fact must be looked at from the eyes of the prudent 
insurer and not from the eyes of an insurer who has an 
interest in a particular case. Accepting the 
unsubstantiated evidence of an interested insurer makes a 
mockery of the prudent insurer test. It can also cause 
extreme hardship to individual litigants who, though 
aware of the fact that there may be opinions to the 
contrary in the insurance circle, will seldom have the 
means to get an independent witness to give evidence. 
Since the onus of proving materiality rests upon the 
insurer, it should be the insurer who should adduce 
independent evidence to support a claim that a particular 
fact is material in the eyes of the prudent insurer. If 
48. (1967) 64 DLR (2d) 715. 
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the insurer merely puts its own officers on the witness 
stand, it is also the duty of the insured's counsel to 
49 object to the admissibility of such evidence . 
The second practice which seems to be more in line with 
that followed in England is that of calling both the 
insurer concerned as well as independent insurers to give 
evidence as to materiality. This approach not only seems 
more fair but also seems to be a more effective and 
realistic way of applying the prudent insurer test. This 
approach was followed in Teh Say Cheng v North British 
and Mercantile Insurance Co. 
50 
where the fact allegedly 
not disclosed was that the insured had an unsatisfied 
judgement against him at the time he made the proposal 
for insurance. In deciding on the materiality of this 
fact, the learned judge heard the evidence from the 
insurer concerned as well as that of two independent 
insurers. 
If the fact allegedly not disclosed is something new to 
the insurance industry as a whole, even disinterested 
parties can only give their opinion as to whether or not 
that fact is material. In the old case of Tan Tye v 
49. In Horne v Poland [1922] 2 KB 364 at p. 365, the 
learned judge expressed doubt as to whether , evidence 
given by the insurer's witness was admissLble 
but 
accepted it because it was not objected 
to by the 
other party. 
50. Op. Cit. footnote 11. 
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Union Insurance Society of Canton51, timber which was 
being shipped in a vessel was insured by its owners. It 
was alleged by the insurer that the insured had failed to 
disclose that the value of the timber had been inflated 
because the profit expected from the sale of the timber 
had been over-valued. The four independent witnesses who 
were called gave different opinions as to the percentage 
of profits that could be regarded as excessive and 
therefore would have to be disclosed . The learned judge 
in this case reiterated that having heard the different 
opinions, the ultimate decision regarding materiality 
rested solely with him. 
1.2.4 Material Facts - Physical Hazards 
As the materiality or otherwise of a particular piece of 
information is a question of fact, something which is 
regarded as material in one case cannot, ipso facto be 
regarded as material in all subsequent cases. The 
materiality of a particular fact has to be 
determined 
within the context of the case itself. Case-decisions on 
the materiality of a particular fact can therefore 
be 
regarded only as guidelines in subsequent cases. 
Facts regarded as material have traditionally 
been 
classified into two broad categories, 
facts relating to 
51. (1879) 1 Ky. 482. 
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physical hazards and facts relating to moral hazards. The 
distinction between the two was explained by Whiteley JC 
in Teh Say Cheng: 52 
Moral hazard is chiefly a man's standing and 
general reputation. The word hazard I use as 
equivalent to the risk of fire. The physical 
hazard is determined by the physical condition 
of the building and the nature of the stock... 
The common denominator in both physical and moral hazards 
is that both can influence the insurer's decision whether 
to accept the risk and, if so, the premium to be charged. 
The presence of either of these hazards increases the 
chances of a claim being made under the policy. When the 
risk of claim is increased because of the physical nature 
of the subject matter of the insurance such as the 
storage of excessive fuel in a building insured under a 
fire policy or that the life insured under a life policy 
is suffering from cancer, these are physical hazards 
which are material to the respective policies. Moral 
hazard relates to the risk of a claim being made not by 
virtue of the physical nature of the subject matter of 
the insurance but by virtue of the insured's own general 
reputation and credibility. The fact that a proposer for 
a fire policy has been convicted for fraud for instance 
is a moral hazard. 
52. Op. cit. footnote 11 at pp. 259 - 260. 
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Considered below are some of the physical hazards 
recognised so far in the different branches of insurance 
in Malaysia. 
(i) Fire Insurance 
In fire insurance the physical hazards are those that 
have a tendency to increase the risk of fire. In Wong 
Lang Hung v National Employees' Mutual General Insurance 
Association Ltd53, it was held that the fact that the 
insured building was attached to another building was 
material. Similarly in a fire policy on stocks of rubber, 
it was held in Asia Insurance Co. Ltd. v American 
International Assurance Co. 
54 
that the place where the 
rubber was to be stored was material. Interestingly 
however the Federal Court in the case of Abu Bakar v 
Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. 
55 did not 
consider the presence of four electrically operated 
grinding mills in the insured premises to be material to 
a policy insuring the said premise against fire. 
According to Ong Hock Sim FJ such fact was not material 
because it did not change the character of the insured 
premises. With respect, the test used is erroneous. If 
the presence of such mills increases the risk of fire, 
surely it should not matter whether the character of the 
53. [1972] 2 MLJ 191. 
54. (1953) 19 MLJ 87. 
55. Op. cit. footnote 34. 
159 
premises was changed or not. 
(ii) Motor Insurance 
In motor insurance, the purpose for which the vehicle is 
to be used is a material fact, as is the type and make of 
the vehicle. In United Malayan Insurance Co. v Lee Yoon 
Heng56, in a proposal for motor insurance the insured 
stated that the vehicle was to be used for private 
purposes. The insured worked as an advertiser and the 
vehicle was in fact used for carrying equipment for 
advertising, to the villages. It was held that the 
purpose for which the vehicle was to be used was material 
and ought to have been disclosed. According to Gill J: 57 
[I]f the vehicle was to be used for commercial 
purposes [the insurer] would have issued not a 
private car policy but a commercial vehicle 
policy, in which the premium charged, the other 
conditions and limitations as to use would be 
different. 
(iii) Life Insurance 
In life insurance all information that tendSto show that 
the insured may die earlier than expected is material. 
Any major ailments suffered by the insured is therefore 
material. In Goh Chooi Leong v Public Life Assurance Co. 
Ltd. for instance, it was held that the fact that the 
58 
56. (1964) 30 MLJ 453. 
57. Ibid. at p-455- 
58. (1964) 30 MLJ 5. 
160 
insured had suffered from pulmonary tuberculosis was 
material. 
While information relating to the age of the life insured 
is certainly a material fact as this directly influences 
the insurers's decision either in accepting the risk or 
in determining the premium59, the law in this respect in 
Malaysia has been modified by s. 15C of the Insurance Act 
1963 which provides that no life policy shall be called 
in question by reason only of a misstatement of the age 
60 
of the life insured. The Act instead provides a formula 
for adjusting the premium once the true age is known. A 
Malaysian insurer can therefore no longer seek to avoid a 
life policy on the grounds of non-disclosure of the 
correct age of the life insured. Evidence as to the 
materiality of such information is also of no relevance. 
(iv) Employer's Liability Insurance 
In an employer's liability policy, the number of 
employees employed is material. In Fook Yew Timber Co. v 
The Public Insurance Co. Ltd. 
61, the plaintiff had an 
employer's liability policy issued by the defendant. For 
the first policy which was for a period of three months, 
59. Hemmings v Sceptre Life Association Ltd. [1905] 1 Ch. 
365. 
60. See infra. pp. 186 - 188. 
61. (1960) 26 MLJ 72. 
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the plaintiff gave the number of their employees as six. 
As no new information was given upon renewal of the 
policy, the renewal was also made on 
were six employees. The plaintiff in 
employment between twenty to thirty 
held that the insurer was not liable 
there had been a non-disclosure of a 
the correct number of employees 
employment. 
(v) Marine Insurance 
the basis that there 
fact had in their 
labourers. It was 
under the policy as 
material fact, ie. 
in the plaintiff's 
In an insurance on a vessel, the fact that the vessel had 
previously been grounded is a material fact62. The type 
of cargo to be carried by a vessel is also material but 
if the change of plans to carry one type of cargo to 
another took place after the issue of the policy, such 
6 
change in plans need not be disclosed3. 
In a marine policy on goods, the fact that the goods are 
to be carried on the deck of the ship is material64. When 
the goods are insured not on their actual value but 
together with an excessive valuation of the profits 
62. Mazzarol v United Oriental Assurance Sdn. Bhd. [1983] 
1 MLJ 328. 
63. Lee Bee Soon and Ors. v Malaysia National Insurance 
Sdn. Bhd. Op. cit. footnote 7. 
64. Pana Vana Letchumanan Chettiar v The Jupiter General 
Insurance Co. Ltd. Op. cit. footnote 16. 
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expected, this fact too is material65. 
1.2.4 Material Facts - Moral Hazards 
Information relating to the general standing, reputation 
and financial credibility of the insured and of others in 
any way connected with the policy are material and ought 
to be disclosed. These facts are commonly described as 
moral hazards. The reason why such information is 
regarded as material is obvious; it is generally regarded 
that the risk involved in issuing a policy to a person 
with such moral hazards, such as a person who is 
financially unsound or who has been convicted of offences 
involving dishonesty, is far higher than the risk 
involved in issuing a similar policy to someone with a 
clean record. 
Although the validity of this line of reasoning has been 
challenged, moral hazards continue to be regarded as a 
category of material facts. The test of what in fact 
amounts to a moral hazard, though, changes not only 
according to the facts and circumstances of the case but 
also according to the general norms of a particular 
society at a given time. In Malaysia, the following are 
some of the moral hazards that have been regarded as 
material. 
65. Tan Tye and Anor. v Union Insurance Society of Canton 
Op. cit. footnote 51. 
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(i) Financial Standing 
Although a person's excessive wealth may not be a 
material fact, his adverse financial standing at the time 
he makes a proposal for insurance is. This includes the 
fact that there is an unsatisfied judgement against him 
and that his property has been attached in the execution 
of such a judgement. In Teh Say Cheng v North British and 
Mercantile Insurance Co. 66, one of the reasons given by 
the insurer in denying liability under a fire policy was 
that the insured had failed to disclose that he had an 
unsatis/fied judgement against him and that his 
stock-in-trade had been attached in execution. The 
insured's counsel argued that such factors were 
extraneous to the risk and could not therefore be 
regarded as material. This was rejected by the learned 
judge who reasoned 
67. 
Was the [insured's] financial position at the 
time when he was negotiating with the [insurer] 
such as would have affected the judgement of a 
rational insurer, governing himself by the 
principles on which insurers do in practice 
act, in considering whether he would accept or 
decline the proposal? ... it seems to me 
beyond 
doubt that the [insured's] financial position 
... was such as would 
have affected the 
judgement of any rational insurer in 
considering whether he would accept or decline 
the proposal. 
As the above case involves a fire policy, it may be safe 
66. Op. cit. footnote 11. 
67. Op. cit. footnote 11 at pp. 259 - 260. 
164 
to presume that in a proposal for fire insurance the 
insured's adverse financial standing is material. Whether 
the same is true in relation to other branches of 
insurance remains to be seen. It is however noteworthy 
that none of the three witnesses who gave evidence 
relating to the materiality of the insured's adverse 
financial standing in the above case linked the 
materiality of such fact to the type of insurance in 
question. Instead they all seemed to have regarded a 
person's adverse financial standing as a moral hazard per 
se, irrespective of the type of insurance applied for. As 
the witnesses were all from within the insurance 
industry, it is extremely foreseeable that should a 
similar question arise in another branch of insurance, 
the insurer would be able to adduce similar evidence in 
favour of the materiality of such information to the type 
of insurance involved. 
(ii) Insurance History 
The phrase 'insurance history' is here used in its widest 
possible context. It includes claims which have been 
made, refusals by an insurer to issue or renew a policy, 
cancellation of policies or the the imposition of a 
higher rate of premium. 
There are two aspects of insurance history, the insurance 
history of the insured in relation to the type of 
insurance he is seeking, for instance in seeking for a 
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life policy, particulars in relation to other previous or 
existing life policies; and the insurance history of the 
insured in all areas of insurance, not just for the type 
for which he is seeking cover. 
In Malaysia there is a difficulty in establishing a 
pattern regarding the materiality of the insured's 
insurance history. This is because matters relating to 
the insured's insurance history are normally made the 
subject of specific questions in the proposal forms. As 
the proposal forms almost always contain a 'basis of 
contract' clause, any untrue answers are deemed to be a 
breach of warranty and the question of materiality 
becomes irrelevant. In Ong Eng Chai v China Insurance Co. 
Ltd. 68 for instance, in a proposal for motor insurance 
the insured was asked if if he had had his policy 
cancelled or refused a renewal. There was such a clause 
in the proposal form. The learned judge cast aside all 
questions of materiality because: 
69 
It is settled law that when in a proposal to 
effect an insurance the parties agreee that 
something should be the basis of contract, it 
would not be open to the court to consider the 
question of materiality. 
A similar decision was reached in National Insurance Co. 
68. [1974] 1 MLJ 82. 
69. Ibid. at p. 83. 
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Ltd. v Joseph70. 
Perhaps the only reported Malaysian case involving the 
alleged non-disclosure of the insured's insurance history 
which was decided solely on the question of materiality 
is Tan Kang Hua v Safety Insurance Co. Ltd. 
71, 
a decision 
of the Federal Court. At the High Court the insurer had 
successfully obtained a declaration that a policy issued 
by them to the insured was void as it was obtained by 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure of material facts. 
In the proposal form, the insured was asked if he had 
ever made a claim under any motor policy. The answer 
'Nil' was given. In answer to another question the 
insured stated that he was entitled to a 'No Claims 
Bonus' from his previous insurer and that he had been 
insured free from claims for two consecutive years. The 
insurer alleged that the insured had failed to disclose 
the fact that he had, within the last two years made a 
claim from his previous insurer. The High Court held that 
this information was material and declared the policy 
void. 
On appeal, the Federal Court72 agreed with the decision 
70. [1973] 2 MLJ 195. 
71. [1973] 1 MLJ 6. 
72. Interesti ngly no reference was made by either of the 
courts to any 'basis of contract' clause. It 
is 
unlikely that the proposal form in question 
did not 
have such a clause. If there was such a claus e 
it was 
extremely negligent of the insurer's lawyers not to 
have reli ed upon it in denying liability. 
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of the High Court as to the materiality of the said 
information. The Federal Court however reversed the 
decision of the High Court on the ground that although 
the information not disclosed was material, it was 
information which was already known to the insurer and 
the insured was therefore under no duty to disclose it. 
Whilst it is clear from the above case that the insured's 
insurance history in relation to the same type of 
insurance is material, it remains to be decided whether 
his insurance history in relation to one type of 
insurance is material to his application for another type 
of insurance. In England, according to the Court of 
Appeal in Locker & Woolf Ltd. v Western Australian 
Insurance Co. 
73, 
an insured must disclose the fact that 
his proposal for a fire policy has been rejected in an 
application for a motor policy. This decision however 
need not necessarily have laid down the general rule in 
this respect. After all different pieces of such 
information may or may not be material depending on the 
circumstances of the case. While it may be difficult for 
even the shrewdest of insurers to prove the materiality 
of an isolated claim in a different type of policy made 
long before the proposal for the current policy, there 
can be situations where the proposer's insurance history 
73. [1936] 1 KB 406. 
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in another type of insurance may bring out other negative 
aspects of the insurer's character, perhaps a tendency to 
exaggerate or even to falsify claims. 
(iii) Criminal and Statutory Offences 
While in England the materiality or otherwise of the 
proposer's criminal history has been subjected to 
countless judicial pronouncements, there has only been 
one such reported case in Malaysia. The lack of local 
decisions however did not seem to have affected the 
learned judge's creativity in New India Assurance Co. v 
Pang Piang Chong74. In a proposal for a motor policy the 
proposer was asked whether he, or any other person who 
would to his knowledge drive the car, had been convicted 
for offences in connection with the driving of any motor 
vehicle during the preceding five years. The answer given 
was 'No'. The vehicle was involved in an accident whilst 
driven by another person with the insured's permission, 
resulting in the death of a third party. The insurer 
sought a declaration that the policy was void for 
non-disclosure of material fact as the insured had failed 
to disclose that during the five years preceding the 
policy he had been convicted of five offences under 
the 
Road Traffic Ordinance. Three of these offences were 
for using vehicles without the required 
licences, 
74. [1971] 2 MLJ 34. 
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one for not having a third party insurance and another 
for not displaying an L-plate on a vehicle. It was held 
that there was no non-disclosure as these offences did 
not show that the insured was irresponsible for the 
purposes of an insurance cover nor did they make him a 
bad risk. According to Syed Othman J: 
75 
The purpose of an insurance in this case is to 
cover the insured in the event of an accident. 
The primary concern of an insurer before he 
insures a proposed insured is therefore to 
determine whether he is a bad risk. I do not 
think that it should be the concern of the 
prudent insurer as to whether or not the 
proposed insured has committed an offence for 
non-compliance of statutory requirements which 
are not pertinent to show that he is a bad risk 
... the real test ... is whether the proposed insured is a bad risk. I am unable to see that 
by the conviction for the five offences the 
[insured] is a bad risk. 
In support of his decision the learned judge cited 
three76 English cases namely, Revell v London General and 
Insurance Co. Ltd. 
77, Taylor v Eagle Star78 and Cocos v 
De Rougemont79. 
In holding that only convictions for offences which were 
75. Ibid. at p. 36. 
76. The learned judge however admitted that he 
did 
read the original reports of the last 
two cases. 
77. [1934] All ER Rep. 744. 
78. (1940) 67 Ll. LR 136. 
79. (1925) 23 L1. LR 34. 
not 
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related to the careful and skillful manner of driving 
were material, the learned judge seemed to have relied in 
particular upon the decision in Revell. However, 
although one of the convictions not disclosed in Revell 
was similar to that in Pang Piang Chong, ie. for driving 
without there being in force a policy of insurance, 
Revell should not, it is submitted, have been used as 
authority for holding such information to be immaterial. 
The decision in Revell centred on the existence of a 
'basis of contract' clause; the issue there being not one 
of materiality but whether a question in the proposal 
form had, on reasonable construction, been correctly 
answered. The answer 'No' was given to the question 'Have 
you or any of your drivers ever been convicted of any 
offence in connection with the driving of any motor 
vehicle? '. It was held that as a reasonable person 
reading the question might honestly have considered that 
a conviction for driving without a policy of insurance 
and for other similar offences were not offences 
in 
connection with the driving of a car, the question 
had 
been correctly answered. As this case dealt solely with 
the interpretation of questions and answers in the the 
proposal form and the effect of the 'basis clause', 
the 
issue of the materiality of those convictions were never 
considered. On the contrary, in Pang 
Piang Chong the 
issue was whether the residual duty of 
disclosure had 
been breached. The insurer in seeking to avoid 
this 
policy specifically stated that 
this was because 'apart 
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from any provisions contained in the policy, the policy 
was obtained by non-disclosure of material facts'. 
In Taylor v Eagle Star, a question in the proposal form 
read: 'Have you or your driver been convicted with any 
offence in connection with the driving of any motor 
vehicle? '. The answer 'No' was given although the 
proposer had been convicted of certain drinking offences 
and the offences of permitting a car to be used without a 
policy of insurance and of driving a car without a road 
fund licence in force. It was held that although the 
answer given was not untrue based on the decision in 
Revell, there remained upon the proposer, apart from the 
obligation to answer questions in the proposal form 
truthfully, the residual duty to disclose all material 
facts. As information relating to the offences were 
material, it was held that the insured had been in breach 
8 
of this residual duty in not disclosing them0. 
Thus when a proposal form contains a 'basis of contract' 
clause and an answer given in the proposal form 
is 
allegedly incorrect, no question of materiality arises. 
All that has to be decided is whether on reasonable 
construction, the question has been correctly answered. 
80. See supra. pp. 131 - 132. 
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However, even if the questions in the proposal form had 
been correctly answered, it remains to be considered 
whether the proposal form aside, the proposer has failed 
to disclose some other material facts and it is at this 
stage that the question of materiality arises. 
The learned judge in Pang Piang Chong also stated that to 
be material, the previous convictions must have shown 
that the insured was a 'bad risk' for the purpose of 
insurance. According to him the five offences for which 
the insured had been convicted did not make him a 'bad 
risk' and therefore need not have been disclosed. It is 
submitted that the scope of moral hazard is far wider 
than being a 'bad risk'. It covers the whole question of 
the moral integrity of the insured and certainly includes 
a person's tendency to commit offences, albeit only 
statutory offences. This clearly represents the English 
law81 as is illustrated by Locker and Wolf Ltd. v 
81. A more restrictive test was applied in the Canadian 
case of Alliance Insurance Co. v Laurentian Colonies 
and Hotels Ltd. [1953] Que. QB 241 where it was held 
that the fact that the director of a company had been 
convicted for living off the proceeds of prostitution 
was not material to an application for a fire policy 
because such conviction would not increase the risk 
of loss by fire. This decision however was not based 
on the common law concept of materiality but on the 
interpretation of Art. 2485 of the Canadian Civil 
Code which reads: 'The insured is obliged to 
represent to the insurer fully and fairly every fact 
which shows the nature and extent of the risk, and 
which may prevent the undertaking of it or affect the 
rate of premium. ' 
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Western Australian Insurance Co. 82 where it was held that 
previous convictions would be material if they tended to 
show that the person concerned was an undesirable person 
with whom to have contractual relations. 
As there are no cases to that effect, it remains to be 
seen how a Malaysian court would treat the non-disclosure 
of offences which are totally unrelated to the subject 
matter of insurance, such as a conviction for gambling in 
a proposal for a fire policy. Perhaps in such a situation 
the individual convictions would have to be looked at. If 
they show general dishonesty or other criminal tendencies 
then such convictions should be regarded as material. 
A factor to be noted in relation to the disclosure of 
criminal convictions is that, unlike England83, Malaysia 
does not have a Rehabilitation of Offenders Act. A 
convicted criminal in Malaysia will never get a 'clean 
slate'. In this light perhaps a more restrictive test to 
the materiality of such convictions makes sense. While in 
England there are two sifting processes which have to be 
undergone before a criminal conviction is required to be 
disclosed, ie. first the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 
and second the test of materiality, in Malaysia there 
is 
82. Op. cit. footnote 73. 
83. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, c. 53. 
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only one such process in the form of the latter. It is 
therefore desirable that such a process be rigid enough 
to ensure the disclosure of relevant criminal convictions 
only. 
1.2.6 Facts Which Need Not be Disclosed 
The very basis of the duty of disclosure is that by their 
very nature there are certain facts which are within the 
exclusive knowledge of one of the contracting parties 
only. It is in relation to such facts that a duty is 
imposed upon that party to disclose such facts which are 
material to the risk to the other party. Matters which 
are not within the exclusive knowledge of either of the 
parties are therefore not subject to the duty of 
disclosure. This includes not merely facts which are 
known to both parties but also those which both have a 
means of finding out. Carter v Boehm is a clear 
illustration of this rule as it was held in that case 
that the insured had not been in breach of the duty of 
disclosure because the insurer had the means and could 
have found out about the facts alllegedly not disclosed 
by the insured. This case imposes a positive duty upon 
the insurer to find out the material facts and as long as 
they have the means of doing so the insured is not 
in 
breach of such duty. 
Cases after Carter v Boehm, unfortunately 
ignored this 
positive duty placed upon the 
insurers and soon 
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transformed the rule into what it is today - that a 
material fact need not be disclosed only if the insurer 
has actual knowledge about it. This is particularly so in 
Malaysia84. 
Before it can be said that an insurer knows about a 
particular fact and therefore no disclosure is required, 
such knowledge must be based on concrete facts. If the 
insurer merely heard rumours about such fact this is not 
sufficient to relieve the insured of the duty of 
disclosure. In Teh Say Cheng v North British and 
Mercantile Insurance Co. 85, an employee of the insurer 
stated in evidence that he had heard rumours that the 
insured had an unsatisfied judgement against him - the 
information which was allegedly not disclosed by the 
insured. It was held that this knowledge was insufficient 
to discharge the insured of his duty of disclosure. 
The non-disclosure of a material fact cannot be used by 
the insurer to avoid a policy if there are evidence that 
the insurer has waived the disclosure of such 
information. While the proposer does not exhaustively 
discharge his duty of disclosure by merely correctly 
84. See eg. Tan Kang Hua v Safety"Insurance Co. [1973] 1 
MLJ 6, Asia Insurance Co. Ltd. v American 
International Assurance Co. Ltd. Op. cit. footnote 54 
and Fook Yew Timber Co. v the Public Insurance Co. 
Ltd. (1960) 26 MLJ 72. 
85. Op. cit. footnote 11. 
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answering the questions in the proposal form, there can 
however be situations where by the nature of the 
questions in the proposal form the insurer can be deemed 
to have waived the disclosure of certain other 
information. When an insured is asked a question with 
reference to a specific time frame, it is generally 
accepted that the insurer has waived the disclosure of 
similar information which falls outside such a time 
frame. 
An interesting case of waiver arising out of the nature 
of the questions in the proposal form can be seen in 
Mazzarol v United Oriental Assurance Sdn. Bhd. 
86. 
A 
claim by the insured whose vessel had grounded was denied 
by the insurer on the ground that he had failed to 
disclose the fact that the vessel had grounded before. In 
the proposal form under the heading 'General' the insured 
was asked inter alia, 'Do you own any other vessel? ', The 
insured answered 'No'. 'Give details of accidents that 
occurred in the last four years to these vessels. ' Answer 
'No'. 'Any of these accidents relate to the vessel 
proposed for insurance? ' Answer 'N/A' meaning not 
applicable. The insurer alleged that the fact that the 
insured vessel had grounded before ought to have been 
disclosed in answer to the last two questions. This 
86. Op. cit. footnote 62. 
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contention was rejected by George j: 
87 
The questions under 'General' specifically 
avoid accidents to the vessel proposed for 
insurance other than accidents to it involving 
other vessels owned by the proposer. No place 
is provided in the proposal form for 
information of previous accidents to the vessel 
On the basis of the format of the defendant's 
proposal form ... I conclude that there was 
neither misrepresentation made to the company 
or concealment of material facts ... and I hold that there was no non-disclosure that entitles 
the defendants to avoid the policy. 
Apart from waiver of disclosure by the nature and format 
of the questions in the proposal form, there can also be 
waiver of disclosure by the conduct of the officers of 
the insurance company concerned. The possibility of such 
a waiver by conduct was considered by Whiteley JC in his 
judgement in Teh Say Cheng88 but no examples of conduct 
which could amount to waiver were given. Perhaps a waiver 
by conduct can occur in a situation where the subject 
matter of the insurance has been subjected to a visual 
examination by the insurer. If such an examination would 
have disclosed something in relation to which further 
enquiries ought to have been made but no such enquiries 
were in fact made, then that should amount to waiver of 
any information which such 
revealed. 
-------------------- 
an enquiry would have 
87. Op. cit. footnote 62 at p. 331. 
88. Op. cit. footnote 11 at p. 255. 
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2.0 Misrepresentation 
2.1 Its Applicability in Insurance Law 
Insurers in seeking to avoid a policy frequently rely 
upon both non-disclosure as well as misrepresentation. 
This coupled with the almost inevitable presence of the 
notorious 'basis clause' in most policies, has resulted 
in the blurring of the line of distinction between 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation in insurance 
contracts. Sometimes this distinction is not even 
appreciated by the courts and frequently the two are used 
89 interchangeably. The tendency to do so no doubt 
originated from England90. However there now seems to be 
change of trend in England; a phenomena which has yet to 
be seen in Malaysia. In Kumar v Life Insurance 
Corporation of India91 the insured answered the following 
questions in the proposal form in the negative: 
Q. 4(d) Have you consulted a medical practitioner within 
the last five years? If so give details. 
Q. 8(a) Did you ever have any operation, accident or 
89. See eg. United Malayan Insurance Co. v Lee Yoon Heng 
Op. cit. footnote 10 at p. 454 where the learned judge 
referred to the 'material misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure' in the proposal form. 
90. Eg. London Assurance Co. v Ma nsel (1879) 11 Ch. D 363 
and Godfrey v Brittanic Assurance Co. 
[1963) 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 515. 
91. [19741 1 Lloyd's Rep. 147. 
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injury? If so give details. 
The learned judge in this case took the unprecedented 
approach of deciding the case solely on the basis of 
misrepresentation. He therefore regarded as irrelevant 
arguments as to whether the non-disclosed information, 
ie. the fact that the insured had undergone a Ceasarian 
section, was material or whether the knowledge of the 
said information could be imputed to the insurer. 
It is hoped that this innovative92 approach will not go 
unnoticed in Malaysia particularly as the law relating to 
misrepresentation is rather complete in Malaysia. 
2.2 Sections 18 and 19 of the Contracts Act 1950 
Misrepresentation according to s. 18 of the Contracts Act 
includes: 
(a) the positive assertion, in a manner not 
warranted by the information of the person 
making it, of that which is not true, though he 
believes it to be true; 
(b) any breach of duty which, without an intent 
to deceive, gives an advantage to the person 
committing it, or anyone claiming under him, by 
misleading another to his prejudice, or to the 
prejudice of anyone claiming under him; 
(c) causing, however innocently, a party to an 
92. For a favourable opinion on this approach, see 
Hasson, RA, 'Misrepresentation and Non-Disclosure 
in 
Life Insurance - Some Steps Forward', 
[1975] MLR 89. 
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agreement to make a mistake as to the substance 
of the thing which is the subject matter of the 
contract. 
Where there is misrepresentation, a contract is voidable 
at the option of the aggrieved party unless the aggrieved 
party had the means of discovering the truth with 
ordinary diligence. Similarly if the misrepresentation 
did not cause the consent of the party to whom the 
misrepresentation was made, the contract is not 
9 3. 
voidable 
Cases of non-fraudulent misrepresentation in contracts of 
insurance should, it is submitted, be considered in the 
light of these provisions. An insurer should only be able 
to avoid a policy for innocent misrepresentation provided 
they had no means of finding out the truth with due 
diligence and provided the misrepresentation had caused 
them to consent to the contract. A heavier burden is 
placed upon the insurer by these provisions compared with 
the duty of disclosure. 
The scope of misrepresentation under the Contracts Act 
being far narrower than the common law duty of 
disclosure, it is hoped that the example set in Kumar 
93. s. 19. 
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will be followed in Malaysia and that judges will refrain 
from deciding cases of misrepresentation on the basis of 
non-disclosure. 
3.0 Fraud 
3.1 Its Applicability in Insurance Law 
The extensive scope of the duty of disclosure coupled 
with the continued recognition of the 'basis of contract' 
clauses, has often made it unnecessary for an insurer to 
rely upon fraud in avoiding a policy. There is also a 
general reluctance to rely upon an allegation of fraud 
because the requirements for proof of fraud as laid down 
in Derry v Peek94 are far more stringent than the 
requirements for proof of non-disclosure. To substantiate 
an allegation of fraud, it must be shown that a 
representation is made knowingly either without belief in 
its truth or recklessly without caring whether it is true 
or false. 
In the context of insurance law, in order to allege 
fraud, there must first be a representation; a mere 
omission to disclose does not amount 
to such a 
representation. Even where there is such a representation 
94. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 (HL). 
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it is much easier for the insurer to allege either breach 
of warranty or non-disclosure because in doing so the 
insurer is not required to adduce evidence as to the 
insured's state of mind. In alleging fraud, the insurer 
must either show knowledge or at least recklessness on 
the part of the insured. Both these elements are not easy 
to prove. 
3.2 Section 17 of the Contracts Act 1950 
In Malaysia, the law in relation to fraud like that in 
relation to misrepresentation is found in the Contracts 
Act 1950. According to s. 17, fraud includes the active 
concealment of a fact by a party to a contract having 
the knowledge or belief of the fact, with intent to 
deceive another party or to induce him to enter into the 
contract. The explanation to this section states that 
mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness 
of a person to enter into a contract is not fraud, unless 
the circumstances of the case are such that, regard being 
had to them, it is the duty of the person keeping silent 
to speak, or unless his silence is, in itself equivalent 
to speech. 
From the above it is clear that in certain circumstances 
silence or an omission to disclose can amount 
to fraud. 
As in a contract of insurance the duty of utmost good 
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faith demands that facts material to the risk be 
disclosed, it is in fact a contract where there is a 
'duty to speak'. Failure to disclose a fact which is 
material to the risk can therefore amount to a fraud. 
While the provisions relating to fraud in s. 17 can in 
certain circumstances be used in place of non-disclosure, 
s. 17 does not and cannot completely and effectively 
replace the law relating to non-disclosure. There are two 
reasons for this. First, a basic ingredient of fraud 
under s. 17 is an intention to induce or to deceive the 
other party into entering the contract. This 
automatically excludes from its scope cases of negligent 
non-disclosure which forms the bulk of non-disclosure 
cases. Second, s. 19 of the Contracts Act provides that 
when consent to an agreement is caused by silence 
amounting to fraud under s. 17, the contract is voidable 
at the option of the aggrieved party. But if the silence 
did not cause the consent of the other party or did not 
induce the other party to enter into the contract, then 
the contract is not voidable. This is an extremely 
difficult element to prove and as such it may be far 
easier to rely on non-disclosure by proving materiality. 
Although s. 17 , 
can be used in certain cases of 
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non-disclosure, this has yet to happen in Malaysia95. The 
insurer cannot be expected to be over eager to use s. 17 
in place of non-disclosure given the difficulties 
mentioned above. There is however one possible advantage 
for the insurer if fraud is relied upon. Section 76 of 
the Contracts Act allows the aggrieved party to claim for 
damages when a contract is avoided for fraud or 
misrepresentation 9 6. 
4.0 Indisputability Clauses in Life Policies 
The general reluctance of the Malaysian judiciary to 
stray from the established common law principles is not 
shared by the legislature. An attempt has been made by 
the latter to restrict, albeit in a very limited sense, 
the scope and application of the duty of disclosure in 
life insurance. The Amendments of 1975 and 1978 to the 
Insurance Act introduced the concept of indisputability 
clauses in life insurance. Section 15C provides that such 
a policy shall not be called in question by reason only 
95. A similar provision in the Indian Contracts Act 1872 
was however applied by the Indian Supreme Court in 
Mithoolal Nayak V Life Insurance Corporation of India 
AIR 1962 SC 814. The insured in applying for a life 
policy had not only failed to disclose several 
serious ailments but had also made false statements 
to the effect that he has never been treated for such 
ailments. The Supreme Court held that this was fraud 
under s. 17 of the said Act. 
96. But damages are now also awarded for non-disclosure, 
see Banque Keyser Ullman SA v Skandia (UK) Insurance 
Co. Op. cit. footnote 4. See also supra. pp. 133-134. 
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of a misstatement of the age of the life insured. 
Instead a method is provided by which adjustments could 
be made by the insurer to the insured sum on the 
discovery of the correct age. This provision has 
0 
effectively negated the effectsknon-disclosure, breach of 
warranty and misrepresentation in relation to 
misstatements as to age in life policies. It is an 
extremely useful provision in the Malaysian context 
because many people who were born during the 
pre-independence days, do not have proper documents 
relating to their birth. It is however unfortunate that 
this provision applies only to life policies. While it is 
a fact that the age of the insured is more important in 
life than in other policies, age can also be a material 
fact in other types of policies like motor vehicle 
policies. If individuals are excused for misstating their 
age in an application for a life policy, why should they 
not be excused for the same omission in respect of other 
types of policies? s. 15C(l) can play an even more 
significant role in protecting the interest of the 
insured if it is made applicable to non-life policies as 
well. 
Another even more significant defect of s. 15C(l) is that 
no exception is made for fraudulent misstatement of age. 
In Anctil v Manufacturer's Life Insurance Co. 
97, it was 
97. [1899] AC 604 (PC). 
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held that if a policy is expressed to be indisputable, it 
does not prevent a party from raising fraud even if there 
is no express exception for fraud in the policy. 
Presumably the same principle ought to be applied to a 
statutory indisputability clause like s. 15C(l) otherwise 
it is grossly unfair to the insurers if they are 
prevented by virtue of this provision, from raising an 
allegation of fraud as regards the insured's age. 
Apart from the indisputability clause as to age, there is 
also another more general indisputability clause for life 
policies. This is s. 15C(4) which reads: 
No life policy ... shall after the expiry of 
two years from the date on which it was 
effected be called in question by an insurer on 
the ground that a statement made in the 
proposal for insurance or in a report of a 
doctor, referee, or any person, or in a 
document leading to the issue of the policy, 
was inaccurate or false unless the insurer 
shows that such statement was on a material 
matter or supressed a material fact and that it 
was fraudulently made by the policyholder with 
the knowledge that the statement was false or 
that it supressed a material fact. 
This provision is more far-reaching in its scope than the 
Statement of Long-Term Insurance Practice of England. It 
immensely restricts the arena open to the insurer 
in 
avoiding a life policy which has been in 
force for two 
years or more. Neither the mere existence of 
the 'basis 
clause' nor the mere fact of the materiality of 
the 
non-disclosed information is any 
longer sufficient ground 
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for avoiding such policies. The non-disclosed information 
must not only be material but must also have been 
fraudulent. 
None of the provisions relating to indisputability 
clauses in s. 15C have been applied by the courts. The 
precise scope and application of these provisions, 
particularly the lengthy s. 15C(4) therefore remains to be 
seen. The Indian Supreme Court in applying a similar 
provision in the form of s. 45 Life Insurance Act 1938 of 
India, laid down three conditions before a life policy 
which comes within the scope of such provision can be 
challenged by the insurer98. First the statement must be 
on a material matter or must supress facts which it was 
material to disclose. Second, the supression or 
misstatement must have been fraudulently made by the 
policyholder and finally, the policyholder must have 
known at that time that the statement was false or that 
it supressed facts which it was material to disclose. 
This should perhaps be used as a guideline in the 
application of the Malaysian provision. 
98. Mithoolal Nayak v Life Insurance Corporation of India 
Op. cit. footnote 95. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
WARRANTIES AND CONDITIONS 
1.0 Introduction 
Express stipulations in a contract of insurance are here 
classified broadly as warranties and conditions. The 
crucial distinction between them is the way in which the 
breach of such a stipulation affects the rights and 
obligations of the parties. While breach of a warranty by 
the insured enables the insurer to repudiate the policy 
from the date of breach, generally breach of a condition 
only enables the insurer to deny liability for a 
particular claim. 
Warranties and conditions in a contract of insurance 
complement, at the post-contract stage, the role played 
by non-disclosure and misrepresentation at the 
pre-contract stage. While the law relating to the latter 
is mainly intended to ensure that prior to the contract, 
the insurer is given a fair chance to make a reasonably 
accurate assessment of the risk to be insured and to 
determine the level of premium to impose, warranties 
serve to ensure that the risk as assessed remains true and 
unchanged throughout the duration of the contract. 
189 
While some conditions serve the same purpose as 
warranties, others generally serve to ensure that on the 
occurrence of the insured event the insurer is able to 
quickly and effectively process the claim. Thus while 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation protect the 
insurer's interest prior to the contract, warranties 
protect this interest during the contract, while 
conditions generally protect their interest after the 
occurrence of the insured event. 
2.0 Warranties 
2.1 Definition 
The term 'warrranty' in the context of insurance law has 
not been ý99ally defined in Malaysia. The Insurance 
Act 1963 makes no mention of the term, let alone define 
it. In most breach of warranty cases the judges have 
applied the common law and have thus given to warranties 
in insurance law an effect similar to conditions in other 
areas of the law, without attempting to, give any 
definition to the term. 
Generally a warranty is an express term of a contract of 
insurance which must be strictly and literally complied 
with by the party upon whom such a term is imposed - 
almost always the insured. Breach of a warranty enables 
the aggrieved party, ie. the insurer, to repudiate the 
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contract from the date of such breach'. Often, though 
this is by no means the rule, the contents of a warranty 
relate either to the description of the subject matter of 
the insurance or to the precautions to be taken by the 
insured to minimise the risk of the occurrence of the 
insured event. 
2.2 Creation of Warranties 
The most common means of creating a warranty out of a 
term in the proposal form is by including therein a 
declaration signed by the insured to the effect that the 
particulars given are true and shall be the basis of the 
contract between him and the insurer. Although it is now 
generally accepted that the presence of the so-called 
'basis of contract' clause does not ipso facto give the 
status of a warranty to every term in the proposal formt, 
Malaysian judges seem to have accepted the existence of 
such a clause as conclusive evidence that a particular 
term has acquired the status of a warranty.. In Suhaimi 
1. According to Lord Mansfield in De Hahn v Hartley 99 ER 
1130 at p. 1131, the contract does not exist unless the 
warranty is literally complied with. This is not 
entirely accurate not only because a breach of 
warranty can be waived by the insurer but also because 
there are circumstances where an insurer may be 
estopped from relying upon such a breach. See infra. 
pp. 216 - 220. 
2. Farr v Motor Traders Mutual Insurance Society [19201 3 
KB 669. See infra. pp. 210 - 211. 
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bin Ibrahim v United Malaya Insurance Co. Ltd., Maclntyre 
J said: 
3 
Where the statements contained in a proposal 
formed the basis of a contract of insurance, 
... the truth of the statements in the proposal form was a condition of the liability of the 
insurer. 
In China Insurance Co. v Ngau Ah Kau4, it was held by the 
Federal Court that when the truth of the answers in the 
proposal form had been made a condition of the policy, it 
was not open to the court to consider the question 
whether the answer to these questions were material. 
A warranty can also be created by the use of the term 
'warranty' or any of its derivatives such as 'it is 
warranted' or 'the insured warrants 
to the case of De Maurier v Bastion 
According 
however, 
the use of such a word does not always conclusively 
create a warranty and that even when such words are used, 
the intention of the parties has to be considered. 
3. [1966] 1 MLJ 140 at p. 142. 
4. [1972] 1 MLJ 52. 
5. In Hock Joo Bee v The Asia Insurance Co. [1931] SSLR 
21 it was held that a clause in a fire policy which 
read: 'Warranted that no hazardous goods ... will 
be 
stored' amounted to a warranty the breach of which 
enabled the insurer to avoid the policy. 
6. [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 550. 
that. .. '5 
Jewellers6 
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Warranties can also be created by the use of other words 
or phrases which clearly indicate that the parties intend 
to regard the contract as void if a particular term is 
not complied with. For instance the use of ph-rases like 
'the validity of this policy is conditional upon... ' 
clearly indicate such an intention and will also have the 
same effect. 
The use of the phrase 'condition precedent' will have the 
effect of creating a warranty if the validity of the 
entire policy, as opposed to the insurer's liability for 
a particular claim, is dependent upon compliance with 
such a condition precedent. As a breach of a condition of 
this nature enables the insurer to avoid the entire 
contract ab initio, inspite of its label, such a 
condition precedent is in fact a warranty. 
In Fook Yew Timber Co. v The Public Insurance Co. 
7, 
the 
plaintiff had an employer's liability policy issued by 
the defendant. One of the conditions precedent for the 
renewal of the policy was that the insured should report 
to the insurer the actual amount paid in wages and the 
number of employees for the previous year. This was not 
done when the insured renewed the policy although the 
7. (1960) 26 MLJ 72. 
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number of employees had increased. It was held that on 
renewal of the policy the insured had not only been in 
breach of a duty of disclosure but had also been in 
breach of a warranty in not fulfilling the condition 
precedent. The policy as renewed was thus void ab initio. 
2.3 Types of Warranties 
Warranties are of three different types. It is crucial to 
identify to which of these three types a particular 
warranty belongs as the legal implications of the breach 
of each type differ from that of the others. 
2.3.1 Affirmative Warrranties 
Also known as warranties as to past or present facts, 
these are contractual stipulations the truth of which is 
guaranteed by the insured at the time of the making of 
these stipulations. As its name suggests, warranties of 
this type relate to past or present facts only. 
Affirmative warranties can usually be identified by 
looking at the language and the nature of a particular 
stipulation. Generally if the language used refers only 
to the past or to the present, then such a warranty is an 
affirmative warranty. There are however two exceptions to 
this. The first is when the warranty, although stated in 
the present tense must in the circumstances, be construed 
as referring to the future. The warranty, although 
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ostensibly affirmative, will then be treated as 
promissory. 
In Beauchamp v National Mutual Indemnit Insurance Co 8 
a warranty in a policy effected by a builder who had 
never carried out demolition work before stated that he 
did not use explosives in his business. This was held to 
be a promissory warranty although the warranty was 
expressed in the present tense as the warranty could not 
possibly have referred either to the past or the present. 
The second exception is that warranties are usually 
deemed to be promissory, even if the present tense is 
used, if it relates to measures to be taken by the 
insured to minimise the risk of the occurrence of the 
insured peril. In Hales v Reliance Fire and Accident 
Insurance Co. 
9, in a proposal form which contained a 
'basis of contract' clause, the insured was asked, 'Are 
any inflammable oils or goods used, or kept on the 
premises? ' The answer given was 'Lighter fuels'. It was 
held that the question and answer was a promissory 
warranty although the present tense was used in the 
question. 
Although both the above decisions seem to be logical, 
they seem to be inconsistent with the basic rule in 
8. [1937] 3 All ER 19. 
9. [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 391. 
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construing such documents, ie. where there is an 
ambiguity, it should be construed contra proferentem. 
After all it is not difficult for the insurer who wishes 
to create a promissory warranty to use words which 
clearly and precisely show such an intentionl0. 
2.3.2 Promissory Warranties 
As opposed to affirmative warranties there are promissory 
or continuing warranties. These are warranties that 
remain in force and hence must be exactly complied with, 
throughout the lifespan of a contract of insurance. The 
recognition of this type of warranty is justified by the 
fact that the insurer has agreed to accept a particular 
risk at a particular premium based on the facts given to 
him before the contract. He is therefore entitled to 
devise a means of ensuring that the risk as assessed and 
the premium as fixed remain unchanged throughout the 
duration of the policy. The effective means of doing so 
is through the instrumentality of promissory warranties. 
Like affirmative warranties, promissory warranties can 
come into being in a number of ways. The basic rule 
however is that to be a promissory warranty a contractual 
10. This point was made by Lord Greene 
in Woolfall & 
Rimmer v Moyle [1942] 1 KB 66 at p. 71 
in rejecting an 
argument similar to that in Hales. 
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stipulation must be clear and unambiguous in its 
language. If there is any ambiguity the courts will 
normally regard such a stipulation to be something other 
l l. than a promissory warranty 
Words precisely to that effect are sometimes used to 
create a promissory warranty. For instance, 'this 
warranty shall be deemed to be of a promissory nature and 
effect'12. The use of future tense or of words showing an 
intention to refer to the future is also generally 
regarded as having the effect of creating a promissory 
warranty13. Sometimes a promissory warranty can also be 
created by the use of the present tense, if from the 
cicumstances, the warranty can only be regarded as 
l 
referring to the future4. 
2.3.3 Warranties of opinion or Belief 
A warranty of opinion or belief is usually created by the 
inclusion of phrases to that effect either in the 
questions asked by the insurer or in the answers given by 
the insured. When there is such a reference to the 
11. Kennedy & Ors. v Smith & Ansvar Insurance Co. Ltd. 
(1976) SLT 110. 
12. Leong Chee Yeong v China Insurance Co. (1952) 18 MLJ 
246. 
13. Suhaimi v United Malaya Insurance Co. [1966] 1 MLJ 
140. 
14. Hales v Reliance Fire and Accident Insurance Co. Op. 
cit. footnote 9. 
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insured's opinion or belief, the statements so made are 
not regarded as either affirmative or promissory 
warranties but as warranties of opinion or belief. This 
is so even if the proposal form contains a 'basis of 
15 
contract' clause. 
In Tan Choo Nik & Anor. v American International 
Assurance Co. Ltd. 
16, the plaintiffs were administrators 
of the estate of the deceased who had a life policy 
issued by the defendant. The plaintiffs' claim for the 
insured sum on the insured's death was rejected by the 
defendant who contended that the policy was void. One of 
the grounds given was that the insured had declared in 
his proposal form that his health was not impaired in any 
way when he in fact was suffering from dysphagia and 
cancer of the oesophagus. The relevant questions relating 
to the insured's health in the proposal form were all 
preceded by the phrase 'to the best of your knowledge and 
belief'. The proposal form also had a 'basis of contract' 
clause. Another statement in the proposal form stated 
that 'All statements made in applying for the insurance 
will in the absence of fraud, be deemed representations 
and not warranties'. Syed Agil J relied primarily upon 
this clause in deciding that in the absence of 
fraud, 
15. Huddleston v RACV Insurance Pty. Ltd. 
[1975] VR 683. 
16. [1982] Malaysian CLJ 570. 
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all statements in the proposal form could only be 
regarded as representations and not warranties. The 
learned judge however also held that even if such a 
clause had been absent, the answers relating to the 
insured's health could not be regarded as affirmative 
warranties inspite of the presence of the 'basis of 
contract' clause. He cited as authority the decision in 
Joel v Law Union and Crown Insurance Co. 
17 
where it was 
held that if a statement which could not be based on the 
proposer's own knowledge was required to be true, an 
express warranty making the truth of the answers a 
condition precedent to the liability of the defendants on 
the policy was necessary. Finally, according to the 
learned judge, a warranty of opinion as to health is 
sufficiently complied with if it was made according to 
18 
the honest belief of a layman. 
2.4 Interpretation of Warranties 
Attempts have on numerous occasions been made by judges 
to mitigate the harsh effects of the law relating 
to 
warranties by resorting to the use of particular 
principles of construction such as the contra proferentem 
rule in construing such stipulations 
in a contract of 
17. [1908] 2 KB 863. 
18. Op. cit. footnote 16 at p. 572. 
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insurance. For instance, an ambiguous stipulation in a 
contract of insurance has often been construed to be 
So<ething other than a promissory warranty. 
19 
In The Cycle and Carriage Co. v The Motor Union Insurance 
Co. 
20, 
referring to the language and interpretation of a 
warranty in a fire policy, Sproule Ag. CJ said: 
21 
[T]he insurer cannot lay traps, and if there is 
any doubts, strict construction must be 
applied, not in his favour but against him. 
In Hock Joo Bee v The Asia Insurance Co. 
22, it was 
contended on behalf of the insured that as a warranty 
relating to the storage of hazardous goods in a fire 
policy was bad due to uncertainty and ambiguity, it 
should be disregarded. This contention though seemingly 
consonant with the contra proferentem rule was rejected 
by the learned judge who favoured another principle of 
construction, ie. that of trying to render a business 
contract effective instead of futile. According to him: 
23 
It is our duty to render this business contract 
effective instead of futile, if we can; -and it 
is enough to do so. 
19. See eg. Farr v Motor Traders Mutual Insurance Society 
Op. cit. footnote 2. , and De Maurier v 
Bastion 
Jewellers Op. cit. footnote 6. 
20. [1931] SSLR 69. 
21. Ibid. at p-77- 
22. Op. cit. footnoe 5. 
23. Op. cit. footnote 5 at p. 221. 
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It is indeed unfortunate that the learned judge chose to 
equate construing a clause contra proferentem with 
rendering the entire contract futile. Such an equation is 
not only inaccurate but seems to lean unjustifiably in 
favour of the insurer. The application of the contra 
proferentem rule does not render a contract futile, 
rather it gives the ambiguous clause an interpretation in 
favour of the party aggrieved by such an ambiguity, ie. 
the insured. As it involves merely an approach in the 
interpretation of a contract, it does not destroy or make 
futile the very existence of the contract itself. 
The contra proferentem rule should, it is submitted, be 
applied not only in construing lengthy warranties drafted 
by the insurer but also in construing ambiguous questions 
in the proposal form which binds the the insured, by 
virtue of the basis of 'contract clause', to answer 
correctly. As such if the questions are ambiguous, then 
such an ambiguity should be read in the insured's favour. 
If his answers to such questions are reasonably or 
substantially correct though not literally accurate, he 
should not be held to have been in breach of a warranty. 
This approach was regrettably not followed in Leong Chee 
Yeong v China Insurance Co. 
24. In a proposal form for a 
life policy, the insured was asked his 'Profession or 
24. Op. cit. footnote 12. 
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Occupation'. The insured wrote 'Merchant'. When asked, 
'Is there anything hazardous about your occupation or 
pursuits? ', the insured wrote 'No'. During the currency 
of the policy, the insured became an Auxilliary Police 
Inspector besides carrying out his work as a merchant. He 
was killed on his first day of duty when a hand grenade 
exploded. In considering whether the' questions in the 
proposal form had been correctly answered, the learned 
judge held that the phrase 'occupation or pursuits' was 
wide enough to include anything which a man did even 
though no emolument or renumeration was received and so 
by becoming an Auxilliary Police Inspector the insured 
had been in breach of a warranty even though he remained 
a merchant as well. 
By adopting a liberal interpretation to vague questions 
in the proposal form the learned judge had failed to 
reflect the need for insurers to carefully and clearly 
phrase the questions in the proposal forms, a matter of 
utmost importance given the far - reaching 
legal 
implications of the 'basis of contract' clause. When a 
layman is asked his occupation he will most likely take 
it to mean what he does for a living and will not 
include 
anything which he does on a voluntary 
basis. When such a 
question is followed by another referring 
to 'occupation 
or pursuits' it can be reasonably expected 
that he will 
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relate this to the preceding question and interpret it to 
mean whether what he does for a living is dangerous. As 
the questions in the proposal forms are framed by the 
insurers, any ambiguity should be interpreted contra 
proferentem. 
Another important principle in construing a warranty is 
that a clause which has the effect of excluding the 
insurer's liability must, in order to be effective, be 
couched in extremely clear and precise terms so that the 
intention to exclude liability in certain circumstances 
is made very clear to the insured. Failure on the part of 
the insurer to use such clear language can result in the 
court's refusal to give effect to such a clause. 
In New India Assurance Co. v Woo Chin Fong25, the proviso 
to s. l in a motor policy provided that no compensation 
should be payable in respect of death or injury resulting 
from an accident whilst the insured was under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. 'An accident 
occurred whilst the insured was driving under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor, resulting in the total 
loss of the car. In denying liability for the loss of the 
car the insurer contended that in driving the car whilst 
25. (1962) 28 MLJ 432. 
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under such influence, the insured had been in breach of 
Condition 3 in the policy which required the car to be 
kept in an efficient working condition. This was rejected 
by the learned judge who reasoned: 
26 
[I]f it was the intention of the [insurer] that 
no compensation should be payable in respect of loss or damage to the car resulting from an 
accident happening whilst the insured was under 
the influence of intoxicating liqour or drugs, 
they would have inserted a proviso to that 
effect in s. l. It seems clear to me that their 
failure to do so shows that they had no such 
intention at the time of making the policy. 
3.0 CONDITIONS 
3.1 Definition 
A condition in a contract of insurance is a contractual 
stipulation which is not a warranty and is therefore 
collateral to the contract. Conditions are of different 
types and serve different purposes - some relate to the 
risk insured against, others relate to the payment of the 
premium while still others relate to the procedure to be 
followed after the occurrence of the insured event. 
Breach of a condition by the insured does not entitle 
the insurer to repudiate the contract, it merely allows 
them to deny liability for a particular claim which is 
26. Ibid. at p. 433. 
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related to such a breach. 
3.2 Conditions Precedent to the Insurer's Liability for 
-1 
These are conditions precedent in the true sense of the 
word as conditions precedent to the validity of a policy 
are in fact warranties. Breach of a condition precedent 
to the insurer's liability for a claim only entitles the 
insurer to avoid liability for a particular claim which 
is connected with such breach. Conditions of this type 
are usually in the form of obligations imposed upon the 
insured which come into play on the occurrence of the 
insured event such as the giving of notice of loss, the 
prohibition against settling any claims with third 
parties and the giving of notice of any intended 
prosecution. 
A mere stipulation in a policy that notice of loss or 
claim be given within a certain time is not in itself a 
condition precedent to liability27. Whether a particular 
stipulation is a condition precedent is a question of 
intention. Such an intention is clear when a clause in 
the policy states that the non-fulfilment of a 
particular condition shall disentitle the insured from 
27. Stoneham v Ocean, Railway & General Accident 
Insurance Co. (1887) 19 QBD 237. 
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, no 
recovery under the policy. According to Murrison CJ in 
Lee Seng Heng & Ors. v The Guardian Assurance Co. Ltd.: 28 
Whether a particular stipulation is intended to 
be a condition precedent or not is a question 
of intention ... Where there is a stipulation 
saying that non-fulfilment of a condition shall 
disentitle the assured from recovery, the 
intention of the parties is clearly shown and 
the stipulation must be construed as a 
condition precedent. 
The plaintiff in this case had a fire policy issued by 
the defendant. After a fire the plaintiff gave a verbal 
notice to the defendant's clerk. This was done inspite of 
Clause II in the policy which stipulated that a written 
notice must be given within fifteen days and that no 
claim under the policy would be payable unless this 
condition had been complied with. It was held to be clear 
from the wording of Clause II that the said clause was 
intended by the parties to be a condition precedent to 
the liability of the insurers for any claim under the 
policy and as the plaintiffs had not complied with it 
their claim failed. 
3.3 Clauses Descriptive of Risks and Exclusion Clauses29 
Both these clauses, as their names suggest, delimit the 
nature and scope of the risk covered by a particular 
28. (1932) 1 MLJ 17. 
29. See also Chapter Twelve - Third Party Motor 
Insurance. 
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policy. While clauses descriptive of risks describe and 
circumscribe the risks in positive terms, exclusion 
clauses complement them by defining the risks in negative 
terms, ie. by describing the situations which are 
excluded by the policy. 
Clauses descriptive of risks and exclusion clauses are an 
integral part of an insurance contract. However it was 
only fairly recently that the common law courts 
recognised these clauses to be in a class of their own, 
separate and different from either warranties or 
conditions generally. This recognition in fact represents 
a judicial reaction to the unsatisfactory state and 
harshness of the law relating to warranties. 
In what must have been the earliest case where clauses 
descriptive of risks were recognised, Farr v Motor 
Traders Mutual Insurance Society30, the plaintiff who was 
insuring his two taxis was asked in the proposal form to 
'State whether the vehicles are driven in one or more 
shifts per 24 hours'. He answered 'Just One'. On one 
occasion during the currency of the policy one of the 
taxis had to be repaired so the other was driven in two 
shifts within 24 hours. An accident occurred involving 
30. Op. cit. footnote 2. This case cited no earlier cases 
where such clauses had been so recognised. 
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one of the taxis at a time when both were being used as 
normal, ie. one shift a day. The insurer denied liability 
on the ground that as the taxis had on one occasion been 
used on two shifts, the insured had been in breach of a 
warranty. It was held that the insurer was liable as the 
statement in the proposal form that each taxi would only 
be used for one shift per day was not a promissory 
warranty but a clause descriptive of risk. If the 
accident had occurred at a time when such a clause was 
breached, the insurer would not have been liable as they 
were not at risk when a clause descriptive of risk was 
not being complied with. 
A similar decision was reached in Provincial Insurance 
Co. Ltd. v Morgan31 although there seems to be a degree 
of uncertainty in t hat case as to whether the relevant 
clause was a clause descriptive of risk or ap romissory 
warranty which had not in fact been breached by the 
insured. 
In Malaysia, although no such specific label was used, 
clauses descriptive of risks were first recognised in the 
32 
criminal case of Dodds v Regina. The appellant who rode 
a motor cycle without displaying an L-plate was charged 
31. [1933] AC 240 (HL). 
32. (1964) 3 MC 320. 
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and convicted for that offence as well as for the offence 
of using a motor cycle without a third party insurance. 
He appealed against the second conviction as he had at 
the time of the offence a third party policy. The 
prosecution however contended that since the appellant 
had been in breach of a statutory provision by not 
displaying the L-plate, a proviso in the policy applied 
and the appellant was not covered by the policy at that 
time. The court agreed and held that as the appellant was 
at that time in breach of a term in the policy, the 
insurer would not have been liable if a third party had 
been injured then33. This meant that the appellant did 
not have the required insurance cover at that time. 
Although the learned judge referred only to a breach of a 
'term of the policy' without attempting to give a 
definite label to the said term, his reasoning seemed to 
show that he regarded the said term either as a clause 
descriptive of risk or as an exclusion clause. This is 
because he held that the insurer would not be liable if a 
third party had been injured at a time when this term was 
broken. He did not regard the policy to be void, which 
would have been the inevitable conclusion if he had 
33. This argument is erroneous. Under s. 80 of the Road 
Traffic ordinance 1958, the insurer would still be 
liable to a third party in such a situation although 
they could afterwards recover the amount paid from 
the insured. 
209 
considered the term to be a warranty. 
Clauses descriptive of risks and exclusion clauses were 
again considered in Leong Chee Yeong v China Insurance 
3 Co. 4. In holding that the insurers were not liable under 
a life policy, the learned judge inter alia reasoned that 
the insured had been in breach of a promise when he 
became an Auxilliary Police Officer. In so doing the 
learned judge summed up the law relating to clauses 
descriptive of risks: 
35 
Where there is a proposal which in terms has 
been incorporated in the policy and which has 
been stated to be its basis then the courts 
have regarded the statements contained in the 
proposal in one of two ways. Either they have 
regarded these statements as promises that a 
certain state of things shall continue or a 
certain course of conduct shall be continued 
during the whole period covered by the policy 
so that if the particular promise is not kept 
the policy is invalidated or they have regarded 
these promises as merely descriptive of the 
risks so that if the accident happens while the 
state of things subsists there is a valid 
claim, but if the accident happens while the 
state of things has ceased or been interrupted 
there is no valid claim. 
Having clearly distinguished clauses descriptive of risks 
from warranties, the learned judge unfortunately refused 
to decide whether the clauses in question in that case, 
ie. that the insured was a merchant 
34. Op. cit. footnote 12. 
35. Op. cit. footnote 12 at p. 252. 
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and that there was 
A 
nothing hazardous in his occupation or pursuits, were one 
or the other. He justified his refusal to make the 
ultimate decision in the following words: 
36 
On the law as I have stated it, it is 
impossible to regard the insured's statement as to his profession or occupation and pursuits 
otherwise than as a promise, and if the 
accident whereby he died occurred while he was in breach of that promise it seems to me immaterial whether it be regarded as a promise 
that he would continue a certain course of 
conduct throughout the duration of the policy 
or merely as a description of the risk. The 
promise was that he was a merchant ... When he assumed duty as an Auxilliary Police Inspector, 
that promise was broken. 
While it is true that every term of a contract is 
essentially a promise, the learned judge's refusal to 
give the broken promise a label which is more specific 
and more familiar in insurance law is regrettable. While 
he was right in saying that such a labelling would not 
have made any difference to the final outcome of the case 
before him, identifying the nature of the broken promise 
would have enabled us to identify the precise reason for 
the non-liability of the insurer and ' the legal 
implications therewith. If the so-called broken promise 
was a warranty, the policy was void from the date of the 
breach and the insurer would not have been liable for any 
claims arising thereafter even if the insured had met his 





Police Inspector. On the contrary, if the promise was a 
clause descriptive of risk, the policy would have 
remained valid until the insured's death. Its cover 
however would be suspended whenever the insured assumed 
his police duties. 
3.4 Arbitration Clauses37 
Arbitration clauses are in effect a variety of conditions 
precedent to liability. These clauses normally stipulate 
that any dispute arising out of a claim under the policy 
must first be referred to arbitration. An arbitration 
clause becomes a condition precedent to liability if, as 
is common, it makes it clear that such a reference to an 
arbitrator is a condition of any claim or any action in 
court. Failure in such a case to refer a dispute to 
arbitration is fatal to the insured's particular claim 
under the policy. In Suhaimi v United Malaya Insurance 
Co. 
38, 
one reason given by the insurer in denying 
liability was that the insured had been in breach of a 
condition in the policy which required a dispute to be 
referred to arbitration within twelve months from the 
date when liability was disclaimed by the insurer. This 
contention was accepted by the learned judge who found on 
the evidence that the insured had failed to refer the 
37. See also Chapter Eight - Claims. 
38. [1966) 1 MLJ 140. 
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matter to arbitration although he was aware that the 
insured had disclaimed liability. 
4.0 Breach of Warranties and Conditions 
4.1 Effect of Breach39 
Affirmative and promissory warranties must be literally 
and strictly complied with. Breach of either of them 
enables the insurer to avoid the policy from the date of 
the breach. As the insured warrants the truth of an 
affirmative warranty at the time he enters into the 
contract of insurance, breach of such a warranty enables 
the insurer to avoid the contract ab initio. On the 
contrary, with a promissory warranty the insured warrants 
its truth throughout the duration of the policy and so a 
breach of such warranty at any time during the lifespan 
of the contract enables the insurer to avoid the policy 
from such date. If a promissory warranty is breached from 
the first day of the contract, then its effect will be 
the same as that of a breach of an affirmative warranty, 
the insurer being entitled to repudiate the contract ab 
39. In England the strict law is not always applied in 
this respect because of the Statements of Insurance 
Practice issued by the Association of British 
Insurers and Lloyd's. No parallel statements have 
been issued by Malaysian insurers. There are 
however provisions in the Insurance Act 1963 which 
introduce statutory indisputability clauses in 
relation to life policies which have been in force 
for two years or more. See Chapter Four - 
Non-Disclosure, Misrepresentation and Fraud. 
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A 
initio. Any breach of warranty is fatal to the contract 
irrespective of either the materiality40 of the warranty 
or the causal connection between the breach and the loss. 
A warranty of opinion or belief is breached if the 
insured is dishonest or fails to exercise due care in 
making it41. An honest opinion or belief which 
subsequently proves to be wrong is not fatal to the 
contract. 
Breach of a condition precedent to liability allows the 
insurer to avoid liability only for a particular claim 
which is directly related to such breach. In third party 
motor insurance an insurer who had settled a third party 
claim is entitled to recover the amount so paid if the 
insured had been in breach of a condition in the policy. 
In Public Insurance Co. Ltd. v Muthu42 the insurer sought 
to recover from the insured a sum of money which they had 
paid to a third party who was injured in an accident with 
the insured as the insured had failed to comply with a 
condition in the policy which required him to give 
written notice of any loss or possible claim or of any 
impending prosecution. The learned judge found that the 
40. China Insurance Co. v Ngau Ah Kau Op. cit. footnote 
4. 
41. Huddleston v RACV Insurance Pty. Ltd. Op. cit. 
footnote 15. 
42. [1965] 2 MLJ 201. 
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insured had not complied with the condition and allowed 
the insurer to recover: 
43 
Under the compendious 'condition precedent' 
clause the due observance and fulfilment of the 
terms and conditions of a policy is a condition 
precedent to liability on the part of the 
company, and the position is not affected by 
the fact that damages have already been paid to 
the injured party under the policy. The right 
to recover is inherent in the terms. 
Breach of clauses descriptive of risks or exclusion 
clauses allows the insurer to deny liability only for 
losses which occur at the time when such clauses are 
4 breached4. It is for this reason that such clauses are 
also known as suspensive conditions. 
4.2 Proof of Breach 
The legal burden of proving breach of a warranty or a 
condition rests upon the party alleging such a breach, 
which is usually the insurer. The insurer must adduce 
sufficient evidence to convince the court, on a balance 
of probabilities, that the insured has been in breach of 
a particular warranty or condition45. 
43. Ibid. 
44. Farr v Motor Traders Mutual Insurance Society, Op. 
cit. footnote 2 and Provincial Insurance Co. Ltd. v 
Morgan Op. cit. footnote 31. 
45. Bond Air Services Ltd v Hill [1955] 2 QB 417 at 
pp. 427 - 428, per Lord Goddard CJ. 
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In Malaysia Rubber Development Corporation v Malaysia 
National Insurance Sdn. Bhd. 
46, 
the defendant insured 
rubber belonging to the plaintiff under a Goods in 
Transit Policy. The rubber was destroyed when a fire 
gutted the plaintiff's godown. The defendant denied 
liability inter alia on the ground that the rubber was 
not in transit when it was destroyed and so a clause 
which excluded the insurer's liability when the rubber 
was stored in a godown for the purposes of storage, 
making-up, processing or packing, applied. At the time 
when it was burnt down the rubber was temporarily stored 
in the godown after being collected from various centres, 
prior to being sent to the port for export. The insurer 
however failed to adduce sufficient evidence to show 
that the rubber was stored in the said godown for the 
purposes mentioned in the exclusion clause and the High 
Court found them liable under the policy. Their appeal to 
the Supreme Court inter alia in relation to the nature 
of evidence and burden of proof required for the 
exclusion clause to apply, failed and the decision of the 
High Court was affirmed. 
4.3 Waiver of Breach 
A breach of warranty need not automatically and 
46. [1986] 2 MLJ 124. 
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-A 
inevitably result in the repudiation of the contract by 
the insurer. The insurer may opt to waive such a breach, 
as a result of which the contract remains intact and the 
parties remain bound by the rights and obligations 
thereunder as if a breach of warranty had not occurred. 
An insurer is deemed to have waived a breach of warranty 
if, after knowing of such a breach, the insurer continues 
to exercise the powers conferred to them by the policy as 
if the policy remains valid and in force. 
In The Cycle and Carriage Co. v The Union Motor Insurance 
Co. 
47 
, fire policies issued by the defendant to the 
plaintiff contained warranties to the effect that none of 
the goods mentioned in an annexed list of hazardous goods 
would be in or upon the insured premises during the 
currency of the policies. The list mentioned inter alia, 
oils of all kinds except essential oils, linseed oil in 
drums and castor oil in tins. After a fire gutted down 
the insured premises, the plaintiff claimed on the 
policies issued by the defendant, which insured different 
parts of the premises and the different contents therein 
against fire. The defendant pleaded breach of the 
warranty relating to storage of hazardous materials. 
47. Op. Cit. footnote 20. 
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'A 
According to the evidence, the insurer after knowing of 
the alleged breach of warranty, continued to exercise the 
rights conferred to them under the policies by taking 
possession of the premises and realising the plaintiff's 
goods by way of salvage. Relying on this evidence the 
plaintiff contended that the defendant had waived the 
breach of warranty. Sproule Ag. CJ agreed: 
48 
[TJhe fire occurred on the night of 16th - 17th 
April 1929. Notice of loss was given by the 
plaintiffs the next day ... 
Before the end of April ... they had all the 
evidence they now possess of the breach of 
warranty of hazardous goods ... and could have 
repudiated the contract and denied the 
liability. 
What they actually did was to enter upon ... 
- and take possession of the premises and the 
property of the plaintiffs thereon on 1st May. 
Then upon 2nd May, plaintiffs asked for an 
extension of time to file their claims in 
detail under Condition 2. Defendants did not 
set up the breach of warranty, they granted the 
extension. 
The effect of these acts was an election by the 
defendants to treat the contract and the 
plaintiff's claim under it as valid and 
subsisting ... and thereby affirmed the 
contract. 
The learned judge cited as authority the Privy 
48. Op. cit. footnote 20 at p. 71. 
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Council 
decision in Yorkshire Insurance Co. v Craine49 whereby 
after a fire had occurred at the insured premises but 
before any claim was made, the insurer's agent went into 
possession of the said premises and allowed the insured 
to enter only with his permission. On being sued for the 
insured sum, one of the defences raised by the insurer 
was that the insured had never submitted to them a claim 
as was required by the policy. The insured pleaded waiver 
by virtue of the insurer's entry into and continued 
possession of, the premises. According to Lord Atkinson, 
it was illegal for the insurer to enter the insured 
premises unauthorised by the terms of the policy, until 
and unless a claim had been filed. However if the company 
did so, they were estopped from disputing the claim as 
they could not set up that their own act of entry was 
illegal. 
To successfully plead waiver the insured must adduce 
evidence to show that the insurer had, after acquiring 
knowledge of the breach, shown an intention to treat the 
contract as subsisting. In Public Insurance Co. v 
Muthu50, the insured contended that an alleged breach of 
condition on their part had been waived by the insurer. 
The sole basis for this contention was that in a letter 
49. [1922] AC 541. 
50. Op. Cit. footnote 42. 
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written earlier by the insurer's solicitor conveying 
their intention to repudiate the contract, the breach of 
the particular condition precedent was not mentioned as a 
ground for the intended repudiation. The learned judge 
rejected the insured's plea of waiver because there was 
insufficient evidence to support it. According to him: 
51 
The burden of proof to show waiver is a strict 
one. I can find nothing in the content of the 
letter ... or the conduct of the plaintiffs to 
show that after the breach the plaintiffs have 
an intention to treat the contract as still 
subsisting between the parties. The [insured] 
has not discharged his burden in this respect. 






The premium in a contract of insurance is the 
consideration from the insured to the insurer, in return 
for the undertaking by the latter to pay the former on 
the occurrence of the insured event. Although ordinarily 
the premium takes the form of the payment of a sum of 
money, this need not necessarily be the case. In mutual 
insurance for instance, the premium may be in the form of 
an obligation to contribute to the losses of others. 
' 
While the size of the premium is usually a reflection of 
the insurer's assessment of the. risk, it is in fact of no 
consequence to its validity as a consideration for the 
contract. Anything that qualifies as, a 
consideration for an ordinary contract qualifies as 
a consideration in a contract of insurance. 
valid 
such 
1. Lion Insurance Association v Tucker (1883) 12 QBD 176. 
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1.2 The Premium and the Contract of Insurance 
An insurance contract being essentially executory in 
nature, the actual payment of the premium is not 
generally a pre-requisite either for the formation of 
such a contract or the commencement of cover thereunder 
unless there are express stipulations to that effect 
2 
While cover under a fire policy usually commences 
immediately irrespective of whether or not the premium 
has been paid, contracts of life insurance normally 
stipulate that the provision of cover thereunder does not 
commence until after the payment of the first premium. A 
third party motor insurance is ineffective unless the 
insurer has delivered to the insured a certificate in the 
prescribed forma. Such a certificate is not usually 
issued until after the premium is paid. 
While neither the payment of the premium nor an agreement 
as to its precise amount is a pre-requisite to the 
formation of a contract of insurance, the parties to such 
a contract must have reached some form of agreement as to 
2. McElroy v London Assurance Corporation (1897) 24R (Ct. 
of Sess. ) 287 at p. 291, per Lord MacLaren. See also 
Thompson v Adams (1889) 23 QBD 361 where the premium 
was not tendered until after the loss. 
3. Road Traffic Ordinance 1958, s. 75(4). 
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the premium before the contract can be concluded4. They 
may agree that the amount be reasonable or that it be 
determined by a third party. Complete uncertainty as to 
the premium precludes the existence of the contract. 
In non-life insurance, Malaysian insurers are statutorily 
prohibited from providing cover before either the premium 
or a deposit thereof is received or is guaranteed to be 
paid in a prescribed manner and at a specified time. An 
insurer who acts in contravention of this prohibition is 
liable to be fined5 but the effect of such a 
contravention on the contract itself is not clear. 
According to the Court of Appeal in Phoenix General 
Insurance Co. SA Greece v Administratia Asiguraliror de 
Stat6, where a statutory prohibition is a unilateral one 
ie. imposed by the statute upon one of the contracting 
parties only, it does not automatically follow that a 
contract entered into in contravention of such a 
prohibition is illegal and void. This depends on a 
consideration of public policy in the light of the 
mischief which the prohibition was designed to prevent. 
The 'cash before cover' provision in the Insurance Act 
was intended to protect insurers by preventing them from 
4. Murfitt v Royal Insurance Co. 10 L1. L Rep. 191 and 
Allis-Chalmers & Co. v Maryland Fidelity Deposit Co. 
(1916) 114 LT 43. 
5. Insurance Act 1963, s. 14A(l). 
6. [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 552. 
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undertaking risks for which no premium has been received. 
If in contravention of such nrný, - ; o;,,, 
chooses to provide cover before receiving the premium, it 
is submitted that the contract should not be illegal and 
void but should be enforceable by the insured as the 
innocent party. 
Whether, having agreed to insure a particular risk at a 
specified premium, the insurer can afterwards refuse to 
accept the premium when tendered seems to depend upon two 
factors. 
The first is whether there has been a change in the risk 
between the earlier negotiation and the tender of the 
premium. If there has been such a change, according to 
the decision in Canning v Farquhar 
7, 
an insurer is 
entitled to refuse the premium tendered. 
The court in that case however left unanswered the 
question whether the insurer could legally have refused 
the premium if there had been no alteration in the risk. 
The answer to this seems to depend upon the second factor 
- the legal status of the preliminary arrangement. If the 
preliminary arrangement is merely a negotiation prior to 
contract which is supposed to be culminated by the 
7. (1886) 16 QBD 727. 
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formation of a contract when the premium tendered is 
accepted, then there is no obligation on the part of the 
insurer to accept the premium irrespective of whether or 
not there has been a change in the risks. If the 
preliminary arrangement is in fact a contract, then the 
tender of the premium and the provision of cover would 
amount to the performance of an existing contract. 
Failure of either party to perform his share of the 
bargain would thus be in breach of the contract. 
The crucial question is thus whether there is a binding 
contract at the time the premium is tendered. In Canning 
v Farquhar, Lord Esher MR regarded the preliminary 
arrangement including the filling in of the proposal form 
as being made preliminary to the moment of insurance and 
was therefore a mere expression of an intention to insure 
by one party and to accept the risk by the other8. His 
Lordship was thus of the view that there was no contract 
binding the insurer to accept the premium. 
A contrary decision was taken by the Malaysian Supreme 
Court in Borhanuddin bin Haji Jantara v The American 
Insurance Association9. About two weeks before an air 
8. Ibid. at p. 731. 
9. [19871 1 MLJ 22. See Chapter Two - Contractual 
Formalities. 
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stewardess was involved in a fatal plane crash, she 
submitted a proposal for life insurance with the 
respondent. Thereafter she paid a sum of (M)$118.00 for 
which a receipt was issued. At the time of her death the 
insurer had not issued her with a policy. At the High 
Court it was held that there was no concluded contract at 
the time of the insured's death and the respondent was 
not liable. This decision was reversed by the Supreme 
Court on the ground that there was a binding contract 
from the moment the insured's proposal was accepted. As 
such the payment of the premium by the insured and the 
issue of a policy by the insurer were regarded as the 
performance by the parties of their obligations under an 
existing contract. Failure by either party to perform 
their part of the bargain would therefore amount to a 
breach of contract. 
1.3 Regulation of Premiums for Life Policies 
In Malaysia, the rate of premium chargeable for a life 
policy is statutorily regulated. The Insurance Act 
provides that an insurer shall not issue a life policy of 
any description if the premium chargeable thereunder is 
not in accordance with rates fixed with the approval of a 
qualified actuary. If no such rates have been so fixed 
for a particular type of policy the premium must be one 
that has been approved for the policy by a qualified 
226 
actuary10. In approving a premium for a policy or a rate 
of premium for a particular description of life policy, 
the actuary must be satisfied that such premium or rate 
of premium is suitable and in accordance with sound 
l 11 
practice 
In determining what premium or rate of premium to 
approve, the actuary must take into account the maximum 
commission which is proposed to be paid to any person in 
respect of that policy and this amount must be certified 
by him12. In order to ensure compliance with these 
provisions, the Director-General of Insurance is 
empowered to require an insurer to furnish him with an 
actuary's report as to the rates of premium for the time 
being chargeable by the insurer for any particular 
description of life policy13. Breach of any of these 
provisions by the insurer amounts to a criminal 
14 
offence. 
The Life Assurance Companies (Compulsory Liquidation) Act 
1962 which was introduced during the period of the 
10. Insurance Act 1963, s. 15(1). 
11. s. 15(2). 
12. s. 15(3). 
13. s. 15(4). 
14. This again raises the question whether a policy 
issued in contravention of these provisions is 
enforceable by the insured. See Supra. pp. 223 -224. 
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'Malayan Mushrooms' and remains in force today has 
even more stringent controls over premiums for life 
policies. It allows the Director-General of Insurance to 
petition for the winding-up of the insurance company 
concerned if the premiums charged are inadequate or are 
not graduated according to the age of the insured or when 
such graduation is by more than four year intervals15. 
The reason behind these tight controls over the premiums 
for life policies can perhaps be best explained by the 
fact that both the Insurance Act 1963 and the Life 
Assurance Companies (Compulsory Liquidation) Act 1962 
were introduced at a time when the life insurance 
industry in the country had barely recovered from the 
scandal caused by the 'mushroom' companies. These 
provisions serve to prevent insurers from issuing 
policies at unrealistically low premiums only to realise 
later that they could not meet their obligations. 
2.0 Payment of Premiums 
Based on the general legal principle that unless the 
contract stipulates otherwise, it is for the debtor to 
seek the creditor and not vice versa, it is the 
responsibility of the insured to pay the premium, not 
15. s. 3. 
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that of the insurer to collect them. The strict 
application of this principle is clearly illustrated in 
Lai Ah Heng & Anor. v China Underwriters Ltd. 16. One of 
the reasons given by the insured in seeking a declaration 
that a life policy had not lapsed for the non-payment of 
the second and subsequent premiums was that it was 
impossible for the premium to be paid because during the 
period of the Japanese Occupation in Malaya, the insurer 
had suspended their business in the country and had not 
appointed agents to collect the premium. In rejecting 
this contention, Gordon-Smith Ag. CJ said that there was 
no obligation or legal duty on the part of the insurers 
17 to collect or even to attempt to collect, the premiums. 
Prima facie premiums must be paid in cash at the 
insurer's principal office. In practice however the 
place, mode and time of payment of the premium are 
usually expressly stipulated in the policy. 
2.1 Payment to the Insurer's Agent 
18 
Premiums can be paid to the insurer's agent provided the 
agent is authorised to receive them on the insurer's 
16. (1948-49) MLJ (Supp. ) 85. 
17. Ibid. at p. 86. 
18. See also Chapter Seven - Intermediaries. 
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behalf. Such authority may be expressed or implied. An 
agent may also have the ostensible authority to receive 
such premiums. If the insured pays the premium to someone 
who has no authority to receive it, the insurer can 
cancel the contract for non-payment of premium19. If an 
agent is only authorised to receive the premium in a 
specific form, payment to him can only be made in that 
form20. Under the Insurance Act, where the premium is 
received by an agent or a broker on behalf of the 
insurer, such receipt shall be deemed to be receipt by 
the insurer. The onus of proving that the person 
receiving the premium was not authorised to receive it 
lies upon the insurer21. 
2.2 Days of Grace 
If the renewal premium in non-life policies or the second 
or subsequent premiums in life policies are not paid by 
the due date and if the continuance of cover is 
conditional upon the payment of such premium, legally the 
policy lapses immediately after the date the premium is 
due. In practice the harshness of this general rule is 
mitigated by the policy expressly allowing a certain 
number of 'days of grace' after the due date, for the 
19. Lee Cheng Oo & Ors. v China Insurance Co. Ltd. (1962) 
28 MLJ 297. 
20. Acey v Fernie 151 ER 717. 
21. s. 14(A)(2). 
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insured to pay the premium before the policy lapses. In 
Malaysia as in England, for non-life policies such as 
fire, theft or accident, fifteen days of grace is 
commonly allowed while for life policies a period of 
thirty days is usually allowed. In both countries it is 
generally accepted that no days of grace can be allowed 
for third party motor policies because the Road Traffic 
Acts of both countries provide that such a policy cannot 
be effective unless a certificate of insurance is issued 
and such a certificate is not issued before the premium 
22 . 
paid 
Whether the insured is covered during the days of grace 
but before the payment of the premium depends basically 
upon the the type of policy in question and the 
stipulations therein. In a short-term policy as the 
insurer is entitled to refuse to renew the provision of 
cover, the insured is not normally covered during such a 
period until the premium is in fact tendered and accepted 
within the days of grace23. If the policy expressly 
stipulates that the insured is held covered during the 
days of grace then such a stipulation is effective unless 
the insurer indicates his refusal to renew the policy 
22. Road Traffic ordinance 1958, s. 75(4) (Malaysia) and 
Road Traffic Act 1972, s. 147(l) (UK). 
23. Simpson v Accidental Death Insurance Co. 140 ER 413. 
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prior to that period. In life insurance, the insurer is 
not entitled to decline to continue the provision of 
cover. However whether the insured is covered during the 
days of grace but before the tender of the premium 
depends primarily upon the terms of the policy. Most 
policies in fact clearly define the position of an 
insured who dies during this period. If there are no 
definite stipulations in the policy, the established 
principle is that payment within the days of grace is 
equivalent to payment on the due date. Thus if an insured 
dies during this period and the premium is thereafter 
paid by his representatives within the remaining days of 
grace, the insurer must accept the premium24. 
2.3 Effect of Non-Payment 
It is customary for insurers to send further reminders to 
the insured if the premium is not paid either by the due 
date or within the days of grace if any. Insurers however 
are not legally bound to send such reminders or to notify 
the insured that forfeiture or other consequences will 
25 follow. 
In determining the effect of the non-payment of premium 
on a policy, it is crucial to distinguish between a 
24. Stuart v Freeman [19031 1 KB 47 at p. 55. 
25. Windus v Tredegar (1866) 15 LT (NS) 108. 
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contract of life insurance and a contract of non-life 
insurance. A life policy involves a single contract 
entered into at the inception of the policy which 
continues to exist until either the death of the life 
insured or the attainment by him of a specified age, 
subject to the payment of the premiums whenever they are 
due. In non-life policies, the contract is usually for a 
period of one year. After this period, the contract comes 
to a natural end and there is no obligation on either 
party to renew or upon renewal, not to impose new terms 
and conditions or to charge a different premium. As every 
renewal of a non-life policy amounts to the making of a 
fresh contract, the effect of the non-payment of a 
subsequent premium in a non-life policy amounts to a 
failure to enter into a fresh contract of insurance. 
The legal effect of the non-payment of the subsequent 
premiums on a life policy depends upon the length of time 
within which the policy has been in force. Under the 
Insurance Act, a life policy which has been in force for 
three years or more shall not lapse or be forfeited by 
reason of the non-payment of premiums26. Instead the 
policy shall continue to have effect subject to such 
26. s. 43(2). 
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modifications to the period for which it is to be in 
force or the benefits receivable thereunder or both, as 
may be determined in accordance with the system adopted 
by the insurer for the particular type of policy. The 
insurer is free to adopt any system in making such a 
modification provided it is one that has the approval of 
the Director-General of Insurance and is a system which 
has been adopted and applied at the time the policy in 
27 
question was issued 
There are at least three systems of modifying a life 
policy which are commonly adopted by Malaysian 
insurers28. The first automatically converts a policy 
into a fully paid-up policy of such a reduced amount as 
is determined by the surrender value of the policy. The 
second involves the grant of a loan by the insurer to the 
policyholder, for an amount which is equal to the amount 
of the premium due, to meet the unpaid premium. This can 
be continued until such time when the loans for the 
unpaid premiums exceed the cash value of the policy, 
after which time the policy is forfeited. The third 
system is one whereby the insurer grants a loan to pay 
the premium only up to the amount which is needed to 
27. s. 43(2). 
28. Lee, KK, Life Insurance in Malaysia, Life Insurance 
Association of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur 1985, pp. 116 - 
117. 
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convert the policy to one which is based on a Term 
Assurance29 for which the premium is much less than that 
for either a whole life or an endowment policy. 
A life policy which has not been in force for the 
statutory minimum period of three years for it to attain 
a surrender value will lapse when the premium due is not 
paid0. Most policies however contain provisions which 
3 
allow its reinstatement upon the payment of all arrears 
of premium together with the interests which has accrued 
thereon, within a given period. 
3.0 Return of Premiums 
3.1 The General Rule 
Generally, the insured can only be entitled to a return 
of the premium if the risk insured against has never 
attached as equity implies a condition that the insurer 
shall not receive the price of running a risk if 
he runs 
none31. Thus unless otherwise provided in, the policy, 
29. A policy which provid 
specified period. The 
the life insured dies 
30. Lai Ah Heng & Anor. v 
footnote 16. 
31. Stevenson v Snow 97 
Mansfield. 
es maximum protection only for a 
insured sum is only payable if 
within such period. 
China Underwriters Ltd. Op. cit 
ER 808 at p. 810, per Lord 
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there must be a total failure of consideration before the 
insured can be entitled to a return of the premium. Once 
part of the risk has attached, there is no right to a 
return of premium as there can be no restitutionary claim 
for return of money for partial failure of 
consideration 
32. 
In practice however, return of premium 
for partial failure of consideration is sometimes done 
either in accordance with the terms of the policy or on 
an ex gratia basis. 
Under the Insurance Act, when a premium for a non-life 
policy has to be returned, it must be paid directly by 
the insurer to the insured and the former must obtain a 
proper receipt from the latter. Under no circumstances 
must such a return of premium be made through an 
3 intermediary3. 
3.2 Where there is no contract or where the risk has 
never attached 
There is a total failure of consideration and therefore a 
right to a return of premium if the contract of insurance 
itself is not valid, for instance where it is vitiated by 
a fundamental mistake, or where the parties were never ad 
32. Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution, 3rd Ed., 
Sweet and Maxwell, London 1986, pp. 54 - 55. 
33. s. 14A(5). 
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idem or where the contract is made ultra vires the powers 
of the insurer. Similarly, the risk does not attach and 
there is a right to a return of premium where the subject 
matter is non-existent34 or where either party fails to 
fulfil a condition precedent to the validity of the 
contract. 
3.3 Where a voidable policy is avoided ab initio by the 
Unlike in other contracts, in a contract of insurance no 
distinction is drawn between the rescission or avoidance 
of a contract for misrepresentation and breach of 
contract by virtue of the breach of an affirmative 
warranty. In both instances, a contract of insurance once 
avoided is deemed to have been avoided ab initio. Hence 
unless the insured is guilty of fraud or the policy 
provides for the forfeiture of premiums, the insured is 
entitled to a return of the premium when the insurer 
avoids the contract ab initio either on the grounds of 
non-disclosure, misrepresentation or breach of an 
affirmative warranty5. There can however be no return of 
3 
premium if the non-disclosure, misrepresentation or 
34. Such as when the life insured had died before the 
contract of insurance was entered into; Pritchard 
Merchants' and Tradesmen's Mutual Life Assurance 
Society 140 ER 885 at p. 894. 
35. Thompson v Weems (1884) 9 App. Cas. 671 at p. 682 
(HL). 
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breach of warranty is not innocent, ie. if it is tainted 
with fraud as the rule is that an insurer is never bound 
to return the premium when they successfully defend an 
3 
action on the grounds of fraud6. 
S. 65 of the Contracts Act 1965 provides that where a 
person at whose option a contract is voidable rescinds 
it, the other party need not perform his part of the 
bargain and the party rescinding the contract shall, if 
he had received any benefits thereunder from the other 
party, restore such benefits as far as may be to the 
other party. While this provision seems wide enough to 
allow a party who had committed fraud to take an action 
against the party rescinding the contract for money had 
and received, it has not been considered in relation to 
contracts of insurance in Malaysia. The Supreme Court of 
India in dealing with a similar provision however held 
that an insured who had committed a fraud on the insurer 
cannot rely upon such a provision to recover the premium 
37 
which he has paid. 
3.4 Contracts Tainted with Illegality 
The right to a return of premium is subject to the 
36. Joel v Law Union & Insurance Co. [1908] 2 KB 431 at 
p. 440 and Anderson v Thornton 155 ER 1415. 
37. Mithoolal Nayak v Life Insurance Corp. of India AIR 
(1962) SC 814. S. 65 of the Indian Contracts Act 1872 
is in pari materia with s. 65 of the Malaysian Act. 
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overriding principle that there can be no such return 
where the contract is tainted with illegality and the 
parties are in pari delicto38. This is because a court of 
law will not have anything to do with such a contract and 
any loss occasioned thereby lies where it falls. A 
contract of insurance is illegal if it contravenes 
certain statutory requirements such as those relating to 
39 insurable interest. 
An insured is entitled to a return of the premium paid 
under an illegal contract if he is not in pari delicto 
with the insurer. Although literally this means he is not 
equally blameworthy, the cases decided so far seem to 
show that an insured is only entitled to a return of 
premium if he is completely blameless0. It remains to be 
4 
seen if an insured who is less blameworthy than the 
insurer but not completely blameless, is entitled to a 
return of the premium on the grounds of illegality. 
4.0 Forfeiture of Premiums 
The rules relating to the return of premium are all 
subject to the terms of the policy which can, and often 
38. Howard v Refuge Friendly Society (1886) 54 LT 644. 
39. Harse v Pearl Life Assurance Co. [1904] 1 KB 588. 
40. See eg. British Workmen's and General Insurance Co. v 
Cunliffe (1902) 18 TLR 502. 
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do, provide for the forfeiture of premiums in certain 
instances such as when the policy is avoided for the 
breach of an affirmative warranty. Strangely, the courts 
in declaring the policy void ab initio for the breach of 
such a warranty have upheld and given effect to the 
forfeiture clauses in such 'non-existent' policies. The 
courts have upheld such forfeiture clauses not only on 
premiums paid upon entry into the contract but also on 
premiums paid after a right to avoid the contract became 
available to the insurer. In Sparenborg v Edinburgh Life 
Assurance Co. 41 for instance, a life policy provided that 
it would be void if the life insured travelled beyond 
certain prescribed geographical limits. After the policy 
had been in force for three years, the life insured 
travelled to India in breach of the said clause. 
Thereafter he continued paying premiums for fourteen 
years. The insurer successfully avoided the policy for 
breach of warranty and the court allowed them to forfeit 
the entire premium. The approach taken by the court in 
this case has been justified42 on the ground that while 
avoidance of a policy on the grounds of non-disclosure 
stricto sensu prevents the insurer from relying upon any 
41. [1912] 1 KB 195. See also Kumar v Life Insurance 
Coporation of India [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 147 where 
the premium was returned on an ex gratia basis when 
the policy was avoided for non-fraudulent but 
incorrect answers in the proposal form. 
42. Birds, p. 134. 
240 
of the terms of the contract, including the forfeiture 
clause if any, avoidance of a policy for breach of a 
warranty does not have the same result as the insurer in 
such an instance is relying upon the terms of the 
contract to avoid it and they can therefore also rely on 
any forfeiture clauses therein. This line of distinction 
however seems academic. Often policies are avoided for a 
misstatement either in the form of non-disclosure or a 
misrepresentation in a proposal form which inevitably 
contains a 'basis of contract' clause which gives the 
status of a warranty to all the statements therein. 
Avoidance of a policy for such a misstatement therefore 
amounts to avoidance for breach of warranty. A policy can 
only be avoided on the grounds of non-disclosure stricto 
sensu if there is a breach of the residual duty of 
disclosure. Given the detailed and extensive questions in 





In Malaysia intermediaries form the lifeline upon which 
the entire insurance industry dependsl. Several factors 
account for the particularly important role played by 
them. 
Demographically, a large proportion of Malaysia's 
population is rural. Although there is demand, 
particularly for third party insurance, from the rural 
populace, few insurance companies find it economically 
viable to set up branch offices away from the main town 
centres. These companies inevitably depend upon 
intermediaries to 'sell' insurance in the rural areas. 
The comparatively high percentage of illiteracy coupled 
with an even higher percentage of those who do not 
understand English which is still the main language 
1. In 1986 there were a total of 57 registered brokers 
and 46,973 life agents in Malaysia. The number of 
non-life agents is not known. 24th Annual Report of 
the Director-General of Insurance 1986, Ministry of 
Finance, Kuala Lumpur 1987, p. 12. 
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used in insurance-related documents2 make the public 
regard the services of an intermediary as indispensable. 
With increasing competition within the industry, insurers 
also regard intermediaries as necessary tools for 
marketing insurance; for in Malaysia, with the exception 
of compulsory third party insurance, policies are sold, 
not bought. Intermediaries are hence regarded by the 
insurers as vital for providing the personal touch and 
often the extra pressure, in marketing insurance. 
1.1 Insurance Agents and Insurance Brokers Distinguished 
Generally an agent is a person employed to do any act for 
another or to represent another in dealings with third 
persons3. An insurance agent is a person who carries on 
4 
insurance business as an agent. His main function is to 
procure persons to enter into contracts of insurance with 
the insurer, for whom he is basically the agent. The 
2.5.16(1) of the Insurance Act 1963 provides that such 
documents can be in any language provided that if they 
are not in Bahasa Malaysia (Malay) or English, a 
translation in either of these languages must be 
included. Thus when English is used no translation in 
Malay or any other languages is necessary. 
3. Contracts Act 1950 (Revised 1974), s. 135. 
4. Insurance Act 1963, s. 20A(1)(a). 
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relationship between the agent and the insurer is an 
on-going one. It does not come to an end after the 
successful procurement of a particular policy. 
Insurance agents in Malaysia fall into three categories. 
First there are the full-time agents who are employed by 
the insurance companies to get business for the company 
and are renumerated by the company by means of 
commissions. Then there are the occasional or part-time 
agents whose main occupation is in another field, such as 
solicitors, estate and travel agents and car dealers, for 
whom the procurement of insurance policies is incidental 
to their main occupation. Finally there are the 
independent agents who are full-time agents but function 
independently and are not employees of any insurer. 
The full-time agents are popular with life companies. 
Most such companies have an Agency Department which 
employs, trains and supervises agents in their activities 
and pay their commissions. Occasional and, independent 
agents deal mainly with non-life policies. 
An insurance broker is any individual, firm or company, 
who for compensation as an independent contractor, 
solicits, negotiates or procures insurance or the renewal 
or continuance thereof on behalf of the insured, other 
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than himself5. He acts upon the instructions of his 
client, the insured, in placing insurance. As his basic 
agency relationship is with the insured it is on the 
insured's authority that he acts and to the insured that 
he owes a duty of skill and care. The broker is usually 
free to choose from a variety of insurers, with whom he 
wishes to arrange insurance cover on behalf of his 
client. Unlike the relationship between the agent and the 
insurer which is an on-going one, that between a broker 
and a particular insured who procures his services, is 
usually for a single identifiable transaction and ceases 
once this purpose is served. Although a broker is 
generally the insured's agent, he is usually renumerated 
by the insurer from whom he obtains insurance cover for 
his client, on a commission basis. 
An insurance intermediary is a person who invites another 
to make an offer or a proposal or to take any other step 
with a view to entering into a contract of insurance6. 
The term intermediary thus includes both insurance agents 
and brokers. 
The Insurance Act requires a person who invites another 
to make an offer or proposal or to take any other step 
5. Insurance Act 1963, s. 1A 
6. s. 20A(1)(a). 
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with a view to entering into a contract of insurance with 
an insurer to inform that person about his (the 
intermediary's) connection with the insurer7. While this 
provision has a lot of potential, the realisation of such 
potential depends to a large extent on how this provision 
is construed and how the authorities respond to 
complaints from the consumers about its breach. If this 
provision requires the intermediary to do no more than 
inform a potential insured whether he is an agent or a 
broker, little purpose can be served as such information 
means little to one who is not aware of the legal 
distinction between the two. To be effective this 
provision must be interpreted as requiring the 
intermediary not only to inform a potential insured 
whether he is an agent or a broker but also to explain 
the significance and legal implications of being either 
of them. For instance, that a broker is for the purposes 
of procuring a policy an agent of the insured and so 
disclosure to him does not amount to disclosure to the 
insurer. Furthermore the effectiveness of this provision 
also depends on the degree of public awareness as to its 
existence. Action can only be taken against 
intermediaries who fail to comply with this provision if 
the public complains to the Director-General of 
Insurance. Without being aware of this provision the 
7. s. 20A. 
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public cannot do so. 
1.2 An Outline of the General Law of Agency 
As an insurance agent basically has an agency 
relationship with the insurer while the broker basically 
has such a relationship with the insured, the general law 
of agency is applicable to both. In Malaysia this is 
found in Part x of the contracts Act 1950. 
Anyone of the age of majority can become an agent and be 
responsible to his principal in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act8. The agent's authority can be 
9 
expressed or implied. An agent who is authorised to do 
an act has the authority to do every lawful act necessary 
for that purpose while one who has authority to carry out 
a business has authority to do every lawful thing 
necessary for that purpose or usually done in the course 
of conducting such businessl0. 
An agent must act within the scope of his authority which 
can be either actual or apparent. Actual authority can be 
expressed, either orally or in writing, or implied from 
custom or the usual course of business. Apparent 
authority is the authority which the agent appears to 
8. Contracts Act 1950, s. 138. 
9. s. 139. 
10. s. 141(1) and (2). 
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have in the eyes of a third party and may be greater or 
wider than the agent's actual authority. Any act which is 
in excess of the agent's authority can be ratified by the 
principal. In the absence of such ratification a 
principal is not bound by the unauthorised acts of the 
2. l 
agent 
An agent is legally bound to conduct the business of his 
principal according to the direction given by the 
principal 
13, 
and to use as much skill and dil%igence as 
is generally possessed by persons engaged in similar 
business14. Notice given to or obtained by an agent in 
the course of the principal's business binds the 
principal15. Similarly, any misrepresentation or fraud 
committed by the agent in the course of the principal's 
business shall have the same effect as if the 
misrepresentation or fraud had been committed by the 
principal 
16. 
The application of the provisions in the Contracts Act to 
insurance intermediaries does not make the common law 
principles totally irrelevant. The provisions of Part X 
11. s. 149. 
12. s. 180 and s. 181. 
13. s. 164. 
14. s. 165. 
15. s. 182. 
16. S. 191. 
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of the Contracts Act are not exhaustive and there are 
various aspects of agency about which the Act is silent. 
Where a situation arises which is not provided for by 
Part X, the trend of judicial opinion seems to favour the 
application of the common law7. 
l 
2.0 Insurance Agents 
2.1 The Agent's Authority 
As mentioned earlier an insurance agent is generally an 
agent of the insurer. Agents who are employed by an 
insurance company usually derive their authority from the 
agency contract between them and the company. This 
document normally stipulates the terms and conditions of 
the agency as well as the general scope of the agent's 
authority. Other types of agents may derive their 
authority from the insurer either verbally, by an 
exchange of correspondence or impliedly from the usual 
17. For instance the Act is silent about del credere 
agents but in Royal Insurance Group v David [1976] 1 
MLJ 128, this concept was recognised, see infra. 
p. 28y. This approach of applying the common law to 
fill in the gaps in the statute contrasts remarkably 
from the approach taken in some other cases. In 
Ramjida v Abdul Kadir (1915) 2 FMSLR 158, it was held 
that as provisions relating to bailment were found in 
the Contracts Enactment 1896, the common law relating 
to common carriers could not be applied even though 
the Enactment was silent on this. In Song Bok Yoong v 
Ho Kim Poui [1968] 1 MLJ 56, a similar decision was 
reached in relation to guarantees. 
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course of business. Sometimes it cannot be determined 
solely by looking at the source of the agent's authority 
whether a particular act is within the scope of the 
agent's authority. In such a situation the specific act 
together with the facts surrounding it will have to be 
looked at. 
2.1.1 Soliciting and Negotiating a Contract of Insurance 
Where an agent has the authority to solicit and negotiate 
a contract of insurance on behalf of the insurer, any 
representation made by the agent within the scope of such 
authority binds the insurer. Similarly any information 
acquired by the agent during this pre-contract stage is 
information acquired by the insurer irrespective of 
whether or not the agent conveys the information to the 
insurer. 
In Mazzarol v United Oriental Assurance Sdn. Bhd. 
(Kuantan)18, a vessel, The Melanie, was insured by the 
plaintiff with the defendant. Just before the insurance 
was procured the vessel had grounded. She was 
subsequently pulled clear and anchored at a jetty, before 
the cover was arranged. In obtaining the insurance cover, 
the plaintiff contacted Pany, the defendant's full-time 
18. [1983] 1 MLJ 328 (HC) and [1984] 1 MLJ 260 (FC). 
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agent. The fact of the earlier grounding was told to Pany 
but was not disclosed in the proposal form which Pany had 
helped to fill in as there was no question to that 
effect. Pany also inspected the vessel at the jetty. 
Two weeks after the cover was obtained the plaintiff took 
the vessel out to sea where it hit a sand bar and was 
damaged. The defendant denied liability because of the 
non-disclosure of the fact that the vessel had grounded 
before. It was held that there was no non-disclosure 
because this information had been disclosed to the agent 
and this amounted to a disclosure to the insurer. 
In upholding the decision of the High Court, the Federal 
Court distinguished between the stage when the agent 
negotiated the contract and the stage when he helped the 
insured to fill in the proposal form. According to Salleh 
Abas CJ (as he then was): 
19 
Whilst we agree that Pany must be regarded as 
an agent for the [insured] in so far as he 
assisted the former in completing the proposal 
form - see Newsholme Brothers v Road Transport 
and General Insurance Co. Ltd. [1929] 2 KB 356 
- we think that the learned trial judge was 
correct in holding that Pany was not acting as 
an agent of the [insured] when he received 
information about the earlier mishap ... from 
the [insured]. The capacity in which he 
received the verbal information must be the 
same as the capacity in which he went to see 
19. [1984] 1 MLJ 260 at p. 262. 
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the [insured] with the proposal form, gave it 
to him, receive it back from him, inspected the 
'Melanie' and handed the form to his branch 
office. All these acts except the tendering of 
advice as to how to fill the proposal form were 
done in his capacity as an agent of the 
[insurer]. 
Since the negotiation for cover, the tendering of advice 
and the actual filling in of the proposal form took place 
on two separate occasions, it was easy for the Federal 
Court to draw a distinction between information acquired 
by the agent in the course of the negotiation and that 
obtained whilst advising the insured about, and helping 
him to fill in, the proposal form. If the two had taken 
place on one occasion as is extremely common in cases 
like motor insurance, it will be difficult to determine 
when negotiation ends and the tendering of advice and the 
actual filling in of the proposal form, begins. 
Interestingly, neither the High Court nor the Federal 
Court seemed to have given any weight to the fact that 
the agent had personally inspected the vessel. It is not 
clear from the facts whether the vessel had any visible 
evidence of the earlier grounding but if there was such 
evidence, than this could also be used to effectively 
distinguish this case from Newsholme Brothers v Road 
Transport and General Insurance Co. 
20, 
and to align it 
20. [1929] 3 KB 356. 
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with the decision in Bawden v London, Edinburgh and 
21 
Glasgow Assurance Co.. 
No reference was made by either of the courts to s. 182 of 
the Contracts Act relating to imputed notice. Once it is 
accepted that an agent has the authority to solicit and 
negotiate a contract of insurance, any information 
obtained by the agent in the course of such negotiation 
must have the same legal consequence as if it had been 
obtained by the principal. While this provision is 
inapplicable when an agent acquires such information when 
he is not acting as the insurer's agent (such as in 
filling in the proposal form) it was clearly applicable 
in this case as the information was aquired by the 
insurer's agent in such capacity. 
2.1.2 Filling in Proposal Forms 
In England, the general rule according to the Court of 
Appeal in Newsholme Brothers is that an insurance agent 
in completing the proposal form is the amanuensis of the 
insured and so any information acquired by him in doing 
so cannot be imputed to the insurer. In this case the 
proposal form was filled in by the insurer's agent 
although he had no authority to do so. Inspite of being 
21. [1892] 2 QB 534. See infra. p. 254. 
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given the correct answer by the insured, the agent wrote 
down an incorrect answer in the proposal form which was 
then signed by the insured. The insurer sought to avoid 
the policy on the basis of the incorrect answer. The 
insured contended that as the correct information was 
known by the agent, it could be imputed to the insurer. 
It was held that the insurer could avoid the policy as 
information aquired by the agent when filling in the 
proposal form could not be imputed to the insurer as in 
so doing the agent was not acting as the insurer's agent. 
This general rule however does not apply when the 
information was acquired by the agent prior to filling in 
the proposal form, particularly when such information was 
evident irrespective of any representation by the 
insured, or where information was aquired by the agent 
when filling in the proposal form but in doing so he was 
acting within the scope of his authority as the insurer's 
agent. These were among the factors used by the Court of 
Appeal in Newsholme Brothers to distinguish the facts in 
that case from those in the earlier Court of"Appeal case 
of Bawden. Bawden, an illiterate who had lost the use of 
one eye, had a policy issued by the defendant. The 
proposal form contained a declaration that he had no 
physical infirmity which rendered him particularly liable 
to accidents and was filled in by a local agent of the 
defendant. It was also not mentioned in the proposal form 
that Bawden had only one eye. It was held that the 
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agent's knowledge was the knowledge of the insurer and so 
the insurer must be taken to have contracted with a man 
whom they knew had only one eye. 
Another landmark English decision is Stone v Reliance 
Mutual Insurance Society22. The plaintiff had fire 
policies issued by the defendant which had lapsed for 
non-payment of premiums. An Inspector from the defendant 
company then persuaded the plaintiff's wife to take out a 
new policy at a higher premium. The proposal form for 
this policy was filled in by the Inspector but was signed 
by the plaintiff's wife. A claim under the new policy was 
denied by the insurer on the ground that the plaintiff 
had not disclosed the facts that he had made claims under 
other policies before and that his earlier policies had 
lapsed. The proposal form had a declaration to the effect 
that insofar as any part of the form was not filled in by 
the insured, it had been done on his instruction and by 
his agent. 
The Court of Appeal's decision in favour of the insured 
hinged so heavily upon the special facts of the case that 
Stone like Bawden is generally regarded as an exception 
to, rather than one that overrules, Newsholme Brothers23. 
------------------- 
22. [1972] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 469. 
23. Birds, pp-124 - 125. 
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The trend of judicial opinion in Malaysia seems to be 
along the lines of the the Court of Appeal decision in 
Newsholme Brothers; the reasons given therein being 
echoed in the local decisions. In Abu Bakar v Oriental 
Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. 24, an attempt was 
made by the insured's counsel to persuade the Federal 
Court to accept the decision in Stone as representing a 
swing back to Bawden. Unfortunately, only Gill FJ in his 
dissenting judgement gave any thought to this argument. 
His Lordship however rejected this contention and 
concluded that Stone represented only an exception to the 
general rule as laid down in Newsholme Brothers. 
The following are among the reasons used by the Malaysian 
judges to justify their unqualified acceptance of 
Newsholme Brothers. 
(i) That the Proposal Form which had a Basis of Contract 
Clause was Signed by the Insured 
Scrutton LJ in Newsholme Brothers emphasised the fact 
that the proposal form which had a 'basis of contract' 
clause was signed by the insured: 
25 
I have great difficulty in understanding how a 
man who has signed, without reading it, a 
document which he knows to be a proposal for 
24. [19741 1 MLJ 149. 
25. Op. cit. footnote 20 at p. 376. 
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insurance, and which contains statements in 
fact untrue, and a promise that they are true, 
and the basis of the contract, can escape from 
the consequences of his negligence by saying 
that the person he asked to fill it up for him 
is the agent of the person to whom the proposal 
is addressed. 
A similar line of reasoning was used by Gill J in United 
Malayan Insurance Co. Ltd. v Lee Yoon Heng: 
26 
[T]he proposal form ... was completed by [the 
agent] at the [insured's] request and ... the [insured] signed a declaration at the foot of 
the proposal form to the effect that the 
particulars of the proposal form were true and 
that the proposal shall be the basis of the 
contract between himself and the [insurer]. I 
therefore find that the [insured] made an 
application for i2ýurance and that he completed 
the proposal form . 
The insurer in this case had sought a declaration that a 
third party motor policy issued to the insured was void 
for non-disclosure of the fact that the vehicle was to be 
used for commercial purposes. The insured contended that 
this fact was known to the agent who had helped him to 
fill in the proposal form. The court rejected this 
contention and granted the declaration. 
Gill J in this case seems to have gone a step too far in 
holding that by signing the proposal form the insured was 
26. (1964) 30 MLJ 453 at p. 454. 
27. Emphasis added. 
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deemed to have filled in the proposal form himself, as 
that would have made the question of agency totally 
irrelevant. The insured's signature does not, it is 
submitted, have the effect of completely wiping out the 
part played by the agent in completing the proposal form. 
Rather, the signature confirms the fact that in filling 
in the proposal form the agent was acting as the 
insured's agent; the signature being evidence of adoption 
or ratification by the insured of the agent's act. 
In National Insurance Co. v Joseph28, the insurer claimed 
that a motor policy issued to the defendant was void for 
non-disclosure and misrepresentation as the defendant had 
failed to disclose that his previous policy had been 
cancelled after he met with an accident. The proposal 
form which contained the usual 'basis of contract' clause 
was filled in by the insurer's agent after it had been 
signed in blank by the defendant. The court decided in 
favour of the insurer as it was found from the evidence 
that the information had not even been disclosed to the 
agent. The learned judge further observed that even if 
the information had been disclosed to the agent when he 
was filling in the proposal form, the insurer would still 
have succeeded because by signing the form, the insured 
would be taken to have read and adopted its contents. 
28. [1973] 2 MLJ 195. 
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11 
As the insured had declared in the proposal form that the 
answers given were true it was his duty to ensure that 
they were in fact true. 
A comparable decision was reached in Wong Lang Hung v 
National Employees' Mutual General Insurance Co. 29. The 
insured's claim under a fire policy was denied by the 
insurer on the ground that there was a misstatement in 
the proposal form. The insured replied that the fact 
allegedly misstated - that the insured premises was 
attached to another building - was known by the insur er's 
agent who had helped to fill in the proposal f orm. 
According to the evidence, after the agent had filled in 
the form, the insured took it away to have someone else 
read it to him. This was used by the learned judge to 
strengthen his decision which was basically similar to 
that in Joseph. According to him: 
30 
If a person ... chooses to sign the 
form 
without reading the contents of the proposal 
form which somebody else filled in and takes 
the form home for someone to read it, and ... 
acquisces in that by signing it, she must be 
taken as having adopted it. 
The Malaysian courts have held rigidly to the rule that a 
person who signs a document is bound by its contents even 
29. [19721 2 MLJ 191. 
30. Ibid. at p. 195. 
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in a situation where the proposal form was in English and 
the insured could neither read, write nor understand the 
3 language1. This rather harsh approach seems consonant 
with local decisions in other areas of the law32. A 
similar approach was also adopted by the Supreme Court of 
New South Wales in Jumna Khan v Bankers and Traders 
Insurance Co. 33 where Street CJ said: 
34 
[The insured's] illiteracy did not in any way 
relieve him from the duty of taking every 
reasonable means that he could to ascertain 
what his obligations were, and to see that no 
untrue statements were put before the company. 
It afforded no excuse for his carelessness and indifference. 
The English courts however seem to be more sympathetic 
towards the illiterate. It is generally accepted that one 
of the factors which justified the Court of Appeal's 
decision in favour of the insured in Bawden is the fact 
that the insured in that case was illiterate35. 
31. United Malayan Insurance Co. Ltd. v Lee. Yoon Heng, 
Op. cit. footnote 26. 
32. The principle in L'Estrange v Graucob [1934] 2 KB 394 
that a person who signs a document which contains 
contractual terms is generally bound by such terms 
even though he has not read them and is ignorant of 
their precise legal effect was applied in Serangoon 
Estates Ltd. v Marian Chye (1959) 25 MLJ 113. In 
Subramaniam V Retnam [1966] 1 MLJ 172, it was held 
that even if the person could not read the language 
in which the document was written, the same principle 
would still apply. 
33. (1925) 37 CLR 451. 
34. Ibid. at p. 454. 
35. See eg. Greer LJ in Newsholme Brothers, Op. cit. 
footnote 20 at p. 381, Birds, p. 123 at footnote 43 and 
MacGillivray, p. 352, at paras. 843 - 844. 
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Perhaps one way of persuading the courts to take 
cognisance of the insured's illiteracy is by pleading non 
est factum. Although not provided by the Contracts Act 
1950, this plea is recognised in Malaysia36. It has not 
however been used in any of the reported cases involving 
proposal forms or other contractual documents in 
insurance. 
(ii) The Insurer's Agent in Filling in the Proposal Form 
Acted in Excess of his Authority 
The other justification used by the Court of Appeal in 
Newsholme Brothers was that in filling in the proposal 
form the agent was acting outside the scope of his 
authority as the insurer's agent. An act done by an agent 
without the principal's authority cannot be imputed to 
the principal in the absence of ratification by the 
principal. Whether an agent is authorised by the insurer 
to fill in the proposal form is not always easy to 
determine. Though the agency agreement or other 
communications creating the agency may be silent on this 
issue, an agent may still have an implied or an 
ostensible authority to do so, such as in a situation 
where the insurer is aware that the agent habitually 
fills in the proposal form and yet takes no positive 
36. Awang bin Omar v Haji Omar and Anor. (1948-49) 
MLJ 
X11rn ) 28. 
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steps to prevent or prohibit such a practice. 
The agent's authority to fill in the proposal form as the 
insurer's agent can also be implied if there is close 
consultation between the agent and the insurer at the 
time when the proposal form was being filled in by him. 
This was used by Suffian FJ (as he then was) in his 
dissenting judgement in China Insurance Co. Ltd. 
Ah Kau37 to get around the decision in 




[B]ecause of the close consultation between the 
[agent] and [the insurer's manager] at the time 
when the form was being filled, it was quite 
proper for the learned judge to find ... that 
[the agent] was also the company's agent and 
that accordingly, [the agent's] knowledge can 
be imputed to the company. 
If an agent is authorised by the insurer to fill in the 
proposal form, he still acts in excess of that authority 
if he commits a fraud on the insurer by deliberately 
giving false answers in the form; his knowledge of the 
true information cannot in such a case be imputed to the 
insurer. This was emphasised by Yong J in National 
Insurance Co. v Joseph: 
39 
37. [1972] 1 MLJ 52. 
38. Ibid. at p. 56. 
39. Op. cit. footnote 28 at p. 196. 
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[If] the agent completes [the proposal form] 
with false and untrue material particulars for 
the purpose of getting a policy for the 
applicant and a commission for himself in fraud 
of his principal, the agent is not acting 
within the scope of his authority and in so doing he is not acting as the agent of the 
insurance company and the latter with no 
knowledge of such fraud is entitled to avoid 
the policy. 
If the agent fills in the proposal form at the request of 
the insured, then clearly he does so as the insured's 
agent. The insured is thus responsible for the entire 
contents of the form; the fact that he had not authorised 
the agent to give false answers being irrelevant. In Ong 
Eng Chai v China Insurance Co. Ltd. 
40 the insured's 
claim under a policy was rejected by the insurer because 
the proposal form contained untrue answers relating to 
the insured's insurance history. The insured contended 
that the form was filled in and signed by the insurer's 
agent who knew the true information. According to the 
evidence the insured had left the entire question of 
effecting the policy with the insurer's agent and 
sub-agent. It was held that as the insured had authorised 
the agent to effect the insurance and to fill in the 
proposal form, he himself was responsbile for the untrue 
answers therein, irrespective of his knowledge of the 
agent's fraud. 
40. [1974] 1 MLJ 82. 
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Insurers frequently include in the proposal form a 
declaration by the insured that if the form had been 
filled in by someone else it was done with the insured's 
authority and as his agent. If such a declaration is 
given literal effect, it would make anyone who fills in 
the proposal form, including the insurer's agent, an 
agent of the insured. In Stone V Reliance Mutual 
Insurance Society41, there was such a declaration in the 
proposal form but Lord Denning was of the view that the 
insurer was not entitled to rely upon it because their 
agent had misrepresented to the insured that the form had 
been correctly filled in. 
In Malaysia the status of a similar clause was considered 
in Pacific and Orient Insurance Co. v Choo Lye Hock42 and 
the Malaysian court too did not allow the insurer to rely 
upon it, albeit for a different reason. According to 
Abdul Hamid J: 
43 
To my mind the declaration only raises a 
rebuttable presumption. It may be rebutted by 
extraneous evidence and the onus lies upon the 
[insured] ... the fact that 
[the agent's] name 
appears at the top of the proposal form against 
the word 'Agency' provides clear proof that he 
was the agent of the [insurer] and not of the 
[insured]. 
41. Op. cit. footnote 22. 
42. [1977] 1 MLJ 131. 
43. Ibid. at p. 132. 
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In accepting the word 'Agency' which appeared against the 
agent's name at the top of the proposal form as 
sufficient to negate the effect of an express 
declaration, the learned 'judge seems to have made a 
desperate attempt to avoid the decision in Newsholme 
Brothers. 'Today it is a common practice particularly 
among large insurance companies to have the agent's name 
on the proposal form not for any legal reason but so as 
to enable easy identification of the agent involved in a 
particular transaction. 
(iii) The Parole Evidence Rule 
The parole evidence rule, ie. the inadmissability of oral 
evidence to contradict the terms of a written contract, 
was also used to justify the decision in 
Brothers. According to Greer LJ: 
44 
Newsholme 
Once a contract is reduced into writing, the 
writing alone can be looked at as containing 
the terms of the contract. Anything said during 
the negotiations ceases to have any legal 
validity. 
In Malaysia, provisions relating to the parole evidence 
rule are found in the Evidence Act 1950: 
s. 91 When the terms of 
been reduced ... to the 
a contract ... have 
form of a document, no 
44. Op. cit. footnote 20 at p-379- 
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evidence shall be given in proof of the terms 
of such contract except the document itself. 
s. 92 When the terms of any such contract have 
been proved according to section 91, no 
evidence of any oral agreement or statement 
will be admitted ... for the purpose of 
contradicting, varying, adding to or 
subtracting from, its terms. 
The Federal Court used the above provisions in relation 
to proposal forms in China Insurance Co. Ltd v Ngau Ah 
4 
Kau5. A claim by the insured was rejected by the insurer 
because of a misstatement in the proposal form. The 
insured contended that he had given the correct 
information to the insurer's agent but was told that it 
was unnecessary to include them in the proposal form. The 
agent gave evidence which corroborated this claim and the 
trial judge decided in the insured's favour inter alia on 
the ground that as the agent had acted throughout on the 
insurer's behalf his knowledge could be imputed to the 
46 insurer . 
This decision was reversed by the Federal Court. One of 
the reasons given was that the oral evidence given by the 
agent was inadmissable by virtue of sections 91 and 92 of 
the Evidence Act. According to Azmi LP, as the truth of 
the statements and answers in the proposal form had been 
45. Op. cit. footnote 3-1. 
46. For the High Court decision see Ngau Ah Kau v China 
Insurance Co. Ltd. (1970) 4 MC 122. 
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made terms of the contract, it was, by reason of those 
provisions, not open to the insured to make use of the 
oral evidence of the agent to contradict, vary, add to or 
subtract from, such terms. 
Suffian FJ (as he then was), in his dissenting judgement 
however was of the view that these provisions were 
inapplicable. His Lordship distinguished between the 
terms of a written contract and the answers in a proposal 
form and held that sections 91 and 92 were only 
applicable to the former. Accordingly: 
47 
The [insured] admits in toto the terms of the 
proposal form and the policy, and accordingly 
there is no question of contradicting, varying, 
adding to or subtracting from its terms; all he 
tried to do was to contradict the written 
answers in the proposal form. For this reason 
in my judgement sections 91 and 92 have no 
application. 
Unless the proposal form can be regarded as a document 
which is independ ent of and different from, the 
contractual documen t which alone contains th e terms of 
the contract, it is difficult to comprehend how answers 
to questions in the proposal fo rm can be regarded as 
anything other than the terms of the contrac t. This is 
particularly so as the proposal form contains a 'basis of 
contract' clause. 
47. Op. cit. footnote 3-1 at p. 36. 
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In Pacific and Orient Insurance Co. v Choo Lye Hock 
48 
r 
the High Court referred to the words used in the 'basis 
of contract' clause in the proposal form to avoid 
sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. The clause 
included a declaration by the insured that the 'answers' 
given therein were true and correct and would be the 
basis of the contract. Abdul Hamid J was able to avoid 
the Federal Court decision in Ngau Ah Kau in relation to 
sections 91 and 92 by arguing that in the case before him 
only 'answers' in the proposal form were made terms of 
the contract. As the incorrect information about the 
insured's address and occupation were not given as 
answers to any question, they were not terms of the 
contract and therefore the provisions relating to parole 
evidence did not apply. 
The meaning given to the word 'answers' in this case is 
unduly restrictive and not entirely accurate. An answer 
need not necessarily be a response to a question only. If 
the words 'Address and Occupation' appear in the proposal 
form and the space next to them is left blank to be 
filled in by the insured, what is then written in is 
surely as much an answer as is a response to the question 
49 
'What is your address and occupation? ' 
48. Op. cit. footnote 42. 
49. See also Poh, CC, 'The Insurance 
Agent and the 
Insured', [19861 1 MLJ xliii. 
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Even if the learned judge was correct in giving such a 
narrow meaning to the word 'answers', his decision is 
unlikely to have any long-lasting positive implication 
for the insured. The effect of the decision can easily be 
neutralised by the insurers specifically making both 
'answers' and 'statements' in the proposal form, terms of 
the contract. 
There are however two possible ways by which the 
provisions of sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act can 
be avoided. 
The proviso to s. 92 provides for six different situations 
where oral evidence may be admissable. Of these, only 
proviso (a) may have some relevance to proposal forms. It 
reads: 
Any fact may be proved which would invalidate 
any document or which would entitle any person 
to any decree or order relating thereto, such 
as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due 
execution, want of capacity in any contracting 
party, the fact that it is wrongly dated,, want 
or failure of consideration or mistake of fact 
or law. 
If an insured is made to believe by the agent who helps 
him to fill in the proposal form, that a particular piece 
of information has been included when this is not in fact 
so, oral evidence can thereafter be adduced to have the 
said proposal form invalidated on the ground of fraud or 
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rectified on the ground of mistake of fact. 
Furthermore, the proviso aside, s. 92 only prohibits the 
adducing of oral evidence to contradict, vary, add to or 
subtract from the terms of a written document. Evidence 
can therefore be adduced to show that a breach of a term 
of the contract has been waived by the other party as 
such evidence of a waiver does not in any way challenge 
the terms of a written document. It is unfortunate that 
this line of argument which could have been successfully 
used was not utilised in his dissenting judgement by 
Suffian FJ in Ngau Ah Kau to support the finding that 
sections 91 and 92 were inapplicable. It could have been 
argued that in adducing evidence to show that the true 
facts were known to the agent, the insured was attempting 
to prove that the insurer had waived the breach of a term 
in the proposal form and was not challenging the term 
itself. 
2.1.3 Statutory Provisions Relating to Information 
Acquired by Agents at the Pre-Contract Stage: Sections 
18E and 44A of the Insurance Act 1963 
Prior to 1975 the Insurance Act did not have any 
provision relating to agents soliciting and negotiating a 
contract of insurance or filling in the proposal form. 
The law till then was the common law as applied in the 
cases considered earlier. The Insurance Amendment 
Act 
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197550 introduced a limited change by the introduction of 
s. 18E, a provision which relates exclusively to agents 
filling in a proposal form for a home-service policy51. 
It reads: 
Where an agent or servant of an insurer fills 
in or writes in any particulars in a proposal 
for a home-service policy with the insurer, 
then notwithstanding any agreement to the 
contrary between the proposer and the insurer, 
any policy issued in pursuance of the proposal 
shall not be avoided by reason only of any 
incorrect or untrue statement contained in any 
such particulars so written or filled unless 
the incorrect or untrue statement was in fact 
made by the proposer to the agent or servant 
for the purposes of the proposal. 
This provision has not made any impact on the development 
of insurance law in Malaysia as it does not effectively 
change the law as represented by the Newsholme Brothers 
line of cases. The basic problem with this provision is 
its opening phrase - it refers to 'an agent or servant of 
the insurer' who fills in the proposal form while 
according to Newsholme Brothers an agent who does so is 
not the agent of the insurer but is the agent of the 
insured. This provision does not therefore prevent an 
insurer from raising the same defence as that raised in 
50. Act A294 of 1975. 
51. Defined in the First Schedule of the Insurance Act as 
'a life policy in respect of which premiums are 
contracted to be paid at intervals of less than two 
months and are or have been ordinarily collected 
in 
the course of door-to-door collection'. 
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Newsholme Brothers, ie. that as the agent was not 
authorised by the insurer to fill in the proposal form, 
in doing so he was not the insurer's agent but that of 
the insured. 
The problems posed by s. 18E were resolved by the 
introduction of s. 44A by the Insurance Amendment Act 
5 19792. This provision which applies to all branches of 
insurance was borrowed from the recommendations of the 
English Law Reform Commission53 which were made more than 
two decades earlier but have yet to become law in 
England. Section 44A reads: 
Knowledge and statement by authorised agent to 
be deemed knowledge and statement by insurer. 
(1) A person who has at any time been 
authorised as its agent by an insurer and who 
solicits and negotiates a contract of insurance 
in such a capacity shall in every such instance 
be deemed for the purpose of the formation of 
the contract to be the agent of the insurer and 
the knowledge of such person relating to any 
matter relevant to the acceptance of the risk 
by the insurer shall be deemed to be the 
knowledge of the insurer. 
(2) Any statement made or any act done by such 
person in his representative capacity shall be 
deemed, for the purpose of the formation of the 
contract, to be a statement made or act done by 
the insurer notwithstanding any contravention 
of section 16A or any other provision of this 
52. Act A465 of 1979. 
53. The Law Commission, Conditions and Exceptions 
in 
Tnsurance Policies, Cmnd. 62, HMSO, London 
1957, 
par a. 14. 
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Act by any such person. 
(3) This section shall not apply - (a) where there is collusion or connivance 
between such person and the proposer in the 
formation of the contract, or 
(b) where such person has ceased being its 
agent and the insurer has taken all reasonable 
steps to inform or bring to the knowledge of 
potential policyowners and the public in 
general the fact of such cessation. 
Section 44A solved the problems posed by s. 18E. While 
s. 18E refers to 'an agent or servant of the insurer', the 
opening phrase in s. 44A refers to 'any person who has at 
any time been authorised as its agent by an insurer' and 
deems such person to be the agent of the insurer for the 
purpose of the formation of the contract. Thus all an 
insured is required to prove under s. 44A is that the 
person he was dealing with has at any time been the agent 
of the insurer. 
Section 44A is much wider in its scope than s. 18E. Whilst 
the former applies exclusively to home-service policies, 
s. 44A is applicable across the board. Furthermore, while 
s. 18E deals with the specific act of the agent in filling 
in the proposal form, s. 44A covers the broad spectrum of 
time from the stage when the agent solicits and 
negotiates a contract of insurance, fills in the 
proposal form and completes the contract, ie. the entire 
pre-contract stage. However the inclusion of the stage 
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where the agent solicits and negotiates the contract in 
s. 44A does not seem to alter in any way the existing law 
in this respect. It is clear from the English case of 
Bawden v London, Edinburgh and Glasgow Insurance X0.54 
and from the Malaysian case of Mazzarol v United Oriental 
Insurance Co. Sdn. Bhd. 55 that even prior to the 
introduction of s. 44A, information acquired by the agent 
at the time when he solicits and negotiates a contract of 
insurance is deemed to be information acquired by the 
insurer, the agent being at such time the insurer's 
agent. 
While there is a 'no contracting out' clause in s. 18E, 
s. 44A is silent on this issue. However it seems clear 
from the nature of the provision that parties to an 
insurance contract cannot contract out of s. 44A. Being a 
'deeming' provision, s. 44A cannot be contracted out of 
even in the absence of an express prohibition to that 
effect. Furthermore the very reason for the introduction 
of this provision is the protection of the insured, the 
weaker of the two parties in an insurance contract. Such 
being the case, the principle enunciated in Johnson v 
54. Op. cit. footnote 21. 
55. Op. cit. footnote 18. 
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Moreton56 and endorsed by the Federal Court of Malaysia 
in SEA Housing Sdn. Bhd. v Lee Poh Choo57 ie. that in an 
Act where the weaker party is the subject of protection, 
even in the absence of specific language to that effect, 
the court will not allow contracting out unless it is in 
favour of the weaker party, will apply. 
Section 44A has also to a certain extent resolved the 
problem posed by the 'basis of contract' clause and the 
decision in Dawsons v Bonnin58. The reference to the 
knowledge of the agent 'relating to any matter relevant 
to the acceptance of the risk by the insurer' includes 
both cases of non-disclosure and breach of warranty. 
While non-disclosure relates only to material facts, 
according to the decision in Dawsons v Bonnin, the effect 
of the 'basis of contract' clause is to make every answer 
in the proposal form though immaterial, relevant. By 
referring to relevancy rather than materiality, s. 44A 
covers not just the agent's knowledge of material facts 
but also of other facts made relevant by the 'basis of 
contract' clause. 
Section 44A(2) places the responsibility for false, 
deceptive 
. or misleading statements 
made by the agents, 
56. [1978] 3 All ER 37. 
57. [1982] 2 MLJ 31. See further, Sinnadurai, V, (Ed. 
) 
Survey of Malaysian Law 1982, Malayan Law 
Journal 
Publishers, Kuala Lumpur 1983, pp. 289 - 391. 
58. [1922] AC 413. 
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upon the insurers. This indirectly imposes upon them an 
obligation to keep a vigilant eye on the activities of 
their agents and the methods employed by such agents in 
the marketing of insurance. To avoid being held 
responsible insurers must ensure that agents with a 
tendency to deceive or to mislead are quickly and 
effectively discharged from office. The emphasis placed 
by sub-section (3)(b) or\ the need for insurers to make 
public the cessation of a particular agency, reflects 
that in introducing this provision the legislature was 
also keen to ensure that insurers inform the public of 
the termination of an agency. 
A final issue for consideration in relation to s. 44A 
relates to its commencement. The Insurance Amendment Act 
of 1979 was gazetted in the same year and has since 
become law. The Act itself however does not give a date 
for that provision to come into force or give details as 
to how it should be implemented. The case of Mazzarol v 
United Oriental Assurance Sdn. Bhd. 
59 
was decided after 
1979 but neither the High Court nor the Federal Court 
mentioned s. 44A. Presumably this was because the facts in 
this case arose prior to 1979. Since then the Malaysian 
judiciary has yet to apply or acknowledge the existence 
of this important provision. Since s. 44A 
deals 
59. Op. cit. footnote 18. 
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essentially with the formation of a contract of 
insurance, it should be applied to all such contracts 
formed after the Amendment Act came into force, for it is 
a general rule in the interpretation of statutes that all 
statutes except those relating to evidence or procedure 
60 
are prima facie prospective. 
2.1.4 Granting Temporary cover 
The Insurance Act does not have any provision relating to 
the granting of temporary cover by agents. Under the 
common law, the authority of the agent to grant temporary 
cover does not depend merely upon the existence of real 
or express authority from the insurer to that effect. 
Circumstances may show that the agent has either 
ostensible or implied authority to grant such cover. This 
is so where the insurer gives to the agent blank cover 
notes for his use61 or where the insurer habitually 
adopts oral contracts providing temporary cover entered 
62 into by the agent on their behalf. 
In Chop Eng Thye Co. v Malaysia National Insurance Sdn. 
Bhd. 63, the insured claimed a sum of (M)$20,000 under a 
temporary protection note allegedly issued by the 
60. Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Ed., Vol. 44, 
Butterworths, London 1983, p. 570, para. 922. 
61. Mackie v European Assurance Society (1869) 
21 LT 102. 
62. Murfitt v Royal Insurance Co. (1922) 38 TLR 
334. 
63. [1977) 1 MLJ 161. 
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insurer. The insurer denied liability on the ground that 
the note had been issued by someone who had not been duly 
appointed as their agent and without their authority. 
The insurer's agent, S Co., as was allowed by the agency 
agreement, appointed the Associated General Corporation 
(AGC) as their sub-agent. AGC was in possession of the 
insurer's protection notes, and the protection note in 
this case was issued to the insured by Lee, an employee 
of AGC but was signed by AGC's manager. The insurer 
contended that the purported appointment of Lee by AGC 
was improper by virtue of the principle delegatus non 
potest delegare and as such the protection note issued by 
him was not binding on them. Ajaib Singh i disagreed and 
held the protection note to be valid. It was issued by 
Lee not as a 'sub' sub-agent but as an employee of AGC 
and the note was in fact signed by AGC's manager. 
2.1.5 Appointing Sub-Agents 
Whether an agent has the authority to delegate his 
functions to someone else or to appoint sub-agents 
depends primarily on whether this is allowed by the terms 
of his agency agreement with the insurer. Where the 
agreement itself is silent on this issue, an agent can 
only appoint a sub-agent if it is in the ordinary custom 
of the trade that sub-agents are appointed, otherwise 
such an appointment would be in conflict with 
the 
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principle delegatus non potest delegare. 
A sub-agent cannot appoint a 'sub' sub-agent, but he is 
free to employ people to work for him and to -make them 
handle, as his employees, work related to the said 
sub-agency. This is inevitably the case where the 
sub-agent is not an individual but a firm or a company. 
In Chop Eng Thye, the insurer's claim that the 
appointment of Lee by the sub-agent was in conflict of 
the principle delegatus non potest delegare was rejected 
by Ajaib Singh J: 
64 
[AGC] might not have been in a position to 
delegate their powers under the sub-agency to 
another person but I think the appointment of 
Lee as their insurance agent was not so much in 
conflict with the maxim delegatus non potest 
delegare as such but was rather an independent 
act by [AGC] of employing someone to work for 
them. It is not unusual for chief agents or 
sub-agents of insurance companies to employ 
people who are loosely termed as insurance 
agents to sell insurance policies and pay 
commission on policies sold by them. 
Once properly appointed, a sub-agent is deemed to be 
employed by, and acts under the control of, the agent. 
The sub-agent is therefore responsible to the agent while 
the agent is responsible to the insurer for the acts and 
omissions of the sub-agent. 
64. Ibid. at p. 164. 
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If the insured deals with a person who fraudulently acts 
as a sub-agent of the insurer, neither the agent nor the 
insurer, in the absence of holding out by either of them, 
is liable to the insured for the acts of the purported 
sub-agent. In Lee Cheng Oo v China Insurance Co. 65, the 
plaintiffs who were timber merchants bought a lorry from 
Orchard Motors through L, Orchard Motors' assistant 
manager. L who claimed that he was also a sub-agent of 
the defendant, offered to help the plaintiffs arrange 
insurance cover for the lorry. L arranged for such cover 
through C, the defendant's authorised agent. The 
plaintiffs paid the premium to L but it was not forwarded 
by L either to C or to the defendant. It was held that 
the defendant could effectively cancel the policy for 
non-payment of premium as payment to L did not amount to 
payment to them or their agent. 
2.1.6 Handling Premiums 
One of the function 
the collection of 
transmission to the 
the premium from 
function raises the 
insured discharges 
s commonly performed by an agent is 
premiums from the insured for 
insurer and occasionally, returning 
the insurer to the insured. This 
important question of whether an 
his obligation to pay the premium if 
65. (1962) 28 MLJ 297. 
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he pays it to the agent but the agent fails to forward it 
to the insurer. Conversely, if a premium has to be 
returned to the insured, has an insurer discharged such 
an obligation by merely returning it to the agent? 
Basically the answers to the above questions depend on 
whether the agent has the authority to handle the 
premiums. If the insured alle ges that he has paid the 
premium to an agent who has t he authority to receive it 
on behalf of the insurer, it is for the insure d to p rove 
it. Similarly if the insurer relies on the ag ent's lack 
of authority in denying liabi lity, then it is for the m to 
prove such la ck of authority. 
While the Insurance Act 1963 retains the basic common law 
principle, the onus of proving such authority has been 
altered. In relation to non-life policies, the Act 
provides that if any such payment is received by an agent 
or a broker on behalf of the insurer, receipt of the 
premium by such person shall be deemed to be receipt by 
the insurer. If the insurer alleges that the agent or 
broker is not authorised to receive such payments, the 
onus is upon them to prove such lack of authority66. 
Unlike the common law, under the Insurance Act, the agent 
is presumed to have the authority to receive premiums 
66. s. 14A(2). 
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on behalf of the insurer and it is for the insurer to 
prove otherwise. 
Once the premium is received by an agent on behalf of the 
insurer, he is required to deposit it with, or dispatch 
it by post to, the insurer within the prescribed time. 
Failure to do so is an offence under the Act7. 
6 
While payment of the premium to an agent is deemed to be 
payment to the insurer, when a premium has to be returned 
to the insured, payment to an agent does not amount to 
payment to the insured and so the insurer must return it 
68 to the insured . 
In relation to motor insurance, the provisions of the 
Insurance Act are supplemented by the Insurance 
(Assumption of Risks and Collection of Premiums) 
Regulations 1980 which provide that the premium for such 
insurance shall be deemed to have been received by the 
insurer if it is paid to an agent or a broker who is 
authorised by the insurer to accept the premium on its 
behalf, and a receipt for such premium has been issued69. 
While the Act places the onus of proving an agent's lack 
67. s. 14A(4). 
68. s. 14A(5). 
69. Regulation 4. 
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of authority upon the insurer, the Regulat 
an agent or a broker who is 'authorised by 
to accept such premium on its behalf. This 
on the part of the insured to ensure that 
broker through whom the premium is to be 
authority to receive it. 
ion refers to 
the insurer' 
implies a duty 
the agent or 
paid has the 
Whilst the relevant provisions of the Act applies to all 
non-life insurance, the 1980 Regulations refers 
exclusively to motor insurance. To what extent the 
provisions of the latter will override the former or vice 
versa remains to be seen as neither has been interpreted 
or applied by the courts. 
There are no parallel provisions in the Act in relation 
to the handling of premiums by agents in life insurance. 
This could be because of the potential difficulty of 
applying such a provision to a long-term policy. In 
non-life policies every renewal amounts to a new 
contract, so it is possible to postpone the commencement 
of cover until the premium is paid. This cannot be done 
with a life policy because the risk does not terminate at 
the end of each year even though the premium is paid 
annually or at other intervals. Such being the case 
there 
is also no reason to change the onus of proof 
in relation 
to the agent's authority to receive premiums. 
Payment of the premium by the insured to someone 
who is 
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not authorised to receive it does not amount to payment 
to the insurer. The authority to receive such premium 
must come from the insurer. No amount of representation 
or holding out by the purported agent or sub-agent can 
amount to a representation or holding out by the insurer 
that such a person has the authority to receive the 
70 
premium 
If an agent fails to transmit the premium which he has 
received from the insured to the insurer, the insurer is 
entitled to notify the insured of the agent's failure to 
do so. The agent cannot then sue the insurer for libel 
because the issue of such notice by the insurer to the 
71 insured is a qualified privilege between them. 
A del credere agent is liable to the insurer for the 
premiums on all the policies transacted by him 
irrespective of whether or not such premiums have been 
paid by the insured persons to him. In The Royal 
Insurance Group v David72, the appellant claimed a sum of 
(M)$1,981.72 from the respondent as their del credere 
agent. The amount was for premiums due in respect of 
policies issued through the respondent. The respondent 
70. Lee Cheng Oo v China Insurance Co., Op. cit. footnote 
65. 
71. Pacific and Orient Underwriters Sdn. Bhd. v Ong Tai 
Wah [1982] Malaysian CLJ 161. 
72. [1976] 1 MLJ 128. 
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denied that he was liable for the premiums as the insured 
persons had not paid them to him. It was held that as a 
del credere agent, he was liable even though the insured 
persons had not paid the premiums to him. 
2.1.7 Handling Notices of Loss/Claims 
All policies contain provisions requiring the insured to 
give notice of loss or of any possible claims under the 
policy to the insurer in a prescribed manner; either 
within a stipulated time or as soon as possible. If such 
a notice is given by the insured through the agent, its 
validity depends on a number of factors. 
If the agent has the authority to receive such notices on 
behalf of the insurer, then notice to an agent is notice 
validly given to the insurer. This is so even if the 
7 
agent fails to communicate such notice to the insurer3. 
If the agent is not authorised to receive such notice or 
if the policy itself stipulates that such notice must not 
be given through an agent, then notice to an agent 
is 
only valid as a notice to the insurer provided the agent 
in fact communicates the notice to the 
insurer. The 
insured therefore takes the risk of the notice not 
being 
73. Gale V Lewis (1846) QB 730. 
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conveyed to the insurer74. 
In Lee Seng Heng and Ors. V Guardian Assurance Co. 75, the 
plaintiffs sought to be indemnified by the defendants 
under a fire policy. One of the reasons given by the 
defendants in denying liability was that the plaintiffs 
had not given them a written notice as was required by 
the policy. The plaintiffs had in fact orally informed a 
clerk of the agent who had arranged the policy of the 
fire. They contended that this amounted to a sufficient 
notice to the insurer. It was held that at the time of 
the loss there was no valid policy because it had been 
previously effectively cancelled and so the question 
relating to the notice was of no relevance to the case. 
However the learned judge did consider the effect of such 
a notice if the policy had been in force at the time. 
According to him the policy clearly stipulated that the 
notice must be in writing. As the notice given to the 
agent's clerk was only a verbal notice, it was not as 
required by the policy. The learned judge then considered 
whether in the absence of a requirement that the notice 
be in writing, the notice to the agent's clerk was a 
valid notice to the insurer: 
76 
74. Shield v Scottish Assurance Corp. Ltd. (1889) 
16R 
(Ct. of Sess. ) 1014. 
75. (1932) 1 MLJ 17. 
76. Ibid. at p. 21, per Murrison CJ. 
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[N]otice to the clerk was notice to the agent. 
But that is not all. I t seems that even where 
notice to the agent is good, the assured takes 
the risk of the notice not being sent on (as 
was the c ase here) to the principal ... 
The clause in the policy seems to insist on 
notice to the company itself but I think Gale v 
Lewis ((1846) QB 730) is a sufficient authority 
for saying that notice to the agent who issued 
the policy is notice to the principal. But 
again as the notice was never communicated to 
the principal this cannot avail the plaintiffs 
anything in view of the overriding principle 
just quoted above, namely that where (as here) 
the notice of loss was never communicated to 
the principal, the risk lies upon the insured. 
With respect, it is difficult to follow the learned 
judge's line of reasoning. He seems to say that where the 
agent has the authority to receive the notice, notice to 
such agent is notice to the principal but the risk of the 
notice not being communicated to the principal is borne 
by the insured. While he correctly cited Gale v Lewis as 
authority for the fact that notice to an authorised agent 
is notice to the principal, he rather confusingly added 
to this the requirement that such notice must in fact be 
communicated by the agent to the principal. Notice to an 
authorised agent cannot be notice to the principal if it 
depends upon whether such a notice is in fact 
communicated by the agent to the principal. 
2.2 The Liability of Agents 
The existence of an agency relationship between 
the 
insurer and the agent does not always insulate 
the agent 
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from being made personally liable either to the insurer 
or to the insured or any other third party for his acts 
or omissions in the insurance transaction. 
Being generally the agent of the insurer, an insurance 
agent is expected to have and to exercise the skill and 
dil/igence that can reasonably be expected from a person 
in that position in the conduct of the insurer's 
business. While a mere error of judgement on his part in 
the exercise of his duties may not be sufficient to make 
him personally liable to the insurer, negligence, want of 
skill or misconduct will make him liable to compensate 
his principal for all losses which result directly from 
7 
such attributes7. 
In the absence of ratification by the insurer the agent 
is also personally responsible for any losses arising out 
of his unauthorised acts and an insurer can sue the agent 
for such losses78. Similarly an agent is liable for any 
fraud or misrepresentation committed by him in respect of 
matters which fall outside the scope of his authority79. 
An insured who has suffered losses because of the 
unauthorised acts of the agent can either sue the agent 
77. Contracts Act 1950, s. 165. 
78. s. 164. 
79. s. 191. 
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directly or make him a third party in an action against 
the insurer. In Tan Boon Heng V Oriental Fire and General 
Insurance Co. Ltd. 
80, 
the insurer sought a declaration 
that a policy issued by them to the appellant was void 
due to certain misstatements in the proposal form. The 
appellant alleged that if those facts were untrue, they 
were supplied by the insurer's agent who was aware that 
such facts were untrue. They applied for leave to issue a 
third party notice to the agent but this application was 
refused by the trial judge. On appeal the Federal Court 
granted leave. In the third party notice, the appellant 
claimed indemnity from the agent on the ground that he 
had failed in his duty to fill in the proposal form with 
the correct answers in that he, either knowing the 
correct answers or without inquiring the appellant about 
it, inserted incorrect answers which enabled the insurer 
to avoid the policy. As the issue in this case rested 
solely on whether a third party notice should be issued 
to the agent, no decision was made as to the agent's 
liability. The granting of the application to serve a 
third party notice to the agent is however an indication 
that the Federal Court recognised the possibility of the 
existence of a cause of action by the insured against the 
agent. 
80. [1968] 1 MLJ 270. 
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If the agent promises on behalf of the insurer to issue a 
policy but fails to do so, it is the insurer not the 
agent who can be sued for specific performance. In Coo an 
Chetty v Bain81, the defendant as agent of the 
Netherlands India Sea Insurance Company, contracted to 
issue the plaintiff with a policy upon certain goods 
which was to be shipped on board 'The Alert'. The 
plaintiff shipped the said goods on the faith of this 
contract. After the ship had sailed the defendant refused 
to issue a policy on the ground that the ship was not 
seaworthy when she left port and that the earlier promise 
was made with the implied warranty that it was seaworthy. 
It was held that an action for specific performance 
against the agent could not succeed because it was in his 
capacity as the insurer's agent that he entered the 
contract and so the suit should have been brought against 
the insurer. 
The liability of del credere agents to the insurer for 
premium on policies issued through them does not depend 
upon whether such premium has been paid by the insured to 
the agent. Provided that the sum involved is an 
ascertained sum (which is usually the case with 
premiums), the insurer is entitled to sue the agent 
directly for the amount due to them. There is no 
81. [1862] Leic. 170. 
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necessity for the insurer to sue the insured first. 
According to Gill LP in Royal Insurance Group V David: 
82 
[T]he obligation on the principal to sue the 
debtor first arises only when the amount 
claimed from a del credere agent is not an 
ascertained sum ... In the present case there 
was no dispute whatsoever as to the quantum of 
the premia claimed from the defendant... 
An agent who fraudulently deceives or misleads a person 
into entering a contract of insurance can be guilty of a 
criminal offence under s. 16A of the Insurance Act which 
reads: 
Any person who, by any statement, promise or 
forecast which he knows to be misleading, false 
or deceptive, or by any fraudulent concealment 
of a material fact, or by the reckless making 
(fraudulently or otherwise) of any statement, 
promise or forecast which is misleading, false 
or deceptive induces or attempts to induce 
another person to enter or to offer to enter 
into any contract of insurance with an insurer 
shall be guilty of an offence ... 
This provision which was introduced by the Insurance 
Amendment Act 197883 attempts to deal with some of the 
complaints that were prevalent against both insurance 
agents and brokers. By this provision the legislature has 
cast a very huge net to catch intermediaries who use 
questionable methods in selling policies. This provision 
82. Op. cit. footnote 72 at p. 129. 
83. Act A432 of 1978. 
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is extremely wide in its scope as it covers not merely 
the actual making of such statements, promises or 
forecasts which are knowingly or recklessly misleading, 
false or deceptive but also fraudulent concealment of 
material information by such intermediaries. Proof of 
actual inducement is not necessary; an attempt to induce 
is sufficient. Neither does it matter whether or not the 
person concerned ultimately enters into the contract. It 
is sufficient if such a person makes an offer to do so. 
3.0 Insurance Brokers 
The insurance broker is a unique class of agent. Prima 
facie he is the agent of the insured, but he normally 
receives his remuneration from the insurer from whom he 
obtains cover for his client. Furthermore while the 
broker is the agent of the insured in negotiating and 
procuring an insurance policy, he is not invariably the 
insured's agent in all matters pertaining to the policy. 
In practice he has certain legal obligations to the 
insurer and in certain circumstances may even be the 
agent of the insurer. 
3.1 The Broker's Authority 
3.1.1 Procuring an Insurance Policy 
In all matters pertaining to the placing of 
the 
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insurance, a broker is an agent 84 of the insured. The 
authority of the broker to procure a policy for the 
insured generally implies an authority to solicit, 
negotiate and, depending on the terms of the agency, 
sometimes even to enter into a contract of insurance on 
behalf of the insured. In procuring a policy therefore a 
broker is subject to all the restrictions and obligations 
arising from his agency relationship with the insured. He 
is under a duty to obey the insured's instructions and to 
carry out the transaction with due skill and care. 
3.1.2 Filling in the Proposal Form 
The general rule in Newsholme Brothers that a person who 
fills in the proposal form is the agent of the insured, 
applies to brokers as it does to agents. As such, if in 
filling in the proposal form the broker fails to exercise 
the care and skill expected of him resulting in the 
insured being left without insurance cover, the broker 
should, logically be liable to his principal. 
This however was not the view taken by the court in 
O'Connor v Kirby 
85. The respondent who had just bought a 
new car consulted his broker to arrange insurance cover. 
84. Anglo-African Merchants Ltd. V Ba le [1970] 
1 QB 311 
at p. 322 per Megaw J. 
85. [1972] 1 QB 90. 
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Inspite of being told by the respondent that he had no 
garage the broker wrote in the proposal form that the car 
would be kept in a garage. The respondent checked the 
proposal form before signing but failed to notice the 
mistake. When an accident occurred the insurer denied 
liability. The respondent sued the broker for breach of 
contract. He was awarded two thirds of the damages on the 
ground that he was contributorily negligent. The Court 
of Appeal allowed the broker's appeal on the ground that 
it was the respondent's duty to ensure that information 
given in the proposal form was correct. In failing to 
rectify the mistake, the respondent was the sole 
effective cause of the loss. 
The broker in the above case seems to have breached at 
least two basic duties which he owed to his principal, 
ie. the duty to obey instructions and the duty to use 
skill and care in carrying out such instructions86. The 
Court of Appeal however chose to put the insured's 
responsibility for a document which he has signed above 
all principles of agency. 
In Malaysia, whether the position of a broker who fills 
in the proposal form is affected by s. 44A seems to depend 
upon the relationship of the individual broker with the 
86. Birds p. 161, footnote 47. 
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insurer. The opening phrase to this section refers to 'a 
person who has at any time been authorised as its agent 
by an insurer'. Ordinarily an insurance broker is not 
authorised as its agent by the insurer and so the 
position of such a broker does not seem to be affected by 
s. 44A. However, under the common law, according to 
Stockton v Mason 
87 
, there can be instances where a broker 
acts as an agent for the insurer. Such a broker will 
certainly be 'a person who has at any time been 
authorised as its agent by the insurer' and will 
therefore fall within the scope of s. 44A. If such a 
broker fills in a proposal form, he is thus an agent of 
the insurer by virtue of this provision. 
Thus while an independent broker who fills in the 
proposal form for the insured does so as the insured's 
agent, a broker who has implied authority to act as an 
insurer's agent in certain circumstances, in filling the 
proposal form is by virtue of s. 44A, the insurer's agent. 
This line of distinction is also crucial vis-a-vis 
non-disclosure. As an independent broker remains 
throughout as the insured's agent, disclosure to him does 
not amount to disclosure to the insurer. If disclosure is 
made to a broker who has implied authority to act on the 
insurer's behalf, disclosure to the agent is disclosure 
87. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 430. 
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to the insurer. 
3.1.3 Granting Temporary Cover 
According to Lord Diplock in Stockton v Mason88, it is a 
principle of law that a broker in non-marine insurance 
has implied authority to issue on behalf of the insurer 
or enter into as agent for the insurer, contracts of 
interim insurance. The insured in this case had changed 
his Ford Anglia for an MG Sports. His wife informed the 
broker about this over the telephone and the broker 
replied, 'That's alright, we will see to that'. An 
accident occurred while the MG was driven by the 
insured's son. The insurer denied liability on the ground 
that cover for the MG did not cover driving by the son. 
At the Court of Appeal it was held that the insurer was 
bound by the temporary cover granted by the broker. 
The fact that the Court of Appeal implied the existence 
of such authority 'as a matter of law' and made no 
reference to any special facts in the case from which 
such authority could be implied, means that the principle 
as laid down by Lord Diplock is generally applicable. 
There may however be exceptional cases where such 
authority cannot be implied. In Stockton v Mason, 
the 
tripartite relationship between the particular 
insurer, 
88. Ibid. at p. 431. 
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insured and broker was already in existence prior to the 
telephone conversation. If a broker who had never 
transacted any business with a particular insurer 
promises his client to obtain a policy from that insurer, 
it would be unreasonable to hold that the broker had 
implied authority from that insurer to grant temporary 
cover on their behalf. 
3.1.4 Handling Premiums 
Payment of the premium to the broker is not ordinarily 
payment to the insurer unless as is usually the case, the 
broker has authority to collect the premiums on behalf of 
the insurer or unless there is a holding out by the 
insurer that the broker acts as their agent for such 
purpose. 
In Malaysia the provisions relating to the handling of 
89 
premiums by agents apply to brokers as well. 
3.2 Conflict of Interest 
Being generally in a fiduciary relationship with the 
insured, the broker owes several stringent duties to the 
insured. One of these is that he must not put himself in 
a position where there would be a conflict of interest. 
89. Supra. pp. 280 - 285. 
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While acting for the insured, the broker should not at 
the same time act for the insurer without the insured's 
express permission90. If he does so, the broker would be 
acting in breach of his duty to the insured who is his 
real principal. 
In North and South Trust v Berkeley 91 , the plaintiffs 
requested a Lloyd's broker to procure insurance for goods 
in transit. The broker placed the insurance with a 
syndicate of which the defendant was a member. When a 
claim was made under the policy the underwriters 
instructed the broker to obtain the assessor's report. 
The plaintiffStook action to force the broker to show 
them the report. It was held that the broker in acting on 
behalf of the insurer in obtaining the report had been in 
breach of his duty to the insured. The learned judge 
however rejected the insured's application for the report 
and upheld the seal of confidentiality between the broker 
and his second principal, the insurer. 
3.3 The Liability of Brokers 
If the broker's failure to exercise care and and skill in 
carrying out the insured's instructions results in losses 
90. Anglo-African Merchants Ltd. v Bayley 
Op. cit. footnote 84. 
91. [1971] 1 WLR 470. 
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to the insured, the insured can sue the broker for 
damages for breach of contract as well as for the tort of 
negligence. The broker may for instance be liable for 
breach of duty towards the insured if he advises the 
insured to insure with the wrong insurer. In Osman 
v Moss92, the insured was of Turkish origin whose ability 
to understand English was extremely limited. On the 
advice of his broker he procured a motor vehicle 
insurance from a company which was well known within the 
insurance industry to be financially unstable. When the 
company was subsequently wound-up, the broker wrote to 
the insured advising him to take up a new policy but the 
insured took no action. An accident occurred whilst the 
insured was without any effective cover. It was held that 
the broker was liable to the insured for breach of 
contract as well as in tort for the breach of a duty of 
9 
care3. 
Similarly if the insured is left 
because the broker had failed to 
information which had been given 
the broker may be liable to the 
Sutton & Co. 
94, the insured in 
without effective cover 
disclose to the insurer 
to him by the insured, 
insured. In Warren v 
structed his broker to 
92. [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 313. 
93. It is not clear from the decision how much weight 
was 
given by the court to the fact that the 
insured spoke 
little English and so could not have effectively 
responded to the letter. 
"" [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 276. 
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extend the cover of his motor vehicle policy to cover his 
friend who was driving to France with him. The broker 
failed to disclose to the insurer the friend's appalling 
driving records and criminal convictions. It was held by 
the Court of Appeal that in making the false 
representations to the insurer the broker had acted in 
breach of his duty towards the insured. 
If the broker is instructed to procure a particular type 
of policy but fails to do so resulting in his client 
being without cover, the broker will also be liable to 
the insurer. In Fraser v Furman Productions95, the 
defendant had asked their broker to effect an employer's 
liability policy but the broker failed to do so. Damages 
having been awarded in favour of an employee and against 
the defendant for negligence, the defendant claimed 
indemnity from the broker. It was held that the broker 
was liable inspite of their contention that even if they 
had carried out the instruction the insurer could have 
avoided liability because the defendant had been 
in 
breach of a condition precedent. According to the court, 
even though the policy if procured would have 
been a 
voidable one, the insurer might not have avoided 
it. 
95. [1967] 3 All ER 57. 
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The broker's liability to the insured for 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure must be considered 
at two levels, ie. misrepresentation and non-disclosure 
at the time when the broker fills in the proposal form 
and misrepresentation and non-disclosure at other times. 
Where the broker fills in the proposal form and in so 
doing fails to disclose or misrepresents a particular 
fact, then according to the decision in O'Connor 
v Kirby 
96, it is the insured's duty to ensure that the 
information given in the proposal form is correct. If the 
insured fails to do so, any non-disclosure or 
misrepresentation in the proposal form is his sole 
responsibility. If the misrepresentation or 
non-disclosure is made by the broker at any other stage 
in the course of procuring a policy, the broker may be 
liable to the insured if as a result of such 
misrepresentation or non-disclosure the insured is left 
without cover. In McNealy v Pennine Insurance Co. 
97, 
a 
property repairer who was also a part-time musician was 
advised by his broker to insure his car with the 
defendant company which offered attractive rates of 
premium. The defendant however would not insure certain 
categories of persons including 'whole or part-time 
musicians'. A claim under the policy was refused 
by the 
96. Op. cit. footnote 85. 
97. [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 18. 
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defendant on the ground that the insured had not 
disclosed the fact that he was a part-time musician. It 
was held by the Court of Appeal that it was the broker's 
duty to use all reasonable care to ensure that the 
insured was properly covered. The fact that the broker 
himself did not know that the insured was a part-time 
musician did not absolve him from blame as in not going 
through the categories of excluded persons with the 
insured, the broker had failed in his duty. 
In Malaysia, the provisions of s. 16A of the Insurance Act) 
which make it an offence for an intermediary to make 
misleading statements, promises or forecasts to induce 
others to enter into a contract of insurance is as 
applicable to brokers as it is to agents8. 
9 
While the broker can sue the insurer on behalf of the 
insured to enforce a contract of insurance, the insured 
cannot sue the broker for indemnity under the contract of 
insurance itself. In Chua Yew Phong v AS Yeo99, the 
defendant who was sued for professional negligence as a 
solicitor, served a third party notice on his broker 
alleging that they were liable for damages arising out of 
the professional negligence suit, under a professional 
98. Supra. pp. 291 - 292 
99. [1966) 2 MLJ 257. 
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indemnity policy procured through them. The broker 
applied to have their name struck off as they were not 
the underwriters of the policy, but merely a firm of 
brokers. In granting their application, MacIntyre J 
said: 
l 
The business of insurance brokers is to act as 
intermediaries between the insurance companies 
and the prospective policyholders. In effecting 
these contracts, the insurance brokers 
constitute themselves as agents of the 
policyholders and in that capacity may sue the 
underwriters of their clients to enforce a 
contract of indemnity; but that right to sue 
does not render them liable for indemnity under 
the contract with the underwriters. 
1. Ibid. at p. 258. 
a Arýý 303 
